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ADMIRALTY PROCEDURE AND JURISDICTION
AFTER THE 1966 UNIFICATION
David W. Robertson*

J.

INTRODUCTION

From the nation's beginning, the federal district courts have been
vested with jurisdiction in cases "of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction. "1 Like its predecessor statute, section 1333 of the present
Judicial Code asserts that the jurisdiction is "exclusive of the courts of
the states," but the infamous "saving clause" 2 goes on to negate that
exclusivity in the bulk of maritime cases by giving the plaintiff the
option of maintaining his action in any other court having jurisdiction
over it. In "saving clause" cases-that is, cases that could have been
brought in federal court under the admiralty jurisdiction, but which
were maintained, at plaintiff's option, in nonadmiralty tribunals-the
substantive federal maritime law continues to obtain, 3 although procedural consequences vary.
The operation of section 1333 would be typified in the case of a
shipyard employee, injured while working aboard a vessel. Such a
plaintiff could maintain a maritime tort action against the shipowner
in federal court, basing jurisdiction on section 1333. 4 If that choice
were made, trial would be to the judge alone, in accordance with
admiralty's well-entrenched nonjury tradition. 5 If the plaintiff wanted
* Professor of Law, University of Texas. B.A. 1960, LL.B. 1961, Louisiana
State University; LL.M. 1965, J.S.D. 1968, Yale University.-Ed.
-r The systematic research for this article was completed in mid-1975.
1. Judiciary Act of 1789, .ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 76-77: "[l1he district courts shall
have . . . exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction . . . ; saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common Jaw remedy,
where the common Jaw is competent to give it . . . ." The present version reads
as follows: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the
courts of the States, of . . . [a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction,
saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled .
. . ." 28 u.s.c. § 1333 (1970).
2. The wording of the saving clause was altered in 1948. Compare 28 U.S.C.
§ 1333 (1970), with Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 76-77. The meaning
was not changed. See Madruga v. Superior Ct., 346 U.S. 556, 560 n.12, 565-66
(1954).
3. See notes 316-35 infra and accompanying text.
4. The leading case on the extent of the admiralty jurisdiction over torts is Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972). Injury to a
ship's repairman aboard ship would be within the section 1333 jurisdiction both before and after Executive Jet.
5. See FED. R. Cxv. P. 38(e).
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a jury trial, he would have to exercise his saving clause option to
take the case either to state court or, if the diversity of citizenship and
amotmt in controversy requirements could be met, 6 to federal court
on that basis.
Many maritime cases present plaintiff with this choice of avenues
into federal court. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure recite in
clear terms how a plaintiff should manifest his choice. Rule 9(h)
states:
A pleading or count setting forth a claim for relief within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction that is also within the jurisdiction of
the district court on some other ground may contain a statement identifying the claim as an admiralty or maritime claim . . . . If the
claim is cognizable only in admiralty, it is an admiralty or maritime
claim . . . whether so identified or not . . . .7
Counsel for the plaintiff who can invoke federal court jurisdiction on
both maritime and diversity grounds should make the designation
permitted by rule 9(h) only if h~ is content with trial by a federal
judge alone. If he wants a federal jury, he should refrain from
making the rule 9(h) designation and should plead his case solely as
a diversity action.
All of this is almost insultingly simple and familiar ,to counsel
experienced in maritime litigation. Yet to some other lawyers it is
arcane. Illustrative is Romero v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation, 8 in
which counsel for an injured shipyard employee filed a complaint that
read: "Complainant alleges a cause of action based upon negligence
in accord with general maritime law and a second cause of action on
the grounds of unseaworthiness in accord with Rule 9(h) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 9 The complaint went on to allege diversity and amount in controversy. Finally, the prayer
read: "Wherefore, Complainant . . . demands judgment . . . general and equitable relief, and for [sic] a trial by jury." 1 ° Knowledgeable counsel would have avoided the internal inconsistency-of making
a 9(h) designation when a jury trial was desired. In such a case,
diversity should have been the only basis used to establish jurisdiction. Evidently unaware of the problem, plaintiff's counsel learned
that the case was on the nonjury docket only when he appeared to
select a jury. When the case was called, he requested a mistrial on
the ground that his client was entitled to a jury. The trial judge
6.
7.
8.
9.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
FED. R. CIV. P. 9{h).
515 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1975).
515 F.2d at 1251.
lO. 515 F.2d at 1251.
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denied the motion and, ultimately, rendered judgment for the defendant.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit disposed of the plaintiff's argument
that he was deprived of his seventh amendment rights:
Whatever the subjective intention of appellant's counsel, it is clear
that neither the district judge nor the defendants were given cause
to believe that Romero had ever withdrawn the reference to Rule 9
(h). . . . Romero could have obtained a jury trial on all claims
simply by omitting or withdrawing the 9(h) designation of his complaint and bringing his entire suit as ·a civil action. Yet, he persistently refused to seek an amendment aimed at withdrawing the admiralty identification. We can find no logical purpose for this refusal
in the face of his repeatedly professed desire for a jury.11

Prior to 1966, the kind of difficulty encountered by plaintiff in
Romero would have been less unexpected. In that year, however, the
admiralty procedural rules were merged with the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The purpose of this highly controversial unification
was to eliminate many of the mysteries of admiralty practice. 12 Yet
the rule 9(h) designation is only one of several unique and often
confusing admiralty procedures that has survived.
Before the 1966 unification, the district courts functioned under
one set of procedural rules when exercising admiralty jurisdiction and
under another when exercising federal question, diversity, or other
jurisdiction. Thus, it was customary and correct to visualize a bifurcated federal district court, having both an "admiralty side" and a
"civil" or "law side." The unification was designed to eradicate that
conceptual separation18 and thereby yield significant simplification
and increased accessibility. Prior to 1966, the admiralty courts had
11. 515 F.2d at 1253-54 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
12. See Wiswall, Admiralty: Procedural Unification in Retrospect and Prospect,
35 BROOKLYN L. REV. 36, 37 (1968).
13. The weight of opinion was that the 1966 unification ,of the admiralty rules
of procedure and civil rules destroyed the wall of separation. See, e.g., Bradley, Admiralty Aspects of the Civil Rules, 41 F.R.D. 257 (1966); Colby, Admiralty Unifi•
cation, 54 GEO. L.J. 1258 (1966); Crutcher, Imaginary Chair Removed from the
United States Courthouse; Or, What Have They Done to Admiralty?, 5 WILLAMETrE
L.J. 367, 374, 375 (1969); Currie, Unification of the Civil and Admiralty R11les:
Why and How, 17 MAINE L. REv. 1 (1965); Fiddler, The Admiralty Practice in
Montana and All That; A Critique of the Proposal To Abolish the General Admiralty Rules by Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and a Counterproposal, 11 MAINE L. REv. 15 (1965); Hecht & Davis, Unification of Admiralty
and Civil Rules, 1967 ABA SECT. !NS. NEG. & COMP. L. 222; Maris, Recent Changes
in the Federal Rules of Procedure, 42 F.R.D. 552 (1966); Wiswall, supra note 12.
Others were better prophets. See Cohn, The Seamless Web: Civil-Admiralty
Unification, 1967 ABA SECT. !Ns., NEG. & COMP. L. 228, 231; Tweedt, Will the Uni•
fication of the Civil a11d Admiralty Rules Be a Happy, Productive Marriage?, Id. at
233,237.
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been "veiled in mystical words, phrases, rules, and forms of practice
which no outsider could confidently penetrate. " 14 After 1966, the
"imaginary chair,"15 the "fiction of an independent admiralty jurisdiction,"16 would, presumably, vanish.
At the same time, it was thought necessary to preserve certain
specialized admiralty procedures that were deemed intrinsic to the
subject matter. Accordingly, Supplemental Rules A through F of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure make provision for what may be
called the essential peculiarities of admiralty practice: actions in
rem; maritime attachment and garnishment; possessory, petitory, and
partition actions; and actions for limitation of liability. Additionally,
the numbered rules preserve a peculiar form of third-party practice, 17
the nonjury tradition, 18 and admiralty's liberal venue doctrines. 111
Preservation of these special procedures reflects the current state
of admiralty jurisdiction more accurately than does the superficial
merger of admiralty and civil rules. The theory of the Rules draftsmen was that unificiation would eliminate any further talk of the
"admiralty side" and the "civil side" of the court. Furthermore, there
would be no occasion for using the terms "libellant," "libel," "responcJent," and "proctor."20 However, as this article will demonstrate,
those terms and the separatist concept that underlies them persist.
The outcome in the Romero case dramatically demonstrates the unwisdom of preserving as a specialist pra~tice a field that is formally
fully accessible to the generalist lawyer. The premise of this article
is that many special characteristics of the admiralty jurisdiction subsist wholly without justification and fall into the category of the oldfashioned "trap for the unwary." If, as has been claimed, "[t]he
entire thrust of modem law reform . . . has been away from the
mumbo-jumbo theory of law practice," 21 admiralty practice in many
respects stands well outside the mainstream. This article will document that claim and propose legislative correction. As a prologue
to these efforts, the next section will examine several recent and unsuccessful attempts at reform.
14. Crutcher, supra note 13, at 375.
15. Id. at 367.
16. Id. at 374.
17. FED. R. CIV. P. 14(c).
18. FED. R. CIV. P. 38(e).
19. FED. R. CIV. P. 82.
20. A "libellant" is a plaintiff, a "libel" is a complaint, a "respondent" is a defendant, and "proctors" are lawyers.
21. Zobel, Admiralty Jurisdiction, Unification, and the American Law Institute,
6 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 375, 398 (1969).
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THE AMERICAN LAW lNSTITUTE'S .ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION
PROPOSALS AND THE FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION ACTS

On March 14, 1969, the American Law Institute (ALI) published its Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and
Federal Courts, 22 which considered all aspects of federal jurisdiction.
Included among the proposals offered by the Institute were certain
modest suggestions for rationalizing admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. The conservative character of these recommendations was the
product of conscious deference to the mysteries of maritime practice.23
The prevailing attitude was epitomized by the Chief Reporter. "[W]e
[the Reporters] were not admiralty experts . . . . [P]artly because
of our inexpertness . . . , and partly because we think it's sound anyway, we thought that fooling around with language which had been
thoroughly construed by the courts, was thoroughly understood by
experts . . .-with which we do not classify ourselves-was a very
much safer and wiser course . . . ." 24 This deference had a significant impact on the Institute's work. Critics brought a number
of obvious and easily cured anomalies in the scope of admiralty
jurisdiction to the Institute's attention. Some corrections were proposed,25 but in an alarming number of instances the anomaly was re22. AMERICAN I.Aw INSTITUTE, Snmy OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BE·
TWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURT (1969) [hereinafter ALI STUDY].
23. The following comments are representative: "[W]ith respect to admiralty,
our major desire, really, was not to rock the boat . . • . [W]hat we really wanted
to do was to leave pretty much as it was the outlines of this jurisdiction." AMERICAN L.\W INSTITUTE, PROCEEDINGS, 45m ANNUAL MEETING 45 (1968) [hereinafter
PROCEEDINGS]. See id. at 45: "It was our objective . • • to make clearer as a matter
of statute what is already clear to those experts in the mysteries of admiralty but
not so clear to the run-of-the-mill, rank-and-file practitioner ••••"
24. Id. at 60, 64. The Institute's philosophy was that admiralty is for the cognoscenti: ''The gloss that time has created on the traditional words [of the grant
of admiralty jurisdiction] may be puzzling to the neophyte but it is well understood
by the specialized bar and experienced judges who try admiralty cases." ALI STUDY
230.
25. The Institute proposed six significant clarifications or alterations in admiralty
jurisdiction:
(1) Adding language making clear that "the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction does not include a claim merely because it arose on navigable waters." See
proposed section 1316(a), ALI STUDY 34, 231-34. Since this proposal was written, the Supreme Court has held that the mere fact of an injuzy or accident occurring on navigable waters is not sufficient, absent "a significant relationship
to traditional maritime activity," to invoke the admiralty jurisdiction. Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 268 (1972). The case
deals with aircraft crashes, but the "maritime relationship" requirement was
probably intended by the Court to apply more generally, and the lower courts
are generally construing it that way. See, e.g., Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d 520,
524 (5th Cir. 1973) (deer hunters in small boat on Mississippi River); Crosson
v. Vance, 484 F.2d 840, 842 (4th Cir. 1973) (water skier on tributazy of Chesapeake Bay). An exception is Richards 'V. Blake Builders Supply, Inc., 528 F.2d
745, 748-49 (4th Cir. 1975).
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tained. 26
Almost as influential as this exaggerated respect for admiralty's
complexity was the ALI's optimistic assumption that the 1966 unification of the admiralty rules with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure27 had cured a number of erstwhile problems. Acknowledging
that an admiralty court's lack of jurisdiction to grant equitable relief
had always been "quite senseless," 28 the Institute hopefully supposed
that "this unwise limitation was ended by the unification of civil and
admiralty procedure in 1966."29 Similarly, the traditional distinction
(2) Rewriting the saving clause to make explicit the-categories of exclusive admiralty jurisdiction. See proposed section 1316(b), ALI SnJDY 34, 234-39.
(3) Providing that actions under the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C.
§§ 761-768 (1970), may be maintained in nonadmiralty tribunals. See proposed
section 1316(b), ALI STUDY 34, 236-37.
(4) Providing that an exclusively admiralty action originally brought in state
court may be removed. See proposed section 1316(b), ALI STUDY 35, 244-45.
(5) Attempting to codify the rules of venue and process for admiralty actions.
See proposed section 1318, id. at 36, 245-49.
( 6) Granting a right to either party to a maritime personal injury or death case
to demand a jury trial in admiralty. See proposed section 1319, id. at 37, 25054.
26. For example, while acknowledging the lack of sense of holding that ship-repair contracts are maritime but ship-building contracts are not, the Institute declared
it to be "an anomaly of little practical significance, save as a matter of symmetry,
since so long as it is understood, as it is by those who build ships and those for whom
they are built, they are able to safeguard their interests." Id. at 228. Actually, a
wealth of anomalous doctrines respecting the admiralty's contract jurisdiction continue
to generate litigation that is highly frustrating to the courts. See, e.g., McCorkle v.
First Pa. Banking & Trust Co., 459 F.2d 243, 244, 251 (4th Cir. 1972); Kane v.
Motor Vessel Leda, 355 F. Supp. 796 (E.D. La. 1972); Hinkins S.S. Agency v.
Freighters, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 373 (N.D. Cal. 1972). Similarly, while there are
strong arguments that pleasure boating should be excluded from admiralty jurisdiction, the Institute felt that
it would be difficult to draft the jurisdictional statute in such a way as to exclude
pleasure boating, and [that] problems would arise in deciding what is a pleasure
boat and what the jurisdictional consequences are of a collision between a pleasure boat and a commercial vessel. In addition it seems that the major problems
here are not really jurisdictional but are matters of substantive law. Whether
a pleasure boat should be regarded as a "vessel" for purposes of the Limitation
of Liability Act, for example, is hardly the sort of question a jurisdictional study
can appropriately resolve.
ALI SnJoy 227-28. Further, while serious questions with respect to the boundaries
of the category of actions in rem over which admiralty jurisdiction is exclusive remain, "the natural obscurity that has existed for many years without doing any great
harm is being perpetuated. . . . [110 clear everything up . . . is not what was attempted here." PROCEEDINGS 66.
21. See notes 13-19 supra.
28. ALI STUDY 226.
29. Id. The argument that the 1966 merger cured the equitable remedies problem
uses the following reasoning:
A suit in admiralty is now, by force of Civil Rule 1, a "civil action." Rule 1.8
expressly allows joinder of as many claims as the party has, whether "legal,
equitable, or maritime." For certain purposes a suitor may continue to invoke
special admiralty procedures, but Rule 65, dealing with injunctions, is not one
of these exceptional rules, and is fully applicable in terms to all civil actions.
The concept of pendent jurisdiction, if necessary, is surely broad enough to permit a federal court . . • to give additional remedies for the same wrong, even
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between building and repairing ships was seen to be completely
anomalous, although it was no't considered overly important. In any
event, predicted the Institute, "since the unification of admiralty and
civil procedure, the doctrines of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction
will permit joinder or impleader in any case in w~ich the transaction
or occurrence involved gives rise to both maritime and non-maritime
claims."30
This article will demonstrate that the ALI erred in its appraisal
of the admiralty jurisdiction.31 The maritime specialists' claims
that admiralty procedure works well and that it is too delicate
and mysterious to be tampered with probably should have been
received with a bit more of the skepticism that is normally required
when a generalist approaches a specialist preserve. The thought has
been expressed, fairly unkindly, in a narrower context: "[I]t seems
likely that [the Reporters] have simply been bamboozled by the
antiquarian crustaceans of the admiralty bar, who maintain a monopoly of aqueous litigation by promulgating the myth that their subject
is arcane. "32
The Institute's recommendations contemplated congressional implementation, which has not eventuated. On May 14, 1971, Senator
Burdick introduced the "Federal Court Jurisdiction Act of 1971;"83
though there were no independent jurisdictional basis for the claim for the additional remedy . . . . Thus today there should be no difficulty in a federal court
giving equitable relief in a case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction.
Id. at 226-27. The assumption that the 1966 merger cured the equitable remedies
problem was also made in much of the commentary dealing with the merger. See
1 W. BARRON & A. HoLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 32 (Wright ed.
Cum. Supp. 1960); Colby, supra note 13, at 1268-70. The post-1966 cases do not
bear out the prediction. See text at notes 49-108 infra. The argument that the merger
could hardly have been expected to cure the problem is well put by Zobel, supra note
21, at 388-90.
30. ALI STUDY 228. Here again, the post-1966 cases do not bear out the prediction. Admiralty's ancillary and pendent jurisdiction may have been increased by the
1966 merger, but the extent and nature of the increase is far too uncertain and random to bear the weight the ALI study puts on it. See text at notes 108-230 infra.
31. One of the two published studies on the ALI's admiralty recommendations
is highly critical. See Zobel, supra note 21, at 398, 410-11. The other study, Currie,
The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute-Part II, 36 U. Cm. L, Rnv.
268, 286 (1969), is' mildly approving. A third treatment of the ALI recommendations does not deal with admiralty. See Comment, An Analysis of the ALi's Approach to the State-Federal Jurisdictional Dilemma, 21 .AM. U. L. REV. 287 (1972).
Professor Maraist treats the ALI study tangentially, in the course of arguing for exclusive state-court jurisdiction over what he calls "admiralty tort and compensation
cases," in Proposed Discipline for a Procedural Problem Child: Reallocation of Admiralty Tort and Compensation Jurisdiction Between Federal and State Courts, 24
U. MIAMI L. REV. 26 (1969).
32. Currie, supra note 31, at 303 (a remark directed specifically at the ALi's admiralty venue proposal).
33. S. 1876, 92d Cong., 1st ~ss. (1971).
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whose admiralty features were a verbatim reproduction of the ALi's
recommendations. 34 During hearings on the bill,35 the maritime bar
became officially involved with the proposals for ,the first time. 36 The
Maritime Law Association forcefully and unambiguously stated its
opposition to any change37 and thus rejected as unnecessary and
probably dangerous even the minimal clarifications recommended by
the ALI. 38 The major "proposal-provision of a jury trial at the
behest of either party in admiralty personal injury and death
cases89-was denounced as downright frightening. 40 The "Federal
34. Compare ALI SnJDy 34-37, with §§ 1316-1319 of S. 1876, supra note 33.
35. See Hearings on S. 1876 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d sess., pt. 2, at 635703 (1972) [hereinafter 1972 Hearings].
36. "The Maritime Law Association of the United States is a 73 year old organization whose nearly 2,000 active members represent, for all intents and purposes,
the entire admiralty bar in this country." Statement to the Senate Subcommittee by
Herbert M. Lord, then Chairman of the Committee on Maritime Legislation of the
Maritime Law Association (MLA) of the United States, 1972 Hearings 666. His
statement may be a slight exaggeration-I am told that attorneys who frequently represent maritime plaintiffs do not inevitably join the Association. Evidently the Maritime Law Association had been invited to participate in the ALI Study but did not
respond. See id. at 685, 686.
37. But see remarks of David Owen, for the MLA: "One thing I would like to
make plain, and that is the admiralty bar generally and the Association in particular
are not against change as such." Id. at 686.
38. See id. at 640, 662, 668-71, 672, 687-90.
39. See proposed section 1319, ALI SruoY 37, 250-54. The proposal appeared
in S. 1876, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1319 (1971).
40. Section 1319 not only grants a jury trial in a personal injury and death
case in admiralty, but by excluding only actions for limitation of liability and
actions against the United States and its agencies, it might be construed as providing for a jury trial in all cases of diversity jurisdiction. Some of our members
are fearful that as previously worded, it might even permit the trial by jury of
collision cases.
1972 Hearings 668.
[T]he fears that some of the members of our association have, namely, you are
going to have jury trials in collision cases, in charter parties, cargo damage .
. . . [I]n some collisions you are going to have a jury trial and in some you
are not. Right now you do not have jury trial in collision cases at all . . . •
[Y]ou cannot get it now. You cannot go into Federal court on diversity juris- diction and get a jury trial in a collision case. Under the proposal you can.
Id. at 690. But see Puget Sound Nav. Co. v. Nelson, 41 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1930)
(jury trial in diversity collision case); Intagliata v. Shipowners & Merchants Towboat
Co., 26 Cal. 2d 365, 159 P.2d 1 (1945) (collision case tried to jury in state court).
Admittedly, jury trials in collision cases are rare. The probable reason is that in
1893 the Supreme Court in Belden v. Chase, 150 U.S. 674 (1893), affirmed a state
court's application of the doctrine of contributory negligence in a collision case. Presumably plaintiffs do not bring collision cases in diversity actions since the application
of the contributory negligence doctrine could act as a bar to recovery. While the
application of the contributory negligence theory is completely out of line with the
modern judicial posture on choice of law in maritime cases, see D. ROBERTSON, ADMIRALTY AND FEDERALISM 194-202 (1970), the decision has never been explicitly repudiated by the Court. Accordingly, experienced maritime counsel may avoid nonadmiralty tribunals out of respect for that threat.
For further objections offered by the MLA to the jury trial provision, see 1972
Hearings 687-90.
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Court Jurisdiction Act of 1973"41 reflected certain changes generated
by the hearings, 42 but it remained closely modelled upon the ALI
proposals. This bill died in the Senate Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery. Some of the ALI's recommendations
may be reintroduced in 1976 as part of a broad-ranging court reform
proposal, but the immediate prospects for a legislative response to the
problems of admiralty jurisdiction are bleak. 43
In any case, neither of the federal court jurisdiction acts spoke
directly to the central issues of civil/ admiralty separatism. The reform proposed here will be considered drastic: Admiralty ought to be
abolished as a separate grant of federal jurisdiction that is formally
coequal with the diversity and federal question grants. It should
instead be made a subcategory of federal question jurisdiction. Very
early in the ALI's deliberations there was "some demand" 44 for just
such a change, but the idea was not acted upon. Nowhere in the
published reports of the ALI's project is there any explanation of the
source of the "demand" or of the reasons for not attempting to meet
it. 45 The ALI Study simply raises the possibility, points out that
"much can be said for it," 46 demonstrates that it would be rather easy
to accomplish, and then concludes that "it seems preferable" to leave
matters as they are. 47
Despite the ALI position, the idea should be pursued as a potential remedy for the vestiges of civil/admiralty separatism that have
41. S. 1876, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973 ).
42. The basic grant of jurisdiction in section 1316(a) was substantially broadened
by adding language extending admiralty jurisdiction to: claims for declaratory and
equitable relief and interpleader; all claims arising out of the affairs of vessels of
300-plus gross tons; broad ancillary and pendent jurisdiction; aircraft crashes beyond
a marine league. See S. 1876, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 1316(a) (1973). The attempted reformulation of the line between exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction, the
new saving clause, was insignificantly reworded. Id. § 1316(b). The venue proposal
was broadened to include a district where a state court would have jurisdiction over
the defendant. Id. § 1318(a)(3). Language was added seeking to make clear thal
the broadening of process and venue is not meant to affect the remedy of maritime
attachment. Id. § 1318(b)(1). A provision was added validating service or attachment in a district adjoining the one where the action is brought, where such arrest
or attachment is made on a body of water that forms or includes the boundary between the two districts. Id. § 1318(b)(2).
43. For a recommendation that the Federal Court Jurisdiction Act of 1973 be
resurrected and altered, see text at notes 379-405 infra.
44. See testimony of Leavenworth Colby, the ALi's admiralty adviser, who presented the legislation to the Senate Subcommittee, 1972 Hearings 637.
45. The matter is not mentioned in AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PROCEEDINGS
45m ANNUAL MEETING (1968). Nor is it explained in AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 6 (1968). I am informed by Professor Charles Alan Wright,
who served as Reporter, that the suggestion originated with Leavenworth Colby. Mr.
Colby's purpose seems to have been full civil-admiralty unification.
46, ALI STUDY 225.
41. Id. at 225-26.
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survived the 1966 unification of the admiralty rules with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. The remainder of this article is devoted to
examining the tenacity of civil/ admiralty separatism in the federal
courts (sectio~ Ill) and to detailing a proposal that attacks this
separatism by integrating the admiralty jurisdiction into the federal
question jurisdiction (section IV).
ill.

THE FAILURE

OF THE 1966 UNIFICATION OF THE
.ADMIRALTY AND CIVIL RULES

This section will discuss many of the cases that have followed the
1966 unification of civil and admiralty rules; these cases demonstrate
the tenacity of the civil/ admiralty conception and the confusion it
often causes. In this discussion, the terminology employed will reflect current thinking regarding the nature of maritime cases. 48 Thus,
"suit in admiralty" is sometimes preferred to the more cumbersome
"claim identified as an admiralty or maritime claim pursuant to Rule
9(h)," although the latter formulation has been the technically correct one since the merger. Similarly, "admiralty court," "admiralty
side," or "court sitting in admiralty" have frequently been used,
rather than the technically correct "United States District Court exercising its admiralty or maritime jurisdiction."

A.

Admiralty's Equity Powers

In its 1969 recommendations the American Law Institute made
no provision for equitable relief in courts of admiralty; the Institute
took the position that the 1966 unification had cured the problem of
admiralty's lack of equitable powers. 49 Like many other assessments
of the effects of the 1966 merger, this position has proved to be overly
optimistic. Some commentators have noted the continuing difficulty, 50 and a number of post-merger cases indicate that further action
is needed to remove the lingering doubts about the availability of equitable relief in admiralty.
The pre-1966 notion that admiralty lacked plenary equitable
48. Since the 1966 unification it is technically incorrect to speak of "admiralty,"
the "admiralty side," or of "sitting in admiralty." See notes 13-20 supra and accompanying text. However, as pointed out in G. GILMORE & L. BLACK, THE LAw OF
ADMIRALlY 19-20 (2d ed. 1975), it is efficient to employ the older terminology with
the implicit understanding that ''no case is any longer 'in admiralty' in the older
sense."
49. See notes 27-29 supra and accompanying text.
50. See Currie, supra note 31, at 286-87 & n.337; Zobel, supra note 21, at 38195; Comment, Admiralty Practice After Unification: Barnacles on the Procedural
Hull, 81 YALE L.J. 1154, 1157-63 (1972).
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power is totally lacking in sense. 51 The difficulty in correcting this
defect is that the matter was generally cast in jurisdictional terms;
hence, efforts to find a remedy in the unification can be met with the
familiar but potent argument that rules of procedure could not con"
ceivably have been proposed or interpreted as a cure for jurisdictional
limitations. The enabling statute52 and the rules themselves 63 make
clear that no attempt was being made to alter jurisdictional bounda"
ries. If admiralty lacked the equitable powers of its civil counterpart
because of considerations rooted in the jurisdictional statute, or in the
jurisdictional provisions of the Constitution, 54 then those limitations
subsist. 55 The prevailing view prior to unification was plainly that
the limitation was of jurisdictional stature. 56
The most thoughtful recent analysis of this question asserts that
the pre-1966 cases denying equitable power depended on a want of
jurisdiction over the underlying claim, and not on a want of jurisdic"
tion to grant relief. 57 That progressive view seems to have been
refuted by the two leading Supreme Court decisions on the subject of
equitable relief in admiralty. 58 Thus, the conventional wisdom is
51. For fun discussion of the genesis of the American limitations on the equity
powers of admiralty courts, see Morrison, The Remedial Powers of the Admiralty,
43 YALE L.J. 1 (1933). See also D. ROBERTSON, supra note 40, at 28-64, 104-22.
52. 28 u.s.c. § 2072 (1970).
53. See FED. R. CIV. P. 82.
54. It is not reany necessary to reach constitutional considerations in analyzing
this matter: "Since . . . Rule 82 forbids interpretation of the rules which would alter
the court's subject matter jurisdiction, one need not reach the constitutional question
in order to invalidate a rule interpretation on jurisdictional grounds. Conversely an
interpretation that is unobjectionable under Rule 82 is also necessarily permissible
under Article Ill." Comment, supra note 50, at 1159.
55. A very harsh critic of the American Law Institute's admiralty proposals has
offered the funest range of arguments that the 1966 unification could hardly have
been expected to cure the equitable remedies problem. See Zobel, supra note 21, at
384-94. The countervailing arguments are wen analyzed in Comment, supra note 50,
at 1157-63.
56. See Zobel, supra note 21.
57. See Comment, supra note 50, at 1159-61.
58. In Rea v. Steamer Eclipse, 135 U.S. 599 (1890), a half owner and creditors
libened the vessel to secure possession from the other half owner. A third party intervened, seeking specific performance of an alleged contract of sale. Deeming the
interests of both the co-libellants (creditors) and the intervenor "[merely] equitable,"
135 U.S. at 607, the Court stated:
So far as the creditors and interveners were concerned, if the former desired to
wind up the trust, or the latter to enforce an alleged contract of sale, which is
indeed what is asked by this intervention, they should have resorted to a different tribunal. While the court of admiralty exercises its jurisdiction upon equi•
table principles, it has not the characteristic powers of a court of equity. It cannot entertain a bill or libel for specific performance, or to correct a mistake;
or declare or enforce a trust or an equitable title; or exercise jurisdiction in mat•
ters of account merely; or decree the sale of a ship for an unpaid mortgage,
or declare her to be the property of the mortgagees and direct possession of her
to be given to them. The jurisdiction embraces an maritime contracts, torts, injuries or offenses, and it depends, in cases of contract, upon the nature of the
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rather clearly supportive of those post-1966 decisions that refuse to
find in unification a cure for the prior want of equity powers. The
courts that have been willing to find such a cure have generally acted
out of an abiding conviction that the limitation had always been
senseless enough to be rejected out of hand.
The Fifth Circuit is alone59 among the courts of appeals in having
contract, and is limited to contracts, claims and services purely maritime, and
touching rights and duties appertaining to commerce and navigation. There was
nothing maritime about the claims of the interveners, and the intervention was
properly dismissed for want of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
135 U.S. at 608 (citations omitted). Comment, supra note 50, views the pre-1966
jurisprudence as resting on the nonmaritime nature of the underlying subject matter,
and focuses on the above disposition of the Supreme Court as though it dealt only
with the intervenor's attempt to get specific enforcement of a contract of sale. The
trouble with that analysis is that the Court in the Eclipse appears to have been partially referring to the co-libellants, whose interests allegedly stemmed from an agreement dealing in part with the operation of the vessel. The context of the quoted
statement as well as its breadth and decisiveness seem to refute the suggested interpretation.
In Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, 339 U.S. 684
(1950), the lower court vacated a foreign attachment of a vessel on the theory that
the defendant in the in personam action was not the owner, and that the admiralty
court lacked jurisdiction to inquire whether the transfer of the vessel was fraudulent.
The disposition in the Supreme Court was favorable to the exercise of equitable
power in that instance, but Justice Frankfurter's opinion devastates the theory that
the general limitations on admiralty's equitable powers are nonjurisdictional:
Unquestionably a court of admiralty will not enforce an independent equitable
claim merely because it pertains to maritime property. The reasoning of the
District Court would be pertinent if the libellants, as creditors • • • , had gone
into admiralty by way of a creditor's bill to set aside a pretended sale of the
Caribe as a fraudulent transfer. But that is not the case before us. Libellants
went into admiralty on a claim arising upon a contract of affreightment supplemented by charges of negligence in the nondelivery of a sea cargo--matters
obviously within admiralty jurisdiction. As an incident to that claim, in order
to secure respondents' appearance and to insure the fruits of a decree in libellants' favor, they made an attachment. • • • The issue of fraud arises in connection with the attachment as a means of effectuating a claim incontestably in admiralty. To deny an admiralty court jurisdiction over this subsidiary or derivative issue in a litigation clearly maritime would require an absolute rule that admiralty is rigorously excluded from all contact with nonmaritime transactions
and from all equitable relief, even though such nonmaritime transactions come
into play, and such equitable relief is sought, in the course of admiralty's exercise
of its jurisdiction over a matter exclusively maritime. It would be strange indeed
thus to hobble a legal system that has been so responsive to the practicalities
of maritime commerce and so inventive in adapting its jurisdiction to the needs
of that commerce. . . . We find no restriction upon admiralty by chancery so
unrelenting as to bar the grant of any equitable relief even when that relief is
subsidiary to issues wholly within admiralty jurisdiction.
339 U.S. at 690-92 (citations omitted). Justice Frankfurter went on to adduce a
number of examples, putting the holding in perspective, and making clear the holding's dependency on the ancillary or derivative nature of the equitable issue in Swift
itself. Making it clear that the Court considered the want of affirmative equitable
powers to be a jurisdictional limitation, the opinion states: "[A]dmiralty is not
seized of jurisdiction to correct a fraud simply because it is a fraud; that's the business of equity. The basis of admiralty's power is to protect its jurisdiction from being
thwarted by a fraudulent transfer, and that applies equally whether it is concerned
with executing its judgment or authorizing an attachment to secure an independent
maritime claim." 339 U.S. at 694-95.
59. While the matter of declaratory and injunctive relief in admiralty under the
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made clear its view that unification removed any doubt about the
reach of admiralty's equity powers. In several cases, Judge Brown° 0
has written: "The Chancellor is no longer fixed to the woolsack. He may stride the quarterdeck of maritime jurisprudence and,
in the role of admiralty judge, dispense, as would his landlocked
brother, that which equity and good conscience impels." 61 Yet it is
in dicta rather than in the results achieved that the post-unification
decisions in the Fifth Circuit support -the argument that unification
cured the equity problem. Three of the decisions sustain the power
of a limitation court to enjoin proceedings collateral to the limitation
proceeding. 62 Under the prevailing view limitation courts have long
had this power. 63 Nevertheless, the leading case in this series 04
provisions of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-466(g) (1)
(1970), was involved in Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191
(1967), the Court did not discuss the question of their general availability in admiralty.
60. Judge Brown was referred to as "our leading admiralty authority" by Justice
Douglas in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 115 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
Similar praise was bestowed on him in Zobel, supra note 21, at 399 ("the most authoritative maritime analyst in all the federal judiciary").
61. Evidently Judge Brown coined this phrase in Compania Anonima Venezolana
de Nav. v. Perez Export Co., 303 ·F.2d 692, 699 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
942 (1962). The phrase is quoted or paraphrased in a number of his subsequent
opinions for the Fifth Circuit, including Law v. Sea Drilling Corp., 510 F.2d 242,
250 (5th Cir. 1975); Cates v. United States, 451 F.2d 411, 414 (5th Cir. 1971);
Florida Bahamas Lines, Ltd. v. Steel Barge "Star 800" of Nassau, 433 F.2d 1243,
1249 (5th Cir. 1970). It is also echoed in other Fifth Circuit opinions, see, e.g.,
Merrill-Stevens Dry Dock Co. v. M/V "Laissez Faire," 421 F.2d 430 (5th Cir.
1970); Olympic Towing Corp. v. Nebel Towing Co., 419 F.2d 230, 235 (5th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
The recent decision in Lewis v. S.S. Baune, 534 F.2d 115, 121 (5th Cir. 1976)
is either very heavy dictum or a holding that admiralty courts have the power to
issue injunctions.
62. See In re Unterweser Reederei, GMBH, 428 F.2d 888, 892 (5th Cir. 1970),
vacated on other grounds sub nom. M.S. Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Co., 407 U.S.
1 (1972); Olympic Towing Corp. v. Nebel Towing Co., 419 F.2d 230, 235 (5th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970) (dictum); Guillot v. Cenac Towing Co.,
366 F.2d 898, 904-05 (5th Cir. 1966).
63. FED. R. Crv. P. F(3 ), dealing with limitation procedure, states: "Upon compliance by the owner with the requirements of subdivision ( 1) of this rule all claims
and proceedings against the owner or his property with respect to the matter in question shall cease. On application of the plaintiff the court shall enjoin the further
prosecution of any action or proceeding against the plaintiff or his property with respect to any claim subject to limitation in the action." This provision reflects and
continues powers of the pre-merger limitation court.
64. In Guillot v. Cenac Towing Co., 366 F.2d 898, 904 (5th Cir. 1966), Judge
Brown stated:
The Court to whom virtually exclusive responsibility is committed for the operation of this [limitation] machinery has ample resources to assure, as appro.priate, that such Court retains exclusive control and power over competing claimants. And in this day, which, to the dismay of some, and the disappointment
of many others who see the esoteric trappings of their specialized calling foundering from the forces of integrated rules, it would be odd indeed if the same
person sitting as the same Judge were powerless tQ act because of the abbrevi-
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is cited by the ALI Study in support of the statement that "today
there should be no difficulty in a federal court giving equitable relief
in a case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction." 65
Other Fifth Circuit decisions that might be cited in support of the
argument that unification cured the equity limitation are similarly
narrow in their holdings. Under these cases, an admiralty court
can distribute among nonlienholder claimants the post-lien-payoff
proceeds of sale of a vessel, 66 exercise "equitable latitude" in declining to enforce a seaman's release against one not mentioned in
it, 67 render appropriate orders respecting the provision or acceptance
of security pending litigation, 68 treat a multi-claim mortgage foreclosure proceeding as a concursus and admit as a putative lienholder an
advertising agency, 69 set aside or modify the judicial sale of a vessel on
grounds of fraud, 70 and arrange lien priorities according to equitable
principles. 71 Each of these exercises of powers would probably have
been sustained prior to unification as derivative or subsidiary to the
main proceeding, 72 but there is some powerful and expansive language in certain cases: "In many respects Israel's commencing a
mortgage foreclosure invited a concursus in which at this day and
time the disposition will be to let the Chancellor stride the quarterated, and now nearly obsolete, prefix to a cause number. In the Admiralty the
Chancellor now goes to sea and has adequate equitable reserves.
This language is relied upon by Wiswall, supra note 12, at 37, in support of the claim
that the 1966 merger was motivated partially by a desire for "liturgical reform." A
similar statement by Judge Brown appears in Cates v. United States, 451 F.2d 411,
412 (5th Cir. 1971): ' 11n an appeal which for the most part ignores the distinctive
role of this Court as though the balmy pre-McAllister days of reconsideration of admiralty cases de novo were still the birthright of proctors who have also lost their
titles . . .." That even language reform is difficult to come by is indicated by continued references to "libellants," "respondents," and "proctors." See, e.g., Jack Neilson, Inc. v. Tug Peggy, 428 F.2d 54, 56 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955
(1970); Flaska v. Little River Marine Constr. Co., 389 F.2d 885 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 392 U.S. 928 (1968).
65. ALI STUDY 227.
'66. Veverica v. Drill Barge Buccaneer No. 7, 488 F.2d 880, 885 (5th Cir. 1974).
67. Cates v. United States, 451 F.2d 411,415 (5th Cir. 1971).
68. Keystone Shipping Co. v. S.S. Monfiore, 409 F.2d 1345, 1346 (5th Cir.
1969).
69. Stem, Hays & Lang, Inc. v. M/V Nili, 407 F.2d 549, 551 (5th Cir. 1969).
This case is cited in Landers, By Sleight of Rule: Admiralty Unification and Ancillary and Pendent Jurisdiction, 51 TEXAS L. REv. 50, 75 (1972), as supporting the
general proposition that, much to the author's surprise and apparently to his mild
regret, unification appeared to have disposed of at least some of the prior jurisdictional limits upon admiralty.
70. Merrill-Stevens Dry Dock Co. v. M/V "Laissez Faire", 421 F.2d 430, 432
(5th Cir. 1970).
71. Florida Bahamas Lines, Ltd. v. Steel Barge "Star 800" of Nassau, 433 F.2d
1243, 1249-52 (5th Cir. 1970).
72. See Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, 339 U.S. 684
(1950), discussed in note 58 supra.
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deck to transport into the Admiralty all of the Court's equity powers."78
At least one district judge in the Fifth Circuit evidently remains
unimpressed. In Nyon Technical Commercial, Inc. v. Equitable
Equipment Co. 74 defendant's counterclaim included a plea for injunctive relief 75 against a tort concededly maritime. 76 In denying
the request, the court reasoned as follows: ( 1) "The traditional
rule in admiralty has been that there is no power to grant equitable relief in a direct proceeding for that purpose."77 (2) "The
injunctive relief sought here by Equipment is not a subsidiary or
derivative issue." 78 (3) The claim for injunctive relief may not
be heard as pendent to the main claim. 70 (4) The 1966 merger
of the civil and admiralty rules liberalized the use of counter-claims
in admiralty, but it did not "create new substantive admiralty causes
of action."80 The court concluded ,that despite any suggestions
generated by ·the merger, the Supreme Court must speak authoritatively before injunctive relief will become available in admiralty. 81
Outside the Fifth Circuit there appear to be only two post-1966
admiralty decisions that are at all favorable to claims for equitable
relief. In one of them, Seaboard Shipping Corp. v. Jocharanne Tugboat Corp., the Second Circuit concluded that it might be within
admiralty's equitable power to order a portion of the costs of salvag73. Stern, Hays & Lang, Inc. v. M/V Nili, 407 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1969) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). See Cates v. United States, 451 F.2d 411, 414 (5th
Cir. 1971), quoting Compania Anonima Venezolana de Nav. v. Perez Export Co.,
303 F.2d 692, 699 (5th Cir. 1962); Keystone Shipping Co. v. S.S. Monfiore, 409
F.2d 1345, 1346 (5th Cir. 1969).
74. 341 F. Supp. 777 (E.D. La. 1972).
75. Plaintiff's vessel burned at defendant's wharf. Plaintiff sought damages for
the fire, and defendant counterclaimed, seeking damages for loss of wharf space and
an injunction compelling plaintiff to remove the wreck.
76. ''The cause of action which gives rise to the circumstances which are sought
to be remedied by injunctive relief, that is, the claim that Nyon's vessel is trespassing
on Equipment's wharf, is a maritime tort." 341 F. Supp. at 778.
77. 341 F. Supp. at 779.
78. 341 F. Supp. at 779. See Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana
Del Caribe, 339 U.S. 684 (1950), discussed in note 58 supra.
79. 341 F. Supp. at 779-80. This aspect of Nyon is discussed in the text at notes
129-40 infra,
80. 341 F. Supp. at 781.
81. 341 F. Supp, at 781. The court also stated that injunctive relief should be
denied on the merits. Compare Amerind Shipping Corp. v. Jordan Intl. Co., 314
F. Supp. 1324 (E.D. La. 1970), where the district court, relying on Judge Brown's
"Woolsack" quotation, found that irrespective of whether a claim by a port agent for
reimbursement of wharfage charges paid lay in subrogation, which may be equity,
or in quasi-contract, which had been rendered doubtful in admiralty by the same
kinds of considerations that had generated the equity doubt, there was power to hear
it. 314 F. Supp. at 1325-26. See text at note 61 supra. See also Kane v. Motor
Vessel Leda, 355 F. Supp. 796, 801 (E.D. La. 1972).
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ing a stranded vessel to be paid by an insurer who benefited from
the services, although the court did not refer to unification. 82 Much
more positively, Judge Wyzanski in McKie Lighter Company v. City
of Boston83 expressed the view that withholding from admiralty the
power to enjoin a maritime tort never had made sense; he relied
most heavily on unification to support his strong assertion that, in any
event, admiralty now possesses this power. 84 But the McKie statement was dictum in two senses: The injunctive relief sought85 was
denied on the merits, and Judge Wyzanski chose to rely on federal
question jurisdiction86 as well as on admiralty jurisdiction.87
There are several decisions in the Second and Ninth Circuits that
go against the argument that admiralty now has a full equity arsenal.
In New York State Waterways Association v. Diamond, 88 the Second
Circuit assumed that admiralty lacks the power to grant an injunction
but speculated that the plaintiff in that case might obtain one from a
three-judge court under federal question jurisdiction. Without any
mention of the 1966 merger, the court stated that while the proscription against admiralty's granting equitable relief "has undergone increasing erosion in recent years ... we still think it fair to say that the
power of an admiralty court to grant injunctive relief remains severely
circumscribed.,,89 In Beverly Hills National Bank and Trust Co. v.
Compania de Navegacione Almirante S.A., Panama, 90 the Ninth
Circuit assumed that pre-unification91 Supreme Court decisions 92
fully controlled the availability of equitable relief in admiralty. It
thus held that the trial court93 had erred in hearing a constructive
82. 461 F.2d S00, SOS (2d Cir. 1972)' (relief denied on other grounds).
83. 33S F. Supp. 663 (D. Mass. 1971).
84. 33S F. Supp. at 666-67.
8S. A tug owner wanted the City of Boston to open a swing bridge regularly so
he could reach his berth.
86. Federal question jurisdiction was present under statutes dealing explicitly with
bridges over navigable water. See 33S F. Supp. at 666.
87. 33S F. Supp. at 666. In another district court decision, the court expressed
grave doubt about the merger's effects on the availability of injunctive relief in admiralty, ultimately denying the relief sought on other grounds. See Thyssen Steel
Corp. v. Federal Commerce & Nav. Co., 274 F. Supp. 18, 20 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
In Carroll v. Protection Maritime Ins. Co., 512 F.2d 4, 9 (1st Cir. 197S), the
First Circuit recently stated: "[B]ecause of the historic unavailability of equitable
relief in admiralty, the plaintiffs' prayer for injunctive relief cannot be granted . • . ."
88. 469 F.2d 419 (2d Cir. 1972).
89. 469 F.2d at 421 n.2.
90. 437 F.2d 301 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 996 (1971).
91. The 1966 unification was not mentioned with regard to the availability of
equitable relief. On the subject of pendent jurisdiction, there were OQlique references
to unification. See 437 F.2d at 306 n.7.
92. See Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, 339 U.S. 684
(19S0), discussed in note 58 supra.
93. See Compania de Nav. Almirante S.A., Panama v. Certain Proceeds of Cargo,
288 F. Supp. 77 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
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trust94 claim in admiralty. 95 The appellate court concluded that
there was authority to hear the claim, not as a matter of equity in
admiralty, but rather in the exercise of the court'~ pendent jurisdiction. 96
Thus, the post-unification case law does not lend significant support to the ALI view that unification cured the equity problem. 07
The most significant decisions are those that deal with the power of
94. The equitable nature of a constructive trust claim, correctly assumed throughout the opinion in Beverly Hills Bank, was relied upon by the court in concluding
that hearing the claim as a matter of pendent jurisdiction presented no jury trial problems. See text at notes 195-96 infra.
95. The Ninth Circuit held that the constructive trust claim was not incidental
or derivative in the sense of the Swift case. See 437 F.2d at 305.
96. See notes 178-96 infra and accompanying text for discussion of this aspect
of Beverly Hills Bank.
97. Courts in holdings and dicta have enumerated the powers of the admiralty
court to be the following:
(1) to enjoin actions collateral to limitation proceedings that arise out of the
same subject matter. In re Unterweser Reederei, GMBH, 428 F.2d 888, 892
(5th Cir. 1970), vacated on other grounds sub nom. M.S. Bremen v. Zapata
Offshore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); Olympic Towing Corp. v. Nobel Towing Co.,
419 F.2d 230, 235 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970); Guillot
v. Cenac Towing Co., 366 F.2d 898, 904-05 (5th Cir. 1966).
(2) to "reform" a seaman's release. Cates v. United States, 451 F.2d 411, 415
(5th Cir. 1971).
(3) to deem a mortgage foreclosure proceeding a concursus and admit a putative lienbolder. Stern, Hays & Lang, Inc. v. M/V Nili, 407 F.2d 549, 551 (5th
Cir. 1969).
( 4) to render appropriate orders respecting security pending litigation. Keystone Shipping Co. v. S.S. Monfiore, 409 F.2d 1345, 1346 (5th Cir. 1969).
(5) to distribute the post-lienholder-payoff surplus of the sale of a vessel to
nonlien claimants. Veverica v. Drill Barge Buccaneer No. 7, 488 F.2d 880, 885
(5th Cir. 1974).
(6) to apply quasi-contract or equitable subrogation principles to a port agent's
claim for reimbursement of wbarfage expenses. Amerind Shipping Corp. v. Jordan Intl. Co., 314 F. Supp. 1324, 1326 (E.D. La. 1970).
(7) to arrange lien priorities according to equitable principles. Florida Bahamas Lines, Ltd. v. Steel Barge "Star 800" of Nassau, 433 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir.
1970).
(8) to set aside or modify the judicial sale of a vessel on grounds of fraud,
Merrill-Stevens Dry Dock Co. v. M/V "Laissez Faire", 421 F.2d 430, 432 (5th
Cir. 1970).
(9) to decree equitable contribution or restitution of salvage expenses among
insurers. Seaboard Shipping Corp. v. Jocharanne Tugboat Corp., 461 F.2d 500,
505 (2d Cir. 1972).
(10) to enjoin a swing bridge from blocking plaintiff's tug from access to its
berth. McKie Lighter Co. v. City of Boston, 335 F. Supp. 663, 666-67 (D.
Mass. 1971).
All but the last two of the enumerated decisions were in the Fifth Circuit.
On the other band, there were holdings or statements that admiralty lacks power:
(11) to enjoin the commission of a maritime tort. New York State Waterways
Assn. v. Diamond, 469 F.2d 419, 421 (2d Cir. 1972); Nyon Technical Commercial, Inc. v. Equitable Equip. Co., 341 F. Supp. 777 (E.D. La. 1972). But see
Thyssen Steel Corp. v. Federal Commerce & Nav. Co., 274 F. Supp. 18, 20 n.3
(S.D.N.Y. 1967).
(12) to hear a constructive trust claim. Beverly Hills Natl. Bank & Trust Co.
v. Compania de Nav. Almirante, 437 F.2d 301 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S.
996 (1971).
(13) to specifically enforce a charter party. See Commercial Metals Co. v. International Union Maritime Corp., 294 F. Supp. 570, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).

August 19761

Admiralty Procedure and Jurisdiction

1645

admiralty to grant injunctive relief. With the exception of the Fifth
Circuit limitation of liability cases98 and Judge Wyzanski's strong
dictum in McKie Lighter Company v. City of Boston, 99 ·the jurisprudence is unfavorable. One district judge expressed doubt about the
effects of the merger on admiralty's injunctive powers;100 another
district judge101 and the Second Circuit102 were certain that admiralty
still lacks general equitable power. 108
As indicated in some of the commentary,1° 4 it would be easy
enough to cure this matter by statute,105 and such legislation has
indeed been proposed.106 Thus, there is hope that the problem will
eventually disappear, whether or not the rest of the suggestions
outlined below are followed. 107 The major recommendation of this
article, to remove admiralty's separate statutory basis and make it a
subcategory of federal question jurisdiction, would cure the equitable powers problem, along with several others.
B.

Ancillary and Pendent Jurisdiction in Admiralty108

Nobody seems to be completely certain how to differentiate be98. See note 97 supra. But see note 61 supra.
99. 335 F. Supp. 663, 666-67 (D. Mass. 1971).
100. See Thyssen Steel Corp. v. Federal Commerce & Nav. Co., 274 F. Supp. 18,
20 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
101. See Nyon Technical Commercial, Inc. v. Equitable Equip. Co., 341 F. Supp.
777 (E.D. La. 1972).
102. See New York State Waterways Assn. v. Diamond, 469 F.2d 419, 421 (2d
Cir. 1972).
103. In Insurance Co. of North America v. Langan Constr. Co., 327 F. Supp.
567, 568 (S.D. Ala. 1971), the court, without comment on the law in the matter,
said it "deems it unnecessary" to consider the injunction question raised in that maritime case.
104. See Comment, supra note 50, at 1163-64. After making the argument that
the pre-1966 limitations were not jurisdictional, and were certainly not based on constitutional limitations, the author proposed that S. 1876, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., §§
1316-1319 (1971)-the then-pending legislation echoing the ALI's jurisdictional recommendations-be amended by adding the following language: ''The district courts
of the United States, when hearing suits under the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, shall be empowered to order all appropriate remedies, whether formerly characterized as legal, equitable or maritime." Id. at 1163-64 n.49.
105. See notes 41-43 supra and accompanying text.
106. The issue of equitable remedies in admiralty was only cursorily treated in
the Hearings on S. 1876. Leavenworth Colby testified that the ALI did not consider
the matter "properly jurisdictional." 1972 Hearings 655. He also reiterated the ALI
view that the 1966 merger cured the problem. After the Hearings, I raised the matter of equitable remedies with subcommittee counsel, and language was added providing: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to amount
in controversy of all civil actions of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, including
those for interpleader, declaratory or equitable relief . . . ." S. 1876, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess., § 1316, May 23, 1973. There has been no further action. See notes 4143 supra and accompanying text.
107. See notes 379-405 infra and accompanying text
108. See Landers, supra note 69; Comment, Third-Party Practice in Admiralty,
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tween the terms "ancillary" and "pendent" in the context of federal
court jurisdiction. 109 The conventional distinction was evidently that
ancillary jurisdiction is the broader category-a nebulous class of
cases where the federal courts will exercise jurisdiction over matters,
including those involving new parties, which themselves lack an
independent federal jurisdicitional basis. Pendent jurisdiction, in this
view, is a definitely limited subcategory of ancillary jurisdiction,
reaching only those cases where a plaintiff will be permitted to join to
his main federal claim another claim, lacking an independent federal
jurisdictional basis, against the defendant. 110 Yet recent developments have suggested that something called pendent (or pendent
party) jurisdiction might also validate the joinder of nonfederal parties who are involved in claims arising out of the same nucleus of
operative facts as the federal claim. 111 This later development,
though quite controversial, is apparently thriving in some quarters. 112
Thus, in the instant context there is probably no reason for attempting to distinguish between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction. The
important issue is the degree to which either or both of these auxiliary
jurisdictional bases are available to federal courts exercising admiralty
jurisdiction.
One major premise of the ALI study was that unification would
greatly increase the availability of "ancillary and pendent jurisdiction. " 118 Prior to unification, the accepted view114 was that courts of
admiralty could not exercise pendent or ancillary jurisdiction. 116 With
28 Sw. L.J. 1021 (1974); Comment, lmpleader of Nonmaritime Claims Under Rule
14(c), 47 TExAs L. REV. 120 (1968); Note, Pendent Jurisdiction in Admiralty, 18
WAYNE L. REv. 1211 (1972); Comment, Pendent Jurisdiction in Admiralty, 1973
Wis. L. REv. 594; Comment, supra note 50, at 1164-80.
109. See, e.g., Landers, supra note 69, at 57 n.31; Comment, 28 Sw. L.J. 1021,
supra note 108, at 1026 n.49; Comment, Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction: Towards a Synthesis of Two Doctrines, 22 UCLA L. REV. 1263 (1975); Note, Rule
14 Claims and Ancillary Jurisdiction, 51 VA. L. REV, 265 (1971); Note, 18 WAYNE
L. REv. 1211, supra note 108; Comment, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 594, supra note 108,
at 599 n.34.
110. See 1 w. BARRON & A. HoLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 23,
at 97 (Wright ed. 1960); C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL CoURTS 65 (2d ed. 1970),
111. See Leather's Best, Inc, v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800, 809-11 (2d Cir,
1971); Astor-Honor, Inc. v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 441 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1971),
See generally Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 710-15 (1973).
112. The recent decision in Aldinger v. Howard, 44 U.S.L.W. 4988 (U.S. June
24, 1976), disapproves "pendant party" jurisdiction over a county with respect to a
claim brought under civil rights statutes (42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343
(3)). The Court expressly reserved the "subtle and complex" general question of
the availability of "pendant party" jurisdiction. See generally Comment, 22 UCLA
L REv. 1263, supra note 109, at 1277-87.
113. See notes 27-30 supra and accompanying text.
114. See Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800, 810 n.11 (2d
Cir, 1971).
115. What this article will call "Romero-pendent" jurisdiction is to be distin-
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the merger of the admiralty with the civil side of the federal court,
there was reason to believe that the full array of incidental or derivative federal jurisdictional powers would extend to the court when it
exercised its admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. Indeed, the framers of the amended rules evidently assumed this. There was also
plausible reason to think otherwise, however, for many of the pre1966 decisions denying to the admiralty various joinder, counterclaim, impleader, cross-claim, and other ancillary procedural devices
seemed to be based on jurisdictional grounds that reached deep into
statutory, 116 and perhaps constitutional, doctrine. 117
It would be interesting to analyze the relative merits of these two
positions which, like so many other currently vexed issues of maritime
law, wake "echoes in the deepest metaphysics of admiralty." 118 But
of more immediate relevance is exploration of what the case law since
unification has made of the matter. If the results of this examination
show that federal courts hearing admiralty cases have not exercised
pendent and ancillary jurisdiction, we will have discovered yet another
indication that unification did not accomplish its major purposethe elimination of the idea of the admiralty as a separate court,
behaving oddly because oddly labelled.
In the ensuing treatment of post-merger decisions relating to
ancillary and pendent jurisdiction, the categories of cases119 are
guished. Well before unification, there was a device, sometimes called pendent jurisdiction, whereby a personal injury suit on the civil side of federal court, with jurisdiction based on diversity or the Jones Act (Merchant Marine Act, 1920, ch. 250, §
1, 41 Stat. 988 (codified in 46 U.S.C. § 688) ), could have appended to it claims
based on the general decisional maritime law, with the entire case being tried
to a jury. This, however, was not a device whereby other claims or parties were
appended to the admiralty claim. It was the converse situation; a general maritime
claim was appended to an arising under (or diversity) claim, on the civil side. The
typical situation, exemplified by Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16
(1963), and Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959),
involved a seaman's Jones Act claim against his employer, wherein jurisdiction on
the civil side of court was based on the Jones Act itself (i.e., "arising under" jurisdiction) to which the seaman's unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure claims were
added. Romero hinted, and Fitzgerald made clear, that all three admiralty claims
could be tried to the jury to which plaintiff is entitled under the terms of the Jones
Act. See notes 231-86 infra and accompanying text.
116. Proponents of this view look all the way back to the First Judiciary Act,
Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 76, which, according to one commentator, is "the sort
of quasi-constitutional statutory law, change in which . . • one feels it almost impious
to contemplate." Black, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Critique and Suggestions, 50 CouJM.
L. REV. 259, 260 (1950).
117. See generally Landers, supra note 69.
118. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALlY 33 n.118 (1957), discussing whether admiralty cases are ipso facto also "arising under" cases. The Su·
preme Court later answered that question negatively. See Romero v. International
Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959), discussed in notes 231-39 infra and
accompanying text.
119. For a "miscellaneous" pendent jurisdiction case, see Czarnikow-Rionda Co.
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presented in what would be, according to traditional thinking, their
approximate order of difficulty. 120 Thus, under this view, it ought to
be easier for defendant to assert a nonfederal counterclaim than for
defendant to add a nonfederal party; easier for defendant to add a
nonfederal party than for plaintiff to add a nonfederal claim; and
easier for plaintiff to add a nonfederal claim than for plaintiff to add
a nonfederal party.

1. Counterclaim
The generally accepted view is that ancillary jurisdiction permits
federal courts to hear, and to bring in additional parties to respond to,
compulsory counterclaims. Permissive counterclaims, on the other
hand, require independent jurisdictional grounds. 121 Despite the fact
that post-unification maritime cases have followed this traditional
pattern,122 difficulties incident to civil/ admiralty separatism have
arisen. In each of the four relevant decisions, the nonmaritime counterclaim that the defendant asserted was permissive. 123 In the two
cases where diversity of citizenship was present, the courts ordered the
nonmaritime permissive counterclaims severed from the main claims
and retained for later trial to a jury. 124 In the two cases where there
v. Eddie S.S. Co. (Arb.), 1975 A.M.C. 1116, 1118 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (pendent jurisdiction gives court power to order cargo purchaser's claims consolidated with shipowner-charterer arbitration) (dictum).
120. According to Professor Wright, the foJlowing categories aJI represent situations where "present consensus" concerning the interpretation of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure would permit a federal court to adjudicate, despite the absence
of independent federal jurisdiction over the matter reached: compulsory counterclaims under rule 13(a); adding parties to respond to a compulsory counterclaim
under rule 13(h); impleader of a third-party defendant under rule 14; cross claims
under rule 13(g); interpleader under rule 22; intervention as of right under rule
24(a). Conversely, under the conventional view the foJiowing matters are not within
the reach of ancillary federal judicial power: permissive counterclaims under rule
13 (b); joinder of parties under rule 20; permissive intervention under rule 24(b); and
"joinder of claims under rule 18, except where the federal and nonfederal claims are
so closely related as to amount to separate grounds in support of a single cause of
action." C. Wrumrr, supra note 110, at 21.
121. Id.
122. For cases assuming that courts exercising admiralty jurisdiction can hear
compulsory counterclaims that lack independent jurisdictional basis, see Industrial
Equip. & Marine Serv., Inc. v. M/V Mr. Gus, 333 F. Supp. 578, 580 (S.D. Tex.
1971) (explicit assumption), and Camper & Nicholsons, Ltd. v. Yacht "Fontainebleau
Il," 292 F. Supp. 734, 735 (S.D. Fla. 1968) (implicit assumption).
123. See Industrial Equip. & Marine Serv., Inc. v. M/V Mr. Gus, 333 F. Supp.
578 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Camper & Nicholsons, Ltd. v. Yacht "Fontainebleau II," 292
F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Fla. 1968); Alaska Barite Co. v. Freighters, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 192
(N.D. cat. 1972); Nyon Technical Commercial, Inc. v. Equitable Equip. Co., 341
F. Supp. 777 (E.D. La. 1972). In Nyon the court did not determine whether the
counterclaim was permissive or compulsory, but it appeared to be permissive. See
text at notes 129-40 infra.
124. In Alaska Barite Co. v. Freighters, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1972),
a maritime shipper of goods sued on an affreightment contract, and the carrier filed
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was no diversity jurisdiction the nonmaritime permissive counterclaims were dismissed. 125
Retention for later trial to a jury over a closely related but
permissive counterclaim that lacks a basis for independent admiralty
jurisdiction is preferable to dismissal, but the procedure is cumbersome. This awkwardness is the result of the continuation in the post1966 rules of the maritime plaintiff's power to command a nonjury
proceeding. 126 Whether that power ought to be preserved generally
is a question that the ALI's 1969 recommendations answered in the
a permissive counterclaim charging the shipper with antitrust violations. The carrier
demanded a jury trial on the counterclaim. The court analyzed plaintiffs motion
to dismiss the counterclaim as raising three major questions: (1) whether a permissive counterclaim can be sustained at all in an admiralty proceeding; (2) whether
federal rule 9(h) preserved intact the former admiralty practice which gives plaintiff
establishing admiralty jurisdiction an unrestricted choice of a nonjury forum; and
(3) whether the antitrust counterclaim necessitates a jury trial. The court answered
in the affirmative to each of the three enumerated questions. A fourth question also
resolved affirmatively was the appropriateness of antitrust counterclaims. See generally 54 F.R.D. at 195-96.
With respect to the first, the court acknowledged that prior to unification, admiralty's use of the counterclaim device had been sparing, but pointed out that there is
nothing in rules 13(a) or 13(b) that generates any doubt that the rule was intended
to apply to admiralty cases. 54 F.R.D. at 195-96 n.1. The answer to the second
question was easy; the rules make clear that a central purpose of rule 9(h) is to preserve plaintiffs right to elect a nonjury proceeding. 54 F.R.D. at 194. The counterclaim, on the other hand, was entitled to a jury trial. Thus, the only sensible resolution, somewhat cumbersome but necessary, was to try the main claim to the court
and then to try the counterclaim to a jury.
In Industrial Equip. & Marine Servs., Inc. v. M/V Mr. Gus, 333 F. Supp. 578
(S.D. Tex. 1971), plaintiff brought an in rem action to enforce a preferred ship mortgage and defendant counterclaimed for breach of warranty in the sale of the vessel.
Defendant demanded a jury trial. The court first determined, without any extended
inquiry, that all of defendant's counterclaim, being based on a ship-sale transaction,
was nonmaritime. Cf. Ohio Barge Lines, Inc. v. Dravo Corp., 326 F. Supp. 863
(W.D. Pa. 1971) (analysis of the implied warranty problem). Then, finding diversity of citizenship to be present, the court retained the counterclaim and, together
with plaintiffs cross-claim against the manufacturer of the engine of the vessel in
question, see note 164 infra, severed it, presumably for later trial to a jury. The
court ordered defendant's counterclaim and plaintiff's cross-claim redocketed, presumably on the "civil side," and ordered plaintiff to move for default in the instant proceeding. What this probably amounts to is a transfer of the counterclaim and crossclaim to the civil (i.e., jury) docket.
125. Plaintiff in Camper v. Nicholsons, Ltd. v. Yacht "Fontainebleau II", 292 F.
Supp. 734 (S.D. Fla. 1968), brought an in rem action to enforce a supply and repair
lien on a vessel, and defendant counterclaimed alleging misrepresentations in the sale
of the yacht. Under the anomalous but well-settled ship-sale doctrine, the counterclaim was deemed nonmaritime. 292 F. Supp. at 735. Being permissive, it necessitated an independent jurisdictional basis. Finding no diversity, the court dismissed
the counterclaim. In Nyon Technical Commercial, Inc. v. Equitable Equip. Co., 341
F. Supp. 777 (E.D. La. 1972), the permissive counterclaim was outside admiralty's
jurisdiction because it demanded injunctive relief. See text at notes 74-81 supra.
Finding no doctrine of ancillary or pendent jurisdiction strong enough to sustain the
court's exercise of equity power, the counterclaim for an injunction was dismissed.
See text at notes 129-40 infra.
126. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(h), 38(e). See text at notes 1-8 supra.
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negative by providing for a jury trial at the option of any party in
maritime personal injury and death cases.127 The philosophy of that
proposal, congenial to the generalist, is that the nonjury tradition is
not rooted in any jurisdictional limitation upon admiralty courts. 128
Adoption of this philosophy should make acceptable a procedure
whereby the existence of a right to jury trial for any appropriately
joined party in a maritime case would result in all related factual
questions being sent to a jury according to the normal judge/jury
allocation.
The decisions dismissing permissive counterclaims that lack any
independent basis for federal jurisdiction contain unexceptionable
holdings, but they do present a conservative view of the effects of
unification on admiralty jurisdiction that is dramatically uncongenial
to the ALi's hopes. Exemplary is Nyon Technical Commercial, Inc.
v. Equitable Equipment Co.,129 in which plaintiff had left his vessel at
defendant's wharf for repairs. While there, the vessel burned. Plaintiff sought damages for the destruction of the vessel, and defendant
counterclaimed for damages and an injunction compelling plaintiff to
remove the hulk. The jurisdictional difficulty presented by the counterclaim, otherwise founded on a maritime tort, was, of course, the
equity limitation.130 Defendant urged "two bases for the court's
jurisdiction over its claim for injunctive relief: (i) pendent jurisdiction, and (ii) ancillary jurisdiction."131
The "ancillary jurisdiction" argument was based on the view that
the 1966 extension of rule 13 counterclaim procedures to admiralty
127. See proposed section 1319, ALI STIJDY 37, 250-54. See also text at notes
390-401 infra.
128. During the Senate Subcommittee Hearings on the ALI's recommendations
on admiralty jurisdiction, the Maritime Law Association objected both to the introduction of the jury generalJy and to extending the right to defendant as well as to
plaintiff. See 1972 Hearings 688-99. In response to this criticism, one version of
the modified bill circulated after the hearings restricted the right to demand a jury
in a maritime injury or death case to the plaintiff. However, S. 1876, as reintroduced by Senator Burdick in May 1973, S. 1976, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), continued to mirror the ALI proposal.
129. 341.F. Supp. 777 (E.D. La. 1972). See notes 74-81, 125 supra and accompanying text.
130. See text at notes 74-81 supra.
131. 341 F. Supp. at 778. The idea (whether the court's or the defendant's is
unclear) of the difference between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction portrayed here
is intriguing:
[Defendant] first argues that the Court's pendent jurisdiction should be invoked
over the equitable injunctive demand because it arises out of the same operative
facts as the maritime claims. Secondly, it is urged that the court has ancillary
jurisdiction over the claim for equitable relief; as a result of the merger of admiralty and civil rules of procedure in 1966, because Rule 13 extended the right
to counterclaim to admiralty cases.
341 F. Supp. at 777-78.
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removed the equitable jurisdiction difficulty. The court disagreed:
Prior to the merger of the rules, there was very limited use of counterclaims in admiralty. One of the purposes of the merger was to allow
admiralty the same liberal practice of counterclaims as enjoyed by
the civil practice. . . . The merger .. ·. did not, however, create
new substantive admiralty causes of action, and this court does not
have the power to entertain an equitable action to enjoin the commission of a maritime tort. . . . This is the law whether the equitable
action is brought as a direct complaint or in a counterclaim.132
Defendant's other argument-on a ,theory of "pendant juris~ction"-was a clumsy effort to blend three decisions: Swift & Co.
Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, 133 the leading Supreme
Court "equitable powers" decision in admiralty, which had held that
the admiralty court could employ powers deemed equitable in order
to secure the defendant's appearance; Beverly Hills National Bank &
Trust Co. v. Compania de Navigacione Almirante S.A., Panama,1 34
wherein the Ninth Circuit had held that a constructive trust claim was
not incidental in the Swift sense,135 but that it could be entertained by
the court as pendent;136 and Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 137 where the Supreme Court had held that, in an action
under the Jones Act on the civil side of federal court, claims based on
the general maritime law doctrines of maintenance and cure and
unseaworthiness could be tried as pendent to the Jones Act claim. It
ought to be fairly obvious that the Romero decision had no relationship to the problem in Nyon. An admiralty court, seeking the power
to ~ntertain an equitable counterclaim, will not derive much support
from a decision permitting general maritime claims to pend to statutory maritime claims in federal question proceedings.138 It is likewise
evident that the Swift case is not directly related to the argument that
the Nyon defendant advanced. Defendant's major reliance should
have been on Beverly Hills Bank, which had employed a pendent
approach. The Nyon court, however, simply lumped Beverly Hills
Bank and Swift together, saying: "In Beverly Hills ... as was the
case in [Swift], the court was faced with a situation where the plain132. 341 F. Supp. at 781 (citations omitted).
133. 339 U.S. 684 (1950). See note 58 supra.
134. 437 F.2d 301 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 996 (1971), discussed in
text at notes 178-96 infra.
135. Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, 339 U.S. 684
(1950). See note 58 supra.
136. The court noted that diversity of citizenship provided a second, independent
ground for the district court to exercise jurisdiction over the claim. 437 F.2d at 306.
137. 358 U.S. 354 (1959). See note 115 supra; notes 231-39 infra and accompanying text.
138. See note 115 supra.
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tiff could not obtain a judgment if jurisdiction over the non-maritime
claim was not retained." 139
There was no discussion in Nyon of the two major questions
seemingly raised by the admiralty/counterclaim cases: ( 1) Was the
counterclaim permissive or compulsory? Although the court would
likely have found it permissive, there was no discussion of the issue.
Indeed, because the claims of each party arose from allegations that
the same fire was the fault of the other party, a decision that the counterclaim was compulsory would probably have been sustainable; (2)
Was diversity or some other nonadmiralty ground of federal jurisdiction present? Presumably not, but the decision gives no indication. 140
Instead, the court manifested little willingness to search for a way
in which to bear the counterclaim, perhaps out of a disinclination to
broaden further the jurisdictional base of the "admiralty side" of
federal courts.
2.

Third-Party Practice

Traditionally, ancillary jurisdiction, which reaches third-party
claims, among others, has been subjected to much less rigorous
jurisdictional scrutiny than has pendent jurisdiction, which principally
affects additional claims asserted by a plaintiff. 141 But there is an
admiralty peculiarity that must be noted here. Former Admiralty
rule 56 permitted both "indemnity" impleader-whereby a defendant
asserts that a third-party defendant may be liable to the defendant
by way of "remedy over, contribution or otherwise" 142-and "substitute defendant" impleader-whereby a defendant asserts that thirdparty defendant may be directly liable to the plaintiff. 143 In the
case of "substitute defendant" impleader, the third-party defendant
139. 341 F. Supp. at 780. In Landers, supra note 69, at 74 n.96, this aspect of
Nyon is criticized as being "of dubious authoritative value" because of its "failure

to come to grips with the pertinent and relevant authorities." The author also took
exception to the Nyon court's failure to mention the decision in Mccann v. Falgout
Boat Co., 44 F.R.D. 34 (S.D. Tex. 1968), discussed in text at notes 147-56 infra,
which would have supported the result reached in Nyo11, and Leather's Best, Inc. v.
S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1972), discussed in text at notes 206-25,
which would have indicated an outcome contrary to Nyo11.
140. Additionally, the court erected an alternative holding: "Even assuming that
the Court did have the power to issue an injunction in an admiralty suit of this type,
[on the merits] this Court would not exercise that power in this case." 341 F. Supp.
at 781.
141. See notes 109-13, 119-20 supra and accompanying text.
142. Admiralty Rule 56, 368 U.S. 1015 (1961).
143. The terms "indemnity impleader" and "substitute defendant" impleader were
evidently coined in Comment, supra note 50, at 1172. These useful terms will be
freely employed in this article. Despite the fact that under the federal rules "thirdparty practice" is the usual term, "impleader" seems a useful synonym.
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is, in effect, tendered to the plaintiff, and the action proceeds as
though the plaintiff had originally joined that defendant. 144 This
feature of the pre-1966 admiralty practice is preserved in Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 14 ( c) .145 Because "substitute defendant"
144. The difference between the two forms of third-party practice is well illustrated by Williams v. United States, 42 F.R.D. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), where plaintiff
sued the United States for injuries allegedly sustained aboard a government vessel,
and the Government sought to implead the state of New York. In the court's view,
impleader was not offensive to sovereign immunity provided, as was true in the instant case, that the theory was restricted to indemnity impleader: "Under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 14(a), unless the plaintiff amends his complaint, no demand is made by or
on behalf of the plaintiff against the third-party defendant, and no judgment against
the third-party defendant can run in favor of the original plaintiff." 42 F.R.D. at
615. To attempt "substitute defendant" third-party practice under rule 14(c) would,
on the other hand, have offended New York's unwaived immunity, because under that
form of third-party practice "the third-party plaintiff may also demand judgment
against the third-party defendant in favor of the plaintiff." 42 F.R.D. at 615.
Also illustrative of the difference between "indemnity" third-party practice and
"substitute defendant" third-party practice is Donaldson v. United States Steel Corp.,
53 F.R.D. 228 (W.D. Pa. 1971), although the opinion itself does not reveal an awareness of the difference. Plaintiff, a seaman, brought a Jones Act suit (the opinion
does not reveal whether it was brought on the law side, with a jury demand, or in
admiralty) for injuries sustained aboard the vessel. Defendant filed a third-party
claim against several defendants, alleging that "if the defendant is liable for the injuries sustained by the plaintiff, then it is entitled to recover such sum from the thirdparty defendants whose alleged negligent and reckless operation of a motor vehicle
caused the plaintiffs injuries." 53 F.R.D. at 229. The third-party claim was evidently asserted under rule 14(a) alone, and the court dismissed it on the ground
that no indemnity relationship existed between defendant and third-party defendants:
fl1he requirement . . . that the relationship between the defendant, as a thirdparty plaintiff and the third-party defendants be in reality one of plaintiff-defendant must be met. Under the circumstances of this suit, there is no such
relationship between the defendant as a third-party plaintiff and the purported
third-party defendants, for no relationship exists between these two parties which
would give rise independently to litigation between themselves.
53 F.R.D. at 230. No mention was made in the decision of rule 14(c), which says
in pertinent part:
When a plaintiff asserts an admiralty or maritime claim . . . the defendant
• . . , as a third party plaintiff, may bring in a third-party defendant who may be
wholly or partly liable, either to the plaintiff or to the third-party plaintiff, by
way of remedy over, contribution, or otherwise on account of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences. In such a case the
third-party plaintiff may also demand judgment against the third-party defendant
in favor of the plaintiff . . ..
FED. R. CIV. P. 14(c). The quoted portion of rule 14(c) would seem to raise at
least an argument that third-party jurisdiction should have been sustained in Donaldson. fo essence, the defendant was arguing th?-t the injuries for which plaintiff sued
the employer arose in fact, wholly or partially, from an automobile accident. Perhaps even under rule 14(c), however, the suit against third-party defendants did not
arise out of the "same . . . series of . . . occurrences." In the court's view, arguably,
what was missing here was "some causal connection between the original action and
the action brought in the third-party suit." 53 F.R.D. at 231.
Another possible interpretation of Donaldson is that plaintiff had brought his
Jones Act suit on the law side of federal court in order to get a jury trial. In that
posture, rule 14(c) would presumably not be available since by its terms it is keyed
to situations where "plaintiff asserts an admiralty or maritime claim within the meaning of Rule 9(h)." FED. R. CIV. P. 14(c). But see Saus v. Delta Concrete Co.,
368 F. Supp. 297, 298 (W.D. Pa. 1973 ), discussed in text at notes 281-86 infra.
145. The matter is well explained in Comment, supra note 50, at 1172-73.
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third-party practice involves a functional tendering of the thirdparty defendant to the original plaintiff, jurisdictional limits ought
to be congruent with those applicable to joinder of parties. As
will be seen, the decision in Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx 146
seems to have significantly expanded the availability of pendent
jurisdiction in joining parties. Thus, "substitute defendant" practice may be broadened more successfully through pendent jurisdiction,
although in this area the problem of the right to a jury trial has
remained a troublesome factor. "Indemnity'' third-party practice, on
the other hand, is probably best treated with the traditionally more
expansive ancillary jurisdiction approach.
a. "Substitute defendant" third-party practice under rule 14(c).
The most celebrated case holding that the 1966 merger does not
expand an admiralty court's powers over third-party defendants is
McCann v. Falgout Boat Co., 141 a decision that contains all the major
arguments against interpreting the 1966 merger as giving ancillary
and pendent jurisdiction to the admiralty courts. 148 Plaintiff, a seaman, sued his employer in admiralty, asserting causes of action based
on the Jones Act and on unseaworthiness. The employer brought a
third-party complaint under rule 14(c) against a San Antonio physician, alleging that because of his incompetence the plaintiff's injury
had culminated in disability. In dismissing the third-party complaint, the court adopted the following line of reasoning:
( 1) The claim against the doctor lacks independent admiralty
jurisdictional basis; his negligence, if any, was committed on
land, and it affected the plaintiff on land. 140 Nor was there
jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship.
(2) Rule 14(c), added in 1966, mirrors the former admiralty
impleader practice of rule 56, under which the third-party defendant was not only subject to indemnity, but was also treated
as though he had been joined by plaintiff.150
(3) The law under former rule 56 was quite clear in prohibiting impleader of a third party over whom independent admiralty
146. 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971), discussed in text at notes 206-25 infra,
147. 44 F.R.D. 34 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
148. See Comment, 1973 Wrs. L. REv. 594, supra note 108, at 609-11. See also
Landers, supra note 69, at 67-69; Comment, supra note 50, at 1176; Comment, 47
TEXAS L. REv. 120, supra note 108, at passim.
149. See Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 26668 (1972) (discussion of the "locality" test for maritime tort jurisdiction, and of
these two facets of the "occurrence" of a tort).
150. "An impleaded party stands as one charged with fault by the original petition, although in fact it did not so charge and is not amended. The cause is treated
as if the petitiqn had been filed against both the defendant and third-party defendant." 44 F.R.D. at 37 n.2 (1968).
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jurisdiction was lacking. 151 The major reason for this restriction was that bringing a nonmaritime party into an admiralty
case would deprive him of his probable seventh amendment right
to a jury trial.
·
(4) The 1966 merger could hardly be taken to work so fundamental a change in the former admiralty impleader restriction
because the Advisory Committee, in drafting rule 14(c), must
have known Admiralty rule 56 and its construction. If the Committee had wanted to change that construction, it would have
done so explicitly. The Supreme Court has often said that a prior
construction of a statute is deemed to receive legislative approval
if the provision is reenacted without material change; surely a
procedural rule should be accorded similar treatment. Furthermore, rule 82 provides that the rules should not be construed to
extend jurisdiction, yet reading rule 14(c) as permitting impleader
of a nonmaritime party would certainly have that effect.
The McCann decision has excited a good deal of commentary,
most of it critical. One writer, though basically convinced that
limitations on admiralty jurisdiction would reasonably have survived
the merger, still found the decision unsatisfactory, partly because of
the court's stress on the third-party's right to jury trial. He observed
that the court evinced no awareness of a solution available since the
merger of law and equity-bringing in the third party but trying the
claim against him to a jury. 152 The ALI jurisdictional study simply
stated that McCann "takes too restrictive a view of the purpose of
unification and of the rules adopted to implement unification." 153 A
student commentator pointed out that by leaving open the possibility
that nonadmiralty grounds of federal jurisdiction, such as diversity,
would permit impleader under 14(c), the court left the jury trial
problem unsolved. He also noted the inconsistency in saying that the
exercise of ancillary jurisdiction in an admiralty action is more violative of rule 82 than is the use of this device in a diversity action. 154
Another student's principal objection rested upon strong indications
that the 1966 Advisory Committee did wish to alter drastically some
151. The court cited seven cases in addition to 3 J.

,r 14.20, at 669 (1966).

MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE

152. Landers, supra note 69, at 67-69. Landers also complained that the court
had not made clear whether jurisdiction would have been denied if the San Antonio
physician had been pursued for indemnity alone under rule 14(a). Id. at 68. It
appears that the opinion was fairly clear on this point; indeed, the opinion took
pains to limit itself to third-party practice under rule 14(c).
153. ALI Snmy 228.
154. Comment, supra note SO, at 1176-80.
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theretofore fundamental aspects of admiralty practice. 11H1 Finally, an
author dealing extensively with the case admitted the validity of the
jury trial objection but thought that two solutions, short of dismissal,
were available: By the first solution the court would give the doctor
his jury trial, which, preferably, would include issues raised by plaintiff against the shipowner; the second possible solution was simply a
split trial. 156
Despite these criticisms and the passage of five years, the same
judge, in a similar situation, 157 declared that he "adheres to the
McCann decision. Regardless of the desirability of appending nonfederal, non-admiralty claims to admiralty causes . . . through the
devices of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction, the use of these devices
in admiralty cases were not intended by the 1966 unification and
amendment of rules. Any change in this ancient restriction on the
Court's jurisdiction should be by explicit alteration of the rules or
statute."158 Each time the Fifth Circuit has confronted the issue
presented by the Mccann case it has avoided a definitive ruling. 1 Go
A much healthier attitude toward the civil/ admiralty dichotomy
was displayed by another district court in Christman v. Maristella
Compania Naviera. 160 Plaintiff sued in admiralty for breach of a
charter party, alleging that the defendant had never undertaken the
155. Comment, 1973 Wrs. L. REv. 594, supra note 108, at 610.
156. Comment, 47 TEXAS L. REV. 120, supra note 108, at 126.
157. Stinson v. S.S. Kenneth McKay, 360 F. Supp. 674 (S.D. Tex. 1973). Judge
James L. Noel, appointed March 17, 1962, acknowledged both commentary adverse
to McCann and contrary decisions, notably Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx,
451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1972), discussed in text at notes 206-25 infra, but was unmoved. 360 F. Supp. at 675-76. Cf. Sanchez v. Lloyd Richardson Constr. Corp.,
56 F.R.D. 472 (S.D. Tex. 1972), sustaining admiralty jurisdiction and denying jury
trial in an action by a maritime third-party defendant against an arguably nonmaritime fourth-party defendant. Plaintiff was hurt on a vessel, and fourth-party defendant was the alleged manufacturer of the device that hurt him. Close reading of a
murky opinion suggests that the court found independent admiralty jurisdiction over
the fourth-party defendant and thus did not have to reach the McCann point. See
also In re McAninch, 392 F. Supp. 96, 97 (S.D. Tex. 1975) (plaintiff in limitation
of liability proceedings under FED. R. Crv. P. F can employ rule 14(c) third-party
practice); Petition of Klarman, 270 F. Supp. 1001 (D. Conn. 1967).
158. 360 F. Supp. at 676.
159. In Watz v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 431 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970), an injured
shipyard worker sued the vessel owner. The owner impleaded the hoist assembler,
who impleaded the manufacturer of an allegedly defective chain. As to jurisdiction,
the court said: "Without expressing any view on the correctness of a decision such
as McCann, we note that the third-party complaint there was distinctly not maritime.
. . . In our case, on the other hand, the consequence of Campbell's conduct was
injury on board the [vessel]. The same reasoning that led us to conclude that admiralty jurisdiction existed over [plaintiffs] claim against [hoist assembler] sustains
admiralty jurisdiction over [hoist assembler's] claim against [chain maker]." 431
F.2d at 118. See also In re Motor Ship Pac. Carrier, 489 F.2d 152, 154 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 931 (1974).
160. 293 F. Supp. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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agreed voyage. Defendant conceded as much and sought to implead
its agent, who had allegedly signed the charter party without authority. The original third-party complaint was probably for indemnity
alone, under rule 14(a),1 61 but it quickly became the functional
equivalent of a rule 14(c) substitute defendant situation when plaintiff amended his complaint to assert a claim directly against the agent.
The agent moved to dismiss both the third-party complaint and the
plaintiffs complaint for want of jurisdiction. Acknowledging the want
of admiralty jurisdiction over a third-party complaint based on a claim
of breach of a nonmaritime agency agreement, 162 the court nevertheless found diversity and held dismissal improper. Further, the court
reasoned that plaintiff's claim against the third-party defendant-unlike defendant shipowner's claim-was not based on the agency agreement, but rather flowed out of the underlying charter party contract;163
as such, it was a claim within the court's admiralty jurisdiction. Thus,
the court viewed the proceeding as consisting of an admiralty complaint, an admiralty cross-complaint, and a diversity third-party complaint, all involving a common issue. Accordingly, it seemed reasonable to proceed with a single jury trial of the matter: "Third-party
defendant's fear that a jury will be confused if the admiralty claim is
tried with the alleged breach of agency agreement is unfounded. The
jury, with the assistance of the court and counsel, will be able to focus
on the single issue which it must determine, namely, whether thirdparty defendant breached its agency agreement with defendant." 164
On their facts, the rule 14(c) third-party practice decisions are
consistent with each other and with the permissive counterclaim
decisions: If there is no independent ground for federal jurisdiction,
the third-party complaint will be dismissed;165 if there is diversity but
no independent admiralty jurisdiction over the third-party complaint,166 it will be retained, with the parties' right to a jury trial
161. The opinion does not discuss the distinction between the two forms of thirdparty practice.
162. The notion that contracts with shore-side agents are not maritime was
avoided and probably weakened in Hinkias S.S. Agency v. Freighters, Inc., 351 F.
Supp. 373 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
163. 293 F. Supp. at 444.
164. 293 F. Supp. at 444. A similar but slightly more cumbersome approach
was deemed necessary in Industrial Equip. & Marine Servs., Inc. v. M/V Mr. Gus,
333 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Tex. 1971), where jurisdiction over a nonmaritime third-party
complaint under rule 14(c) was retained because of the presence of diversity. However, the third-party complaint was severed from the maritime claim and retained for
later trial, presumably to a jury. The counterclaim aspect of the case is discussed
in note 124 supra.
165. McCann v. Falgout Boat Co., 44 F.R.D. 34 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
166. In several cases independent admiralty jurisdiction was found to exist over
third-party claims although the jurisdictional basis was not discussed in the opinions.
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preserved as to that claim. 167 As argued above in connection with
nonmaritime counterclaims, 168 the cumbersomeness of some of the
techniques employed to preserve that jury right are probably necessary under the present state of doctrine. However, once it is realized
that the plaintiff's "right" to a nonjury proceeding lacks constitutional,
or even statutory, status, the difficulties become solvable.
The Christman 169 decision is appealing, largely because the approach adopted by that court could be extended to establish that the
right to ,a jury trial of any party appropriately joined in a maritime
case would take all related factual questions to the jury. Any factual
matters solely involved with plaintiff's maritime claim could be tried
to the judge alone, without unduly complicating or prolonging the
trial. With this technique, the plaintiff's right to a nonjury trial can
be treated as merely a matter of tradition that must yield in some
cases to the combined pressure of the seventh amendment and the
dictates of efficiency and economy. 170
Once the jury trial problem is solved, there is no legitimate reason
for courts, in the exercise of their admiralty jurisdiction, to be any less
free in recognizing pendent jurisdiction over substitute-defendant
third-party claims than are federal courts generally in recognizing
joinder of parties. In fact, under the approach approved in the
Leather's Best171 decision, such recognition would be liberally given.
Cases like McCann, 172 however, suggest a prevailing judicial attitude
that is unsympathetic to the larger aims of the 1966 merger and
unresponsive to the logic compelling the breakdown of the civil/ admiralty distinction. Hence, despite rays of hope like Christman,
legislative action remains desirable.
b. "Indemnity" third-party practice under rule 14(a). In the
third-party practice decisions involving rule 14(a) alone, the courts
have uniformly sustained jurisdiction. In one case, occasionally cited
in support of the application of pendent jurisdiction in admiralty, it
appears that the third-party complaint was actually found to have an
See In re MIT Alva Cape, 405 F.2d 962 (2d Cir. 1969); Raymond Intl. Inc. v. MIT
Dalzelleagle, 336 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Petition of Klarman, 270 F. Supp.
1001 (D. Conn. 1967).
167. See Industrial Equip. & Marine Servs., Inc. v. M/V Mr. Gus, 333 F. Supp.
578, 581 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Christman v. Maristella Compania Naviera, 293 F. Supp,
442, 444 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
168. See notes 125-28 supra.
169. 293 F. Supp. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
170. Cf. Fitzgerald v. United States Line Co., 374 U.S. 16 (1963) (the Supreme
Court's approach in a related situation), discussed in text at notes 236-39 infra.
171. 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971).
172. 44 F.R.D. 34 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
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independent admiralty basis.173 In others, the 14(a) third-party
action was retained as "diversity and/ or pendent."174 None of the
opinions indicates that any jury trial problem was presented. Evidently, the prevailing view is that 14(a) third-party practice does not
generate any problems with the seventh amendment. That viewpoint
is certainly supportable on the basis of the simple but useful idea that
a matter thus auxiliary to an admiralty proceeding is just not a "suit at
common law."175 This implicit philosophy of the 14(a) third-party
practice decisions could, of course, be extended without too much
strain to the 14(c) situation, and perhaps it should be. However, as
indicated above, 176 there is an argument that 14(c) third-party practice is jurisdictionally indistinguishable from joinder of parties. And,
as will be seen, 177 most of the joinder of parties decisions mirror the
rule 14(c) third-party practice decisions in finding the preservation
of the joined party's right to a jury trial to be a major problem. Thus,
the simple solution of the 14(a) cases is not helpful in extending the
ju:psdiction of federal courts in other admiralty contexts.
3.

Joinder of Claims

There are just two decisions that address the issue of joining
claims in admiralty. Each concludes that pendent jurisdiction can
sustain the power of a court exercising admiralty jurisdiction to hear
nonmaritime claims. While both cases support the aims of unification, the difficulties presented in arriving at these results indicate that
these aims have not yet been completely realized.
The first admiralty case to use pendent jurisdiction in its original
sense of joining state claims with a federal claim178 was Beverly Hills
Bank170 where the jurisdictional difficulty arose from the long-debated
notion that courts exercising admiralty jurisdiction lack equitable
powers. 180 Seeking to recover unpaid charter hire, a shipowner had
asserted a maritime lien on funds in the hands of the defendant bank.
Alternatively, the shipowner had sought recovery on a constructive
trust theory. The maritime lien theory failed on the merits. Finding
173. See Louis Furth, Inc. v. S.S. Srbija, 330 F. Supp. 305, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
174. Eutectic Corp. v. M/V Gudmundra, 367 F. Supp. 681, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
Royal Typewriter Co. v. M/V Kulmerland, 346 F. Supp. 1019, 1025 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), affd., 483 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1973). See also Gambino v. United Fruit Co.,
48 F.R.D. 28, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
175. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
176. See notes 141-46 supra.
111. See notes 205-30 infra.
178. See Note, 18 WAYNE L. REv. 1211, supra note 108, at 1214.
179. 437 F.2d 301 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 996 (1971).
180. See notes 90-96 supra and accompanying text.
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no independent admiralty jurisdiction over the constructive trust
claim due to its equitable nature, 181 the trial court nevertheless heard
the matter; it reasoned that ancillary jurisdiction over the constructive
trust claim could be sustained on the basis of its derivative relationship to the main (maritime lien) claim. 182
The court of appeals disagreed with the recognition of ancillary
jurisdiction: "Compania's constructive trust claim constituted a separate basis for recovery, legally unrelated to Compania's maritime lien
claim; and we are inclined to the view that it was therefore an
independent equitable claim beyond the admiralty jurisdiction."183
On traditional learning, the analysis of the appellate court was correct.184 Because the lien claim could be asserted without reference to
the constructive trust matter, the issues were, in the relevant sense,
separate. Still, to have held that such an important alternative argument must be dropped or pursued in a separate proceeding would
have been separatism at its worst. The appellate court did mitigate
this potentially harsh result by sustaining jurisdiction over the constructive trust claim on the basis of "pendent jurisdiction"185 and
diversity. 186
With regard to pendent jurisdiction, the court of appeals in
Beverly Hills Bank reasoned that the gist of United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs187 was that a federal court has power188 to entertain a state
claim if it relates to the federal claim in a way that would generate the
expectation that plaintiff would try both in a single proceeding. The
court concluded that, because both claims arose from "a common
nucleus of operative fact" and would ordinarily be tried in one
judicial proceeding, the district court had the power, on the basis of
Gibbs, to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the equitable claim. 180
Yet, the Gibbs case had dealt with the jurisdiction of federal
courts in federal question cases, and it has always been recognized
181. See Compania de Nav. Almirante S.A., Panama v. Certain Proceeds of
Cargo, 288 F. Supp. 77, 81 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
182. The trial court read Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del
Caribe, 339 U.S. 684 (1950), discussed in note 58 supra, as meaning that "an Admiralty Court can, as a means of effectuating a claim incontestably in Admiralty, determine subsidiary or derivative equitable issues." 288 F. Supp. at 81.
183. 437 F.2d at 305.
184. See note 58 supra.
185. 437 F.2d at 305.
186. 437 F.2d at 306.
187. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
188. It is important to stress the word "power," because much of the traditional
pendent-jurisdiction learning stresses that there are two inquiries: (1) whether 'the
bare power to reach the asserted state claim exists; (2) the wisdom of reaching the
claim. See 437 F.2d at 306.
189. 437 F.2d at 306 (footnote omitted).
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that admiralty has peculiarities of its own, which generally tend
toward the restriction of jurisdiction. The Beverly Hills Bank court
addressed this complication in an unilluminating footnote: "Gibbs
involved federal question jurisdiction but there is no reason why the
doctrine of pendent jurisdiction should not be equally applicable
when jurisdiction over the federal claim is in admiralty. 7(a)
Moore's Federal Practice 3146-47."190
A traditionalist could readily conclude that the court in Beverly
Hills Bank made more of a leap than it acknowledged. 191 Fairly and
conservatively read, the case stands for the proposition that an admiralty court has jurisdiction over a plaintiffs closely related equitable
claim against a defendant where jurisdiction over the defendant is
also supported by diversity192 and where there has been waiver or
other disposition of the potentially thorny seventh amendment issue.193 Even thus limited, it is an important case, and the relative
want of attention it has received is surprising. 194
As noted above in the discussion of counterclaims and third-party
practice, 105 the maritime courts that have employed auxiliary jurisdictional techniques to establish jurisdiction over nonmaritime claims
and parties have been sensitive to the jury trial rights involved. The
Ninth Circuit in Beverly Hills Bank had a conspicuously easy time
with that problem: "It is immaterial that the district court purported
190. 437 F.2d at 306 n.7. Following that footnote, the Ninth Circuit also mentioned that the presence of diversity jurisdiction would sustain power to hear the constructive trust claim.
In making its pendent jurisdiction argument, the court did not rely on unification,
nor did it mention that rule 18(a) states: "A party asserting a claim to relief as
an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, may join, either as
independent or as alternate claims, as many claims, legal, equitable, or maritime, as
he has against an opposing party." FED. R. Cxv. P. 18(a).
191. The Moore treatise does support the use the court made of it. Professor
Moore has frequently expressed impatience with jurisdictional niceties of any sort
that he deems inimical to the just powers of a sensibly functioning federal court.
The portion of the treatise referred to culminates with a nice statement of that philosophy: "If the matter is one which, in the opinion of the court, would ordinarily be
expected to be tried in one judicial proceeding there is power in the court-whether
sitting within its maritime or nonmaritime capacity-to hear and determine the entire
cause by invoking its pendent jurisdiction." 7A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ,r 270,
at 3149 (2d ed. 1968).
192. See notes 94, 190 supra and accompanying text.
193. See notes 195-96 infra and accompanying text.
194. The case is briefly described, without comment, in the 1973 supplement to
Moore's treatise. See 7A J. MOORE, supra note 191, ,r 270, at 3149. It was cited
in passing in two district court cases. See Ohio Barge Lines, Inc. v. Dravo Corp.,
326 F. Supp. 863, 867 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Nyon Technical Commercial, Inc. v. Equitable Equip. Co., 341 F. Supp. 777, 779-80 (E.D. La. 1972). For two useful evaluations of the case, see Note, 18 WAYNE L REV. 1211, supra note 108, at 1215 and
Landers, supra note 69, at 70 n.88.
195. See notes 126-28, 167-69, 175-77 supra,
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to exercise aQllliralty rather than pendent or diversity jurisdiction.
. . . There was no right to a jury trial since the constructive trust
claim was equitable . . . ; and even if such a right existed the bank
could not complain for it did not demand a jury. . . ."100
In the other major joinder of claims case, however, no such easy
resolution of the jury problem was possible. In Ohio Barge Lines,
Inc. v. Dravo Corp., 197 the plaintiff alleged that defects in a towboat
built by the defendant caused the vessel to go out of control while
being operated by plaintiff and to hit several barges and a landing, all
owned by Delta Concrete. Ohio Barge settled with Delta and took an
assignment of Delta's legal claims. It then brought suit in admiralty
against the shipbuilder for the amount paid Delta plus the cost of repairs; it urged eight separate theories in support of recovery. 198 There
was no diversity of citizenship. Defendant's exception to the jurisdiction of the court was based on the foolish but well-settled doctrine
that contracts for the sale or construction of ships are nonmaritime.199 Examining each of plaintiff's eight theories separately, the
court found independent admiralty jurisdiction over all except a count
in express warranty and a count based on indemnification provisions
in the construction contract. Those two counts were directly and
closely tied to the ship-sale contract and were thus beyond the reach
of admiralty jurisdiction. Nevertheless, on the authority of United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs2° 0 and the 1966 unification of the civil and
admiralty rules, 201 the court found pendent jurisdiction.
196. 437 F.2d at 306-07 (citations omitted).
197. 326 F. Supp. 863 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
198. Strict liability under REsTATEMENT (SECOND} OF TORTS § 402A (1965); assignment of Delta's claim for damage to its barge and landing; express warranty; implied warranty; indemnity provisions in the construction contract between plaintiff
and defendant; indemnification under general tort principles; unjust enrichment; unseaworthiness. 326 F. Supp. at 865.
199. "Few admiralty doctrines have received more criticism and with so little ef•
fect as that which holds that agreements for the construction of vessels are not maritime contracts and, hence, not within the purview of admiralty jurisdiction. This
holding has been repeated many times by decisions of the Supreme Court and is now
accepted as firmly established, albeit arguably inconsistent and illogical," 326 F.
Supp. at 864 (footnotes omitted).
200. "We cannot order that the non-admiralty counts be filed in a civil action
because diversity is lacking. The situation therefore is not unlike that faced by the
Supreme Court in United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966),
where it was held that pendent jurisdiction could be exercised in circumstances where
diversity was lacking as to a state cause of action but where it and the federal claim
were derived from a common nucleus of operative facts." 326 F. Supp. at 867.
201. "In the American Law Institute, Study of Division of Jurisdiction Between
State and Federal Courts (1969) we read: 'Moreover, since the unification of admiralty and civil procedure, the doctrines of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction will per•
mit joinder or impleader in any case in which the transaction or occurrence involved
gives rise to both maritime and nonmaritime claims.' " 326 F. Supp. at 867-68.
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In two respects Ohio Barge Lines extends the holding in Beverly
Hill Bank. It is true that in both cases, pendent jurisdiction sustained an admiralty court's exercise of jurisdiction over a nonmaritime
claim urged by plaintiff against the original defendant. Yet in
Beverly Hills Bank, the holding was buttressed by the presence of
diversity jurisdiction, while in Ohio Barge Lines diversity was lacking.
Moreover, in Beverly Hills Bank, the court disposed of the issue of
defendant's possible right to a jury trial of the appended claim by
adverting to its equitable nature and to a waiver argument. 202 The
Ohio Barge Lines court did not mention the jury trial issue, probably
because nothing helpful could be said. The claims over which independent admiralty jurisdiction was found wanting were claims at law,
to which the seventh amendment right to jury trial would have
extended, and there was less room to build a waiver argument than
there had been in Beverly Hills Bank, for the Ohio Barge Lines defendant had vigorously contested the jurisdiction.
A student commentator saw the Ohio Barge Lines case as "an
inevitable outgrowth of the merger of admiralty and civil
procedure. . . . The instant [decision] was innovative and stands
as a benchmark along the way toward a unified treatment of admiralty
procedure and civil procedure in practice as well as in print."203
Another commentator, however, in arguing that unification could
not have removed prior jurisdictional limitations on admiralty, asserted
that "the Ohio Barge court indicated . . . that the maritime and
nonmaritime issues were not separable. Therefore under .traditional
learning admiralty could decide the whole matter." 204 The court
actually said nothing of the kind and in fact relied explicitly on the
1966 merger rather than on "traditional [admiralty] learning." Together, Beverly Hills Bank and Ohio Barge Lines do advance the
purposes of the 1966 unification, but the leaps that hacl to be made
by both courts demonstrate that problems of the separatist tradition
continue to plague the courts.
4.

Joinder of Parties

According to the ·traditional view, the plaintiff in a maritime
proceeding could not join a nonmartime party. 205 The strength of
202. See notes 195-96 supra and accompanying text.
203. Note, 18 WAYNE L. REv. 1211, supra note 108, at 1219-20.
204. Landers, supra note 69, at 72 n.91.
205. The traditional learning on joinder of parties is fully explained in Howmet
Corp. v. Tokyo Shipping Co., 320 F. Supp. 975 (D. Del. 1971), where shipper
brought an action in admiralty against the carrier and against the City of Wilmington, Delaware, for damage to the cargo occurring on the ship, on the pier, or both.
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that prohibition highlights the dramatic nature of the Second Circuit's
decision in Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx. 200 Plaintiff, the
disappointed shipper of a cargo of valuable leather, sued MooreMcCormack Lines, which had conveyed the goods from Antwerp to
New York, and Tidewater Terminal, with which the goods were
stored in New York when they were stolen. The trial judge did not
The court granted the city's motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. No independent admiralty ground to support an action against the city could be found. 320
F. Supp. at 977-78. Plaintiff's pendent jurisdiction argument was brushed aside:
[A]Ithough this Court had admiralty jurisdiction over [shipper's] first alternative claim for cargo damaged in ocean transit . • . this claim would not confer
pendant or incidental admiralty jurisdiction over [shipper's] alternative and separate claim against the City for damage allegedly sustained after the cargo had
been discharged . . . . To confer pendant or incidental jurisdiction, the complaint must state a "single cause of action" supported by federal and non-federal
grounds, as distinguished from separate causes of action under federal and nonfederal law. Separate causes of action are presented • • • where the parties to
the federal and non-Iederal claims are not idential. Here the separate and alternative federal and non-federal causes of action are not asserted against identical
defendants. Thus, no incidental or pendant jurisdiction exists with respect to
the claim against the City.
320 F. Supp. at 979 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
The strength of the traditional prohibition against using the pendent jurisdiction
device to permit plaintiff to join an additional party is highlighted by Consolidated
Cork Corp. v. Jugoslavenska Linijska Plovidba, 318 F. Supp. 1209 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
In that case cargo was damaged, probably on the pier, and the shipper brought an
action in admiralty against the carrier and the carrier's stevedore. On the th~ory
that the cargo damage occurred on the pier, independent admiralty jurisdiction was
lacking. The court was quite troubled by the stevedore's being present in the case
at the behest of plaintiff but elected to focus on the fact that the carrier had brought
a third-party complaint against the stevedore under rule 14(c). A third-party complaint over the same defendant, in the court's view, would have sustained jurisdiction
under ancillary notions: "Clearly, this procedure through which admiralty jurisdiction
is retained over a matter involving the same transaction or occurrence could have
and would have been invoked by [defendant] in this case but for plaintiff's libel.
Therefore, the court will decide this case as if admiralty jurisdiction had been acquired . . . through the usual third-party procedure." 318 F. Supp. at 1211. The
third-party complaint used by the Consolidated Cork court to sustain jurisdiction
over the claims against the stevedore was obviously under rule 14(c). (In Landers,
supra note 69, at 69 n.82, the Consolidated Cork case is briefed: "[N]o admiralty
jurisdiction over plaintiff's direct claim against a third party, but admiralty proper
if treated as third-party claim for indemnity." Actually, the third-party claim was
both "indemnity" and "substitute defendant" third-party practice. For discussion of
the jurisdictional affinity between "substitute defendant" third-party practice and joinder of parties see notes 141-46, 175-77 supra and accompanying text). Yet the court,
evidently perceiving no difficulty with the jury trial issue, did not mention it. The
Consolidated Cork case is doubly anomalous because of this failure. Both the rule
14(c) third-party practice decisions and the joinder of parties decisions generally
have indicated at least a perception of the seventh amendment difficulty.
Comparison of the results in Howmet and Consolidated Cork is warranted. In
Howmet, plaintiff was not permitted to join a defendant allegedly responsible for
shore damage to cargo, whereas in Consolidated the court ignored that facet of the
case in favor of focusing on the fact that the maritime defendant, in addition to the
plaintiff, wanted the shorebased party in the case. It should be noted that the claim
in Howmet seemed to be based on two separate incidents of damage, one at sea and
one ashore, whereas in Consolidated all the damage presumably occurred ashore.
206. 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971).
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question the existence of independent admiralty jurisdiction against
either defendant, 207 but the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
disagreed with the trial judge's theory that Tidewater was a party
to the maritime contract of carriage. 208 The only other ·traditional
basis for admiralty jurisdiction over Tidewater would have been tort.
However, even if the plaintiff's complaint had been read with the
liberality necessary to discern a claim based on tort, there would have
been no jurisdiction under traditional admiralty principles, because
both the alleged negligence and the damage occurred on land. 209
Upon concluding that there was no independent admiralty
jurisdiction over Tidewater under either a contract or a tort
approach, an admiralty judge of traditional views would have ordered
dismissal as to that defendant. Under the traditional view, not even
diversity (which was lacking in any event210 ) would have cured the
problem, for it was thought that independent admiralty jurisdiction
was a requisite for the joinder of additional parties in a maritime case.
Yet Judge Friendly, writing for the Second Circuit, ignored this
constricting view and achieved a breakthrough of potentially major
significance by using the device of pendent jurisdiction to sustain the
trial court's power to hear the claim against the non.maritime defendant. 211
Judge Friendly's analysis in Leather's Best began with a consideration of the Gibbs212 liberalization of pendent jurisdiction over additional claims; 213 he concluded that the claim against Tidewater passed
the "common nucleus of operative facts" 214 test. The first major step
207. "The district court was not asked, and evidently saw no need, to examine
the jurisdictional underpinnings of this action. Neither has any question in this regard been raised by the parties on this appeal." 451 F.2d at 807.
208. 451 F.2d at 807-08.
209. While the Supreme Court in Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972), held that not all torts that occur on water are within the
admiralty jurisdiction, under one view of the case, it also strongly implied that some
torts not occurring on water may be. See 409 U.S. at 256-61. See also Robertson,
Book Review, 1976 WIS. L. REV. 352, 363-65. However, it is questionable whether
anything in Executive Jet would have validated traditional tort jurisdiction over Tidewater. In any event, the Leather's Best decision antedates Executive Jet.
210. See 451 F.2d at 809 n.10.
211. Leather's Best is generally viewed as one of a trilogy of Second Circuit cases
dramatically extending the pendent jurisdiction doctrine to include the joinder of additional parties by plaintiff. See Comment, Federal Pendent Subject Matter Jurisdiction-The Doctrine of United Mine Workers v. Gibbs Extended to Persons Not Party
to the Jurisdiction-Conferring Claim, 73 CoLUM. L. REv. 153 (1973). The other
two cases of the series were Astor-Honor, Inc. v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 441 F.2d
627 (2d Cir. 1971), decided before Leather's Best, and Almenares v. Wyman, 453
F.2d 1075 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 944 (1972), decided after Leather's
Best.
212. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
213. 451 F.2d at 809.
214. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
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beyond Gibbs necessitated by the instant case--use of pendent jurisdiction to bring in a nonfederal party-had already been taken by the
Second Circuit in a nonadmiralty case, Astor-Honor, Inc. v. Grosset &
Dunlap, Inc., 215 which had involved federal claims under the copyright laws and state claims of unfair trade practice and unfair competition_. There the court had held that a federal court had power to
hear a state claim against a defendant not named in the federal claim,
provided the Gibbs test was satisfied. The Astor-Honor court found
support for this conclusion in prior decisions that had established
ancillary jurisdiction to entertain compulsory counterclaims under
rule 13(a) and third-party claims under rule 14(a). 216
The second necessary step-applying the liberal "pendent
party"217 device in an admiralty case-was a large one, but Judge
Friendly took it with ease:
At an earlier date this [civil/admiralty] difference might have affected our decision here. But the rules of procedure in the admiralty
and civil jurisdiction were merged in 1966, and we are of the opinion that at least since that merger, the constitutional rationale which
underlies the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction in the context of Rule
13(a) and Rule 14 may be applied to support the conclusion that
a federal court has the power to hear a related state claim against
a defendant not named in the federal claim regardless of whether the
federal claim arises in the civil or admiralty jurisdiction. 218
As indicated above, 219 the traditional view of the availability of

auxiliary jurisdictional devices in the federal courts generally would
have listed the following categories, ranging from those where the
extension of federal judicial power was deemed easiest to those where
it was deemed most troublesome:
( 1 ) compulsory counterclaims and cross claims [added state claim
by defendant];
(2) third-party practice220 [state party added by defendant];
(3) joinder of closely related state claim [state claim added by plaintiff];

( 4) joinder of closely related state party [state party added by plaintiff].

Prior to Astor-Honor, 221 the extension of federal judicial power to the
215. 441 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1971).
216. See Judge Friendly's discussion of Astor-Honor in Leathers Best, 451 F.2d
at 809-10. See also note 211 supra; Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693
(1973); Comment, 22 UCLA L. REV. 1263, supra note 109.
217. Comment, 22 UCLA L. REV. 1263, supra note 109, at 1278.
218. 451 F.2d at 810-11 (footnotes omitted),
219. See notes 119-20 supra and accompanying text.
. 220. This would refer, of course, to "indemnity" third-party practice under rule
14(a), and not to the peculiarly admiralty "substitute defendant" third-party practice
under rule 14(c). See notes 141-46, 175-77, 205 supra and accompanying text,
221. See notes 119-20 supra and accompanying text.
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first three situations was well established on the civil side, and AstorHonor set the fourth on its way. Before 1966, the prevailing view
was that admiralty courts could not assume jurisdiction through the
ancillary or pendent devices in any of these cases. 222 Leather's Best
holds that the admiralty side of federal court may now extend its
jurisdiction over cases in the fourth category, which traditionally has
been seen as the least promising category for ancillary or pendent
jurisdiction. The structure of Judge Friendly's argument and ·the
prior practice on the civil side together suggest that all four of these
categories of cases are as fully cognizable on the admiralty side as they
are on the civil side. 223
222. As to the various categories of ancillary jurisdiction-parties other than
plaintiff adding nonfederal claims or parties-Judge Friendly pointed out in Leather's
Best that, prior to 1966, there were no such doctrines in admiralty. 415 F.2d at 810
n.11. As to pendent jurisdiction, the prevailing view is correctly mirrored by the following footnote remark: "Prior to [Beverly Hills Bank], Professor Currie's appraisal
of pendent jurisdiction in admiralty held true [from Currie, The Silver Oar and All
That: A Study of the Romero Case, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 59 (1959)]: 'No one
has ever suggested . • . that the doctrine of "pendent" juriscliction applies to maritime
claims, except in the context of the problem of procedure in seamen's injury cases'
[where the "pending" was not at all of a state claim to a maritime claim in admiralty
court, but rather of a general maritime claim to a statutory maritime claim on the
civil side of federal court]." Note, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 1211, supra note 108, at 1215
n.27. At the time of Leather's Best, there had been two other post-merger decisions
arguably exploiting the third category of juiisdictional extension. See Beverly Hills
Natl. Bank & Trust Co. v. Compania de Nav. Almirante S.A., Panama, 437 F.2d 301
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 996 (1971), discussed in notes 90-96, 178-94 supra;
Ohio Barge Lines, Inc. v. Dravo Corp., 326 F. Supp. 863 (W.D. Pa. 1971), discussed
in notes 197-204 supra. While neither case was mentioned in Leather's Best the prevailing view clearly was that a maritime plaintiff could not utilize the pendent jurisdiction device to add nonmaritime parties. See Howmet Corp. v. Tokyo Shipping
Co., 320 F. Supp. 975 (D. Del. 1971); Consolidated Cork Corp. v. Jugoslavenska
Linijska Plovidba, 318 F. Supp. 1203 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), discussed in note 205 supra.
223. In two long footnotes in Leather's Best, Judge Friendly touched on these
matters as follows:
Prior to the 1966 merger, there was no rule of compulsory counterclaim, much
less a doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction, in the maritime jurisdiction, and permissive cross-libels were limited to claims in admiralty arising out of the same contract or cause of action as the original claim. With merger, however, Rule 13
became applicable to proceedings brought in the admiralty jurisdiction. There
is no evident reason why the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction should not now
be applicable as well to compulsory counterclaims which arise in the context of
suits in admiralty.
With respect to third-party practice, too, admiralty practice differed from
practice on the civil "side" prior to the 1966 merger. Under former Admiralty
Rule 56, at least some independent basis of federal jurisdiction was always necessary to implead a third party. Indeed, there was substantial authority to the effect that the third-party claim had to come within the admiralty jurisdiction.
With merger, a subsection (c) was added to Rule 14 with the intent of preserving certain features of admiralty impleader which were more liberal than civil
impleader. The effect of merger upon the former admiralty requirement of indep.:ndent jurisdiction for impleader has not as yet been conclusively resolved. But
if we were presented with the question, it would be only with the greatest reluctance that we would conclude that under the merged rules the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction did not extend to admiralty as well as to civil impleader. Certainly the practical considerations which support the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction in the context of civil impleader are equally persuasive on the admiralty
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But what of the seventh amendment right to jury trial, the issue
that had created much of the difficulty in the admiralty counterclaim,
third-party, and joinder of claims decisions? 224 Leather's Best disposes of the problem with a footnote: "[I]n this case, we are not
faced with any problem of denial of the right to jury trial since
Tidewater made no such demand below."225 Judge Friendly's failure
to treat the jury trial problem is puzzling. Leather's Best has the look
of a case chosen by the court of appeals as a vehicle to write some
law. The trial court's inclusion of the terminal operator on the theory
that the claim against it was incident to a maritime contract was
perhaps erroneous, but the Second Circuit was under no compulsion
to notice that problem sua sponte. In the context of an exposition
upon the post-1966 reach of admiralty's pendent and ancillary powers, the relegation of the jury trial problem to a footnote about "this
case" is disappointing.
The Leather's Best decision has been used to support the exercise
of pendent jurisdiction over rule 14(c) third-party defendants, 226 and
in one case to support pendent jurisdiction over an additional party
joined by plaintiff, 227 but it has not exercised an influence even
remotely commensurate with its potential importance. One reason
for the relative paucity of discussion of this aspect of the case228 might
be its failure to confront the seventh amendment problem, but a more
likely explanation is the tendency of courts and commentators dealing
with matters of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction to perceive the
subject as divided into fairly rigid compartments. Thus, for example,
if a given decision dealt with third-party practice, it is not likely to be
mentioned in the context of counterclaims. As the Leather's Best
opinion indicated, the underlying problems are the same whether the
additional claim or defendant is added to the maritime case at the
behest of the plaintiff or the defendant, but, by and large, the cases
side. In any event, we do not perceive the requirement of independent jurisdiction in pre-merger admiralty impleader to have had constitutional underpinnings.
Rather it reflected a judicial conception of the limited nature of Admiralty Rule
56 and the appropriate reach of the then distinct admiralty jurisdiction.
451 F.2d 810-11 nn.11 & 12 (citations omitted) (emphasis original).
224. See notes 126-28, 167-69, 175-77 supra and accompanying text.
225. 451 F.2d at 811 n.12.
226. See Royal Typewriter Co. v. M/V Kulmerland, 346 F. Supp. 1019, 1025
(S.D.N.Y. 1972), atfd., 483 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1973).
227. See Princess Cruises Corp. v. Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 762,
765 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (the jury trial problem was not mentioned).
228. The case is widely known for its substantive treatment of the $500 per package limitation of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) (1970).
Sae, e.g., Note, 4 J. MAR.~- & COMMERCE 159 (1972).
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and the commentary do not treat these questions from this perspective.220
~
If Leather's Best had been decided by the Supreme Court, and if
it were understood and followed by the lower courts in the sense
indicated here, the 1966 merger would have gone far toward accomplishing what many of its proponents saw as its major purpose-the
abolition of civil/ admiralty separatism. Such a Supreme Court decision would validate the hope, expressed in the 1969 ALI study, that
such jurisdictional anomalies as admiralty's want of equitable powers
and the rule that ship-sale contracts are not maritime could be cured
or mitigated by the doctrines of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction.230
As it stands, however, the case has not been that influential.
5.

"Romero-Pendenf' 231 Problems

This subsection discusses situations in which a party seeks to add
maritime parties or claims to cases brought on the civil side232 of
federal court under federal question or diversity jurisdiction. In these
decisions the problems of separatism are not the direct result of the
conception of "admiralty" as a separate court. Rather, the difficulties confronted by the federal courts stem in part from the rigidity of
the concomitant conception that maritime substantive law differs
radically from other federal law, and in part from uncertainties as to
the appropriate role of the seventh amendment in maritime cases.
The largest single category of such cases consists of actions
brought by injured seamen, who typically will assert in a single
proceeding three distinct claims against the employer: (1) Negligence, under the Jones Act; 233 (2) unseaworthiness, under the general
229. Landers, supra note 69, at 73, appears to view the Leather's Best case in
a light similar to that indicated in the text. Landers disapproved of the decision,
using the familiar argument that the 1966 rules could hardly have worked the necessary change.
230. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STuDY OF THE DMSION OF JURISDICTION BETIVEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 226-29 (1969).
231. For the explanation of this term, see note 115 supra.
232. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
233. 46 u.s.c. § 688 (1970):
Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment
may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of
trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or
extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway
employees shall apply; and in case of the death of any seaman as a result of
any such personal injury the personal representative of such seaman may maintain an action for damages at law with the right of trial by jury, and in such
action all statutes of the United States conferring or regulating the right of action for death in the case of railway employees shall be applicable. Jurisdiction
in such actions shall be under the court of the district in which the defendant
employer resides or in which his principal office is located.
As interpreted in Panama. R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924), the Jones Act per-
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maritime law; and (3) maintenance and cure, under the general
:p1aritime law. The Jones Act expressly gives an injured seaman the
option of proceeding "at law, with the right of trial by jury." The
problem that gave rise to the important case of Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co. 234 was the natural desire of the seaman-plaintiff for a jury trial of the other two claims as well. The
court of appeals had split on whether the unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure claims, premised as they are on federal case law,
"arise under" federal laws in the sense necessary for federal question
jurisdiction. In Romero, the Supreme Court decided that they did
not, but went on to hold that when a seaman brings a Jones Act suit
at law, the intimately related unseaworthiness and maintenance and
cure claims can be heard simultaneously as a matter of pendent jurisdiction. One would have thought that this disposition necessarily
afforded the seaman a jury trial on all three of his closely connected
injury claims, but, because of the technical posture of the case, the
Romero court expressly left this issue open.285
Several years later, in Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 286 the
Court resolved the matter in favor of the right to a jury trial. In
Fitzgerald a seaman had brought a Jones Act suit on the civil side of
federal court; he added counts based on the general maritime law of
unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure, and demanded a jury
trial of all the issues. The Supreme Court held in his favor:
Although remedies for negligence, unseaworthiness, and maintenance
and cure have different origins and may on occasion call for application of slightly different principles and procedures, they nevertheless,
when based on one unitary set of circumstances, serve the same purpose of indemnifying a seaman for damage caused by injury, depend
in large part upon the same evidence, and involve some identical elements of recovery. Requiring a seaman to split up his lawsuit, submitting part of it to a jury and part to a judge, unduly complicates
and confuses a trial, creates difficulties in applying doctrines of res
judicata and collateral estoppel, and can easily result in too much or
too little recovery. 2 a1
Thus, common sense dictated a single trial to a jury "[i]n the absence
of some statutory or constitutional obstacle."288 While admiralty's
mits an injured seaman, at his option, to proceed in admiralty, without a jury, or in
state court or federal court, with a jury.
234. 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
235. 358 U.S. at 381. For a thorough analysis of the Romero case, see Currie,
The Silver Oar and All That: A Study of the Romero Case, 27 U, Cm. L. REV, 1
(1959), and Kurland, The Romero Case and Some Problems of Federal Jurisdiction,
73 HARV, L. REV. 817 (1960),
236. 374 U.S. 16 (1963).
237. 374 U.S. at 18-19 (footnote omitted).
238. 374 U.S. at 20.
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nonjury tradition was firm and venerable, it did not, in the Court's
view, amount to such an obstacle: "While this court has held that
the Seventh Amendment does not require jury trial in admiralty cases,
neither that amendment nor any other provision of the Constitution
forbids them. Nor does any statute of Congress or Rule of Procedure, Civil or Admiralty, forbid jury trials in maritime cases."239
The traditional interpretation of Romero and Fitzgerald has been
that pendent jurisdiction on the civil side of the federal court was
the seaman's only route240 to jury trial of his unseaworthiness and
maintenance and cure claims; on the admiralty side juries remained
unknown. 241 But several recent decisions, noµng that the language
of Fitzgerald2 42 is consistent with limited provision of jury trials in
courts of admiralty, have concluded that in appropriate cases admiralty's nonjury tradition should yield to the dictates of the seventh
amendment. 243 The two leading cases are from the Third Circuit. In
Haskins v. Point Towing Co.,244 a pleading that the court termed
"confused" 245 was interpreted as asserting a Jones Act claim at law,
and unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure claims in admiralty.
Plaintiff sought consolidation of the civil and admiralty actions and a
jury trial of all three claims. 246 The court granted his request because of the policy it found to be implicit in Fitzgerald: 247
239. 374 U.S. at -20.
240. A plaintiff with a maritime case as to which admiralty jurisdiction is not
exclusive can proceed on the basis of diversity and get a federal jury, provided he
can meet the requirements for diversity jurisdiction. See text at notes 4-7 supra.
241. See, e.g., Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Philadelphia Ship Maintenance Co., 342
F. Supp. 786 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Sanderlin v. Old Dominion Stevedoring Corp., 281
F. Supp. 1015 (E.D. Va. 1968).
242. See text at notes 237, 239 supra.
243. See Blake v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 417 F.2d 264, 266 (3d Cir. 1969); Haskins
v. Point Towing Co., 395 F.2d 737 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 834
(1970); Saus v. Delta Concrete Co., 368 F. Supp. 297 (W.D. Pa. 1973). See generally In re Dearborn Marine Service, Inc., 499 F.2d 263, 271 (5th Cir. 1974); Terracciano v. McAlinden Constr. Co., 485 F.2d 304, 308-09 (2d Cir. 1973),
244. 395 F.2d 737 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 834 (1970). The denial of certiorari occurred after the Third Circuit had affirmed a decision by the
trial court on remand that plaintiff was not entitled to Jones Act benefits because
he had failed to establish an employment relationship with the defendant. See Haskins v. Point Towing Co., 421 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1970).
245. 395 F.2d at 738.
246. Broad discretion respecting consolidation and separate trial orders is provided in rule 42, which requires "preserving inviolate the right of trial by jury as
declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of
the United States." See FED. R. CIV. P. 42.
247. In Fitzgerald the Supreme Court "made no attempt to define precisely how
plaintiff had labeled his claims, whether in admiralty or at law, . . . [but rather]
based its decision on the fundamental factors of simplicity, utility to litigants and
the interest of justice in having one tribunal decide the three claims which in general
arise from a unitary set of circumstances." 395 F.2d at 740.
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We see no reason why a plaintiff who sues at law under the Jones
Act for negligence must make his claims for unseaworthiness and
maintenance and cure pendent to it on the law side in order to maintain his right to trial by jury on all three claims. To require this could
compel him to lose the advantages which inhere in the characteristic
admiralty claims, such as in rem process, interlocutory appeals, [and]
admiralty attachment . . . . There is no reason to make relinquishment of the procedural advantages of the inherent admiralty claims
for unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure the price for a jury
trial. 248

Thus, out of regard for "simplicity, utility to litigants, and the interest
of justice,"249 Haskins took the Fitzgerald decision a major step
forward. Fitzgerald had mandated jury trial of maritime claims
brought on the civil side as pendent to "arising under'' claims; Haskins
extended the mandate to maritime claims brought on the admiralty
side and consolidated with "arising under'' claims. Still, the decision might have been interpreted as limited to the assertion of
a seaman's rights under a statute affirmatively endowing seamen with
the right to jury trial; the availability of jury trial for other kinds of
maritime claims that lack an independent diversity or federal question
basis was not implicated in the Haskins rationale.
It remained for the same court of appeals to complete the picture
the following year. Blake v. Farrell Lines, Inc. 250 consolidated several
like cases in which a longshoreman's personal injury action against
a shipowner was based on diversity and in which a separate admiralty
suit for indemnity had been brought by the shipowner against the
plaintiff's employer. Each shipowner moved for consolidation of the
original diversity suit with the admiralty indemnity suit and requested
a separate bench trial of the indemnity suit; each employer argued
that consolidation should result in a jury trial of all issues in the case.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the trial judges had
properly ordered jury trial of the entire case. At the core of its
decision was the court's perception that, while jury trial is clearly a
matter of right under the Constitution, nonjury trial in admiralty
is merely a matter of tradition. 251 The court noted that while the
federal rules provide for "the assertion and preservation of the right to
248. 395 F.2d at 741 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). Accord, Saus v.
Delta Concrete Co., 368 F. Supp. 297 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
249. 395 F.2d at 740.
250. 417 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1969).
251. "[J]ury trial is a matter of right in the action for damages while only historic practice and the failure of the Rules to make affirmative provision for this situation inhibit the ordering of a jury trial of the admiralty suit." 417 F.2d at 266ol.
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jury trial," 252 they "neither create nor preserve any right to a non-jury
trial." 253 It concluded that in special situations of trial consolidation
of closely related actions or claims, one of which is attended by a right
to jury trial and the other not, a court may, in the interest of efficient
and expeditious administration of justice, submit both to a jury for a
decision concerning disputed factual issues. 254
The Blake court did caution against reading the decision to mean
"that in the ordinary situation in which there is no right to a jury trial,
the trial judge may, within his discretion, reject the traditional mode
of fact finding and order a jury trial." 255 Yet the reasoning in the
case is potent, 256 and might be used with equal efficacy to resolve the
jury problems created by the use of ancillary and pendent techniques
in cases originally based on admiralty jurisdiction. As previously
mentioned, the jury trial problem in those cases has been handled in
various ways. In some instances the problem was ignored,257 in
others a jury trial of the nonmaritime claim was ordered. 258 Occa252. 417 F.2d at 266.
253. 417 F.2d at 266.
254. 417 F.2d at 266.
255. 417 F.2d at 266.
256. See, e.g., Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Philadelphia Ship Maintenance Co., 312
F. Supp. 380, 381-82 (E.D. Pa. 1970), revd. and remanded, 444 F.2d 727 (3d Cir.
1971), on remand, 342 F. Supp. 786 (E.D. Pa. 1972). In Bergeria v. Marine Carriers, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 1153 (E.D. Pa. 1972), a district court suggested the one
obvious extension. In that case, a seaman brought a civil-side action premised on
the Jones Act and the doctrine of unseaworthiness, demanding a jury trial. Shipowner counterclaimed for fraudulently procured maintenance and cure. Plaintiff
urged that the counterclaim should be dismissed as not within federal jurisdiction.
The court, however, found independent admiralty jurisdiction over the counterclaim.
The major question remained the mode of trial of the issues presented by the counterclaim. Relying on Fitzgerald, Blake, and the fact that the issues on the main claim
and the counterclaim were almost entirely overlapping, the court ordered the counterclaim tried to the jury. The court's discussion of the jury trial problem is aptly expressive of the Blake philosophy:
In the present case, the jury will have to determine whether the injuries giving
rise to plaintiff's Jones Act claim were the result of an accident aboard ship . • •
or whether they resulted from the preexisting condition alone. Much the same
factual determination is involved in the claim for recovery by the shipowner of
the maintenance and cure which it claims was fraudulently procured. . . . It
would appear that this case presents the obverse of the Fitzgerald situation, since
what is involved here is a claim to recover maintenance and cure allegedly
wrongfully paid instead of a claim by the seaman to recover maintenance and
cure in the first instance. However, since the same policies of judicial efficiency
and consistency apply, we hold that Fitzgerald, as amplified by Blake, required
submission of the counterclaim to the jury.
341 F. Supp. at 1157-58 (emphasis added).
257. See Ohio Barge Lines, Inc. v. Dravo Corp., 326 F. Supp. 863 (W.D. Pa.
1971), discussed in notes 197-204 supra and accompanying text; Eutectic Corp. v.
M/V Gudmundra, 367 F. Supp. 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Royal Typewriter Co. v.
M/V Kulmerland, 346 F. Supp. 1019 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), affd., 483 F.2d 645 (2d
Cir. 1973).
258. See Alaska Barite Co. v. Freighters, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1972),
discussed in note 124 supra; Industrial Equip. & Marine Serv., Inc. v. M/V Mr.
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sionally courts have found that a befuddled nonmaritime party made a
highly fictional waiver of his seventh amendment rights. 250 One
possible nonseparatist resolution of the problem would be that the
assertion of jurisdiction by an admiralty court over any closely related
claim or party makes that claim or party maritime, 260 thus removing
it from the seventh amendment's "suits at common law" category. A
more appealing solution, suggested by Blake v. Farrell Lines, Inc., is
to recognize that the want of juries in admiralty is merely a matter of
tradition261 that is clearly outweighed by the seventh amendment on
the "admiralty side" just as Fitzgerald struck this balance on the "law
side." Such recognition would lead to a requirement that, regardless
of the original basis for jurisdiction, federal courts provide a jury trial
for all issues upon the demand of any party who could have summoned a federal jury to decide any one of the claims. This practice
would comport with the conclusion of one district court that,
"[g]iven the policy of the seventh amendment . . . , federal courts
are less apt to err by granting jury trials, where not prohibited, than
by denying jury trials. "262
As indicated above, very few cases where admiralty was the
original basis for federal jurisdiction have adopted the philosophy of
providing jury trials for all issues of fact. 263 Indeed, this approach
has gained only partial acceptance in the maritime cases brought on
Gus, 333 F. Supp. 578, 582 (S.D. Tex. 1971), discussed in note 124 supra; Christman
v. Maristella Compania Naviera, 293 F. Supp. 442, 444 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), discussed
in notes 160-64 supra and accompanying text.
259. See Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800, 811 n.12 (2d Cir.
1971), discussed in notes 206-25 supra and accompanying text; Beverly Hills Natl.
Bank & Trust Co. v. Compania de Nav. Almirante S.A., Panama, 437 F.2d 301, 307
(9th Cir. 1971), discussed in notes 178-94 supra and accompanying text.
260. See text at note 175 supra.
261. Rule 38(e) does not detract from this argument. It states: "These rules
shall not be construed to create a right to trial by jury of the issues in an admiralty
or maritime claim within the meaning of Rule 9(h)." FED. R. C1v. P. 38(e). This
is no more than a statement that the rules draftsmen did not see fit to examine the
tradition. See Nice v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 305 F. Supp. 1167 (W.D. Mich.
1969), in which the court stated:
The Explanatory Notes to then proposed Rule 38(e) indicate that the drafters
were cognizant of a very limited right to a jury trial [in admiralty]. "There
is no constitutional right to a jury trial in admiralty, and statutes conferring it
are rare. The purpose of the new subdivision is to preserve the status quo as
to a jury trial." Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Memo to the Advisory Comm. on Admiralty Rules, the Status of Unification of the Civil and
Admiralty Rules 33 (Nov. 15, 1962).
305 F. Supp. at 1185 & n.4.
262. Ballard v. Moore-~cCormack Lines, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 290, 297 (S.D.N.Y.
1968). Accord, In re Dearborn Marine Serv., Inc., 499 F.2d 263, 271 (5th Cir.
1974); Terraccian~ v. McAlinden Constr. Co., 484 F.2d 304, 316 (2d Cir. 1973);
Gyorf1 v. Partredenet Atomena, 58 F.R.D. 112, 114-16 (N.D. Ohio 1973) · Gvirtsman
v. Western King Co., 263 F. Supp. 633 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
'
263. See text at notes 126-28, 154-56, 160-64, 176-77 supra,
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the civil side, as reflected in three sets of cases. In one group of
decisions, a shipowner's rights under the Limitation of Liability
Act264 were asserted as a defense to a maritime action on the civil side
of the federal court. In each case the court provided a bifurcated
trial, and only the limitation issues were tried to the judge sitting
alone. 265 In these decisions, the plaintiff had asserted his saving
clause option in order to get a jury trial, and it was the defendant who
sought to convert all or part of the case into an exclusively admiralty
proceeding. The bifurcated trial resolution was deemed essential to
preserve both the plaintiff's seventh amendment rights and the defendant-shipowner's right to an exclusively admiralty defense. 266
No consistent resolution has emerged for the second category of
cases, in which the plaintiff seeks both unique admiralty procedures
or remedies and a jury trial. Where plaintiffs sought to combine
causes of action under the exclusively admiralty 267 Death on the High
Seas Act268 with a Jones Act civil action, jury trial of all the issues has
been held proper. 269 This outcome is in full accord with the spirit of
Haskins 270 and Blake 271 that "there is no reason to make relinquishment of the procedural advantages of the inherent admiralty claims
. . . the price for a jury trial. "272 On the other hand, in two cases
where plaintiffs sought to combine in personam jury trials with in rem
procedures, district courts held that the in rem features would have to
264. 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-189 (1970); See also FED. R. CIV. P. F.
265. See Terracciano v. McAlinden Constr. Co., 485 F.2d 304, 308-09 (2d Cir.
1973) (appropriate procedure is to try liability issues to the jury and limitation issues
to the judge alone; but where no objections made at the trial level, no error in trying
the entire matter to the jury); Famiano v. Enyeart, 398 F.2d 661, 664 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1020 (1968); Doughty v. Nebel Towing Co., 270 F. Supp. 957,
959 (E.D. La. 1967).
266. Where limitation of liability is affirmatively invoked by a limitation complaint filed under the admiralty jurisdiction, see FED. R. CIV. P. F, there is no right
to a jury trial on behalf of any of the claimants. Complaint of Great Lakes Towing
Co., 395 F. Supp. 810, 812-13 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (if there are multiple claimants
in the limitation proceeding, admiralty's nonjury tradition takes precedence over
Great Lakes jury trial statute, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1873 (1966) ).
267. The weight of authority is that actions under the Death on the High Seas
Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1970), must be brought on the admiralty side, and may
not be brought at law under the saving clause. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra
note 48, at 40 n.133. But there has always been doubt about the validity of that
view. See Comment, Death on the High Seas Act, 55 CoLUM. L. REv. 907 (1955).
268. 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of March 30, 1920, ch.
111, § 1, 41 Stat. 537).
269. Peace v. Fidalgo Island Packing Co., 419 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1969); Gvirstman v. Western King Co., 263 F. Supp. 633 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
270. Haskins v. Point Towing Co., 395 F.2d 737 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 834 (1970), discussed in notes 244-49 supra and accompanying text.
271. Blake v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 417 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1969), discussed in notes
250-54 supra and accompanying text.
272. Haskins v. Point Towing Co., 395 F.2d 737, 741 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 834 (1970).
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be dropped from the case as the price for jury trial. 273 From the
traditional viewpoint, the reasoning of these cases was
unexceptionable: (1) The law side of a federal court has no jurisdiction to entertain a libel in rem, which is the major category of
exclusive admiralty jurisdiction; (2) There are no jury trials in admiralty; (3) Therefore, the plaintiff must choose between the admiralty
side, where a libel in rem is available, or the civil side, where there is
a right to a jury trial. Far preferable to this reasoning would have
been an acknowledgment, on the authority of cases like Haskins and
Blake, of the feasibility of jury trials in admiralty.
In a third category of Romero-pendent cases, the plaintiff pursues
a maritime cause on the civil side of federal court and the original
defendant seeks to implead a third-party defendant as a matter of
admiralty or maritime jurisdiction under rule 9(h). 274 If Blake is
correct then it ought to follow that when a plaintiff asserts a maritime
claim for jury trial on the law side, and the first defendant seeks to
implicate the second according to third-party practice, the entire case
may be tried to the jury. 275 This was, in fact, the holding in Gyorfi v.
Partrederiet Atomena,276 where the plaintiff had brought a diversity
action277 against a shipowner, and the shipowner brought a third-party
action, which he designated an admiralty claim under 9(h), against
the stevedore. The question in the case was whether the stevedore was
entitled to a jury trial of the third-party claim. The court held that
the entire case should be tried to the same jury. Relying extensively
on Blake, 278 the court made an important distinction:
[T]he fact that there is no jury trial in admiralty does not mean that
it is impermissible for a jury to hear and determine issues denominated as arising under the court's admiralty jurisdiction. . . .
273. Johnson v. Venezuelan Line S.S. Co., 314 F. Supp. 1403, 1406-07 (E.D. La.
1970); Fernandes v. United Fruit Co., 303 F. Supp. 681 (D. Md. 1969).
274. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(h).
275. Indeed, in Close v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 44 F.R.D. 398 (E.D. Pa. 1968), the
district court advanced from the assertion that if the more usual third-party practice
had been employed there would clearly be a jury right, to the conclusion that there
was similarly a jury trial in the consolidation situation.
276. 58 F.R.D. 112 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
277. ''The complaint is lacking a formal jurisdictional allegation. However, the
plaintiff does plead facts which would be sufficient to support both general civil jurisdiction under diversity of citizenship and admiralty jurisdiction. Trial by jury was
requested." 58 F.R.D. at 113. The court elected to treat plaintiffs complaint, in
accordance with its obvious intention, as though it were in diversity. This is to be
contrasted with the highly technical, almost punitive, approach taken in Americana
of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Transocean Tankers Corp., 317 F. Supp. 798 (D.P.R. 1969),
holding that where plaintiff pleads both rule 9(h) and diversity, he is precluded from
making a later jury demand. See note 314 infra and accompanying text.
278. The Gyorfi court was also much impressed by the reasoning of the court
in Close v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 44 F.R.D. 398 (E.D. Pa. 1968). See 58 F.R.D. at
115-16. Close was one of the cases consolidated on appeal in Blake.
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[W]hile it is often said that there may not be a jury trial in admiralty,
the accurate statement of law is that there is no constitutional right
to a jury trial in admiralty and that customarily admiralty actions
are tried to the court.279

Custom can yield, said the court, when factors such as those discussed
in Blake280 are present.
A similar philosophy obtained in Saus v. Delta Concrete Co.,281
where the plaintiff sued his employer at law under the Jones Act, and
the employer brought in as a third-party defendant the owner of the
barge on which the plaintiff had been hurt. The third-party defendant contended that because the plaintiff's Jones Act claim could not
be considered a rule 9(h) claim, substitute-defendant third-party
practice under rule 14(c)282 was unavailable. The district court
answered that despite the plaintiff's request for a jury trial of his
Jones Act claim, the case was still, in a conceptual sense, an admiralty
or maritime claim, for which the procedure of rule 14(c) was
available. In response to the third-party defendant's contention that
a Jones Act jury proceeding and a rule 9(h) maritime case are
mutually exclusive concepts, the court noted that Fitzgerald283 and
Haskins 284 were "unequivocally against [third-party defendant's] argument."285 The Saus court also indicated that the entire matter
should be tried to the jury. 286

6.

Summary

Much of the recent case law concerned with the conflict between
one party's asserted right to jury trial and another's asserted right to
an admiralty bench trial has revealed a judicial tendency to disregard
the civil/ admiralty barrier in order to accommodate the overriding
seventh amendment right. Yet the cases continue to exhibit uncertainty over the proper force of admiralty's nonjury tradition, especially
where admiralty was the basis for the original invocation of federal
jurisdiction. Particularly in the Romero-pendent cases, there is evidence that the 1966 merger is gradually coming to have the intended
effect of dissolving the artificial separateness of admiralty jurisdiction.
However, there is more than enough evidence of a continuing paten279. 58 F.R.D. at 114 (emphasis original).
280. See 58 F.R:D. at 115-16.
281. 368 F. Supp. 297 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
282. See text at notes 141-46 supra.
283. Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16 (1963).
284. Haskins v. Point Towing Co., 395 F.2d 737 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 834 (1970).
285. 368 F. Supp. at 298.
286. 368 F. Supp. at 298.
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tial for confusion and arguable injustice in the courts' view of the
nature of unification to warrant legislative action to complete what
the unification intended to achieve.

C.

Other Separatism Problems

In a variety of otherwise unrelated ways, the separatist view of
admiralty that has survived the 1966 unification continues to create
problems for the courts. In this subsection, a number of such
discrete problem areas will be briefly considered.
1.

Amendment of Pleadings To Add or Withdraw the Rule 9(h)
Designation

As indicated above, 281 in cases where federal jurisdiction is
present on diversity or federal question as well as admiralty grounds,
the plaintiff must decide whether to include in his complaint "a
statement identifying the claim as an admiralty or maritime claim" 288
under rule 9(h). If the 9(h) designation is made, admiralty's
nonjury tradition obtains;289 if it is not, trial will ordinarily be to a
jury.
Rule 9(h) evidently contemplates a liberal policy of allowing
amending pleadings to add or withdraw the identifying statement, for
it specifies that such amendment "is governed by the principles of
Rule 15."290 Rule 15 in tum states that "[a] party may amend his
pleading once-as a matter of course at any time before a responsive
pleading is served . . . . Otherwise a party may amend his pleading
only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and
leave shall be freely given when justice so requires." 291 On the basis
of these provisions, the proper practice would appear to be clear.
Indeed, a leading treatise on federal practice has so concluded:
The pleader's identification of his claim as an admiralty or maritime
claim or his failure to do so is not an irrevocable election. The
general liberal principles found in Rule 15 as to amendment of
pleadings are expressly made applicable to the identifying statement
by the penultimate sentence of Rule 9(h). Hence the identification
287. See text at notes 1-12 supra.
288. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(h).
289. Rule 9(h) provides for an optional statement identifying the claim "as an
admiralty or maritime claim for the purposes of Rule[s] ••• 38(e) ••.•" FED.
R. CIV. P. 9(h). Rule 38(e) provides: ''These rules shall not be construed to create a right to trial by jury of the issues in an admiralty or maritime claim within
the meaning of Rule 9(h)." FED. R. CIV. P. 38(e).
290. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(h).
291. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a) (emphasis added).
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can be deleted or belatedly inserted as permitted by the rules governing amendment of pleadings. 292
Unfortunately, the case law on the matter is less clear. In several
cases wherein plaintiffs sought to add the 9 (h) designation, the indicated liberality has properly prevailed. 293 But courts have been
sharply divided in cases where the plaintiff's option to add the 9(h)
designation clashes with another party's asserted right to jury trial.
The conflict among the circuits has been produced in part by a lack
of clarity in the rules themselves. While rules 9(h) and 15 express a
liberal amendment policy, rules 38 and 39 provide that once any
party has demanded a jury trial of an issue triable of right by a jury, a
nonjury trial may be conducted only with the consent of the parties.204 Thus, the rules seem to speak with two voices to the situation
where plaintiff has filed his maritime action on the basis of diversity or
federal question jurisdiction, either party has demanded a jury trial,
and plaintiff then seeks to amend in order to add the rule 9(h)
designation. 295
In the Fifth Circuit, Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co.206 takes the
position that in the situation suggested here the jury right prevails.297
In each of the two cases disposed of in Johnson, a seaman suing his
employer under the Jones Act (and alleging diversity of citizenship as
well) demanded a jury trial. Then, over two years Iater, 298 each
plaintiff sought to add a 9(h) designation; neither amended complaint referred to the matter of a jury trial. Despite defendants'
motions for jury trials, each case was tried to the judge alone. That,
said the Fifth Circuit, was reversible error, which deprived defendants
of their seventh amendment right to trial by jury. 299 The court's
reasoning was as follows:
The procedure set forth in Rule 39(a) for transferring an action from
a district court's jury docket to its non-jury docket gives explicit recognition to the quasi-constitutional privilege of the party who did not
292. 5 C,
455 (1969).

WRIGHT

& A. MILLER, FFDE.RAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§

1314, at

293. See McCrary v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 469 F.2d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 1972);
Doucet v. Wheless Drilling Co., 467 F.2d 336, 341 (5th Cir. 1972); Elverfield v.
Central Gulf S.S. Co., 1974 A.M.C. 409,410 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Di Paola v. International Terminal Operating Co., 294 F. Supp. 736, 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
294. FED. R. Civ. P. 38(b), 38(d), 39(a).
295. See Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., 469 F.2d 897, 901 (5th Cir. 1972),
affd. en bane, 510 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1975): "Our resolution of the jury trial issue
presented by these appeals requires that we attempt a reconciliation of apparently
conflicting provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."
296. 469 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1972), afjd. en bane, 510 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1975).
297. Accord, Banks v. Hanover S.S. Corp., 43 F.R.D. 374, 380 (D. Md. 1967).
298. 469 F.2d at 899, 900.
299. 469 F.2d at 899.
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originally demand trial by jury to rely upon the jury trial demand
made by the adverse party. We therefore hold that the district court
erred when it transferred these two actions from its jury docket to
its non-jury docket without first obtaining Rule 39(a) consent to the
transfers. . . .300
To precisely the opposite effect is McCrary v. Seatrain Lines,
/nc.,801 decided by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals just twenty
days before Johnson. In Mccrary, a longshoreman had sued a
shipowner in diversity, apparently without any explicit jury demand.
The shipowner filed a third-party complaint against the stevedoring
company, and in its answer the stevedoring company demanded a
jury trial. The plaintiff settled with the shipowner during pretrial,
and the trial judge decided to try the shipowner's action against the
stevedore without a jury, despite the stevedore's objections. The
Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the trial judge had reached
the right result for the wrong reasons. In the view of the trial judge,
the indemnity claim of the shipowner against the stevedore lay only in
admiralty; as such, it was triable to the court alone, without the
necessity of a 9(h) designation. 302 That determination was erroneous, said the appellate court, because the shipowners' third-party
claim "did not lie solely in admiralty. It was ancillary to the injured
workman's diversity action."303 Therefore, it would have been incorrect to deny the stevedore's motion for jury trial on these facts alone.
However, the shipowner should have been allowed, as it had demanded, to amend its third-party complaint to add the 9(h) designation under the terms of rule 15. Here, the shipowner had made a
timely effort to amend its third-party complaint, and there was no
showing that the stevedore would suffer any prejudice if the amendment were allowed. 304
The Fifth Circuit offers the better argument. Under the present
form of the Rules, admiralty's nonjury tradition is bound to conflict
300. 469 F.2d at 903. It should be noted that despite the fact that plaintiffs in
Johnson were not explicit in withdrawing their jury demand when they sought to add
the rule 9(h) designation, the Fifth Circuit properly read the amendments as designed for that purpose; indeed, that could have been the only purpose. This is to
be contrasted with the kind of concern for technicalities manifested in some of the
other decisions involving similar points. See text at notes 8-21 supra, 308-15 infra.
301. 469 F.2d 666 (9th Cir. 1972). Accord, Elverfield v. Central Gulf S.S. Co.,
1974 A.M.C. 409, 410 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
302. Rule 9(h) says in pertinent part: "If the claim is cognizable only in admiralty, it is an admiralty or maritime claim for those purposes [Rules 14(c), 38(e),
82, and the Supplemental Rules] whether so identified or not." FED. R. C1v. P.
9(h).
303. 469 F.2d at 668.
304. McCrary thus is like Johnson in taking a nontechnical approach to construing pleadings, in sharp contrast to several other relate • decisions. See text at notes
8-21 supra, 308-15 infra,
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on occasion with seventh amendment rights. As indicated above, 305
a sensible interim policy would be a simple resolution in favor of the
jury right in all such cases. A more stable long-term resolution
would be achieved by legislation designed to bring the jury into
admiralty proceedings. 306 Better yet, legislative adoption of the-proposal advocated in the concluding section of this paper3° 7 would
resolve this matter, and other problems as well.
In the converse situation, where a plaintiff seeks to withdraw his
9(h) designation in order to obtain a jury trial, there is no confusion
in the rules, no conflict between the jury right and the liberal amendment policy of rules 9(h) and 15, and therefore no reason for judicial
reluctance to permit amendment. It ought to be far easier for a
plaintiff to withdraw a 9 (h) designation and get a jury trial than it is
to add the designation in the face of some other party's asserted right
to jury trial. Yet the case law demonstrates precisely the reverse
emphasis. In Romero v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation,3° 8 the Fifth
Circuit refused to permit plaintiff to amend his complaint in this
fashion, on the theory that while such amendment might be permissible, plaintiffs counsel plainly did not know how to obtain it. 309 In
achieving that draconian result, the court strongly suggested that it
ought to be much more difficult for plaintiff to "shift . . . from admiralty to law" than vice versa. 310 Other decisions agree with Romero
that while the 9(h) designation may not be irrevocable, an amendment
to withdraw it will not be allowed when it is attempted late311 or in
improper form. 312 Worse yet, other decisions flatly defy the plain
wording of rule 9(h) that "the amendment of pleading to add or
withdraw an identifying statement is governed by the principles of
Rule 15,"313 and hold that the 9(h) designation is irrevocable. 814
305. See notes 126-28, 167-69, 175-77 supra and accompanying text.
306. See notes 33-43 supra and accompanying text.
307. See notes 379-405 infra and accompanying text.
308. 515 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1975). See notes 1-12 supra and accompanying
text.
309. 515 F.2d at 1249.
310. The Court quoted and relied on the earlier Fifth Circuit decision of Doucet
v. Wheless Drilling Co., 467 F.2d 336 (5th Cir. 1972), where the plaintiff had been
accorded great latitude respecting a shift from "law to admiralty" in order to obtain
pre-judgment interest under the Jones Act. 515 F.2d at 1252-53 n.1. See text at
notes 345-52 infra.
311. Anderson v. American Oil Co., 60 F.R.D. 676 (S.D. Ga. 1973).
312. Williams v. Shipping Corp. of India, Ltd., 354 F. Supp. 626 (S.D. Ga.
1973).
313. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(h).
. 314. See Transamerican Trailer Transp., Inc. v. Transocean Gateway Terminal,
foe., 1974 A.M.C. 1860 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Americana of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Transocean Tankers Corp., 317 F. Supp. 798 (D.P.R. 1969); See also Alaska Barite Co.
v. Freighters, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 192, 194 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (dictum). Compare Maz-
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This view of the rule 9(h) choice is clearly contrary to the spirit of
unification, and seems yet another instance of the undesirable tenacity
of old formalisms. 815

2.

Choice of Law Mistakes

No convincing argument has ever been advanced for allowing the
choice of forum in our federal system to affect applicable substantive
law. It is now well-established that in a case based upon diversity of
citizenship, a federal district court sitting in a particular state must
apply the same substantive principles that the state's own courts would
apply. 816 Similarly, if a plaintiff exercises his saving clause option to
bring an admiralty and maritime case in a nonadmiralty forum, the
applicable substantive principles will be those that an admiralty court
would apply in that case. 817 Since 1917,318 the Supreme Court has
consistently held that the substantive aspects of cases of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction are presumptively controlled by the general
maritime law of the United States, which consists of federal statutes
and case law. 319 Choice of law in the maritime sphere is, in other
words, governed by a reverse-Erie principle. 320 In both diversity and
admiralty cases consistency of the applied substantive law is the goal.
With some frequency, maritime matters arise for which there is no
settled disposition in the federal maritime law, or which have some
significant feature that is local in nature. In such instances, a "marizella v. Pan Oceanica A/S Panama, 232 F. Supp. 29, 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), a pre•
unification decision wherein plaintiff originally pleaded admiralty and faulty diversity, and was allowed to amend his complaint to cure the diversity flaw on the sensible view that "plaintiff could now bring a new civil jury action based on diversity
jurisdiction, and if plaintiff did so there would appear to be no reason to bar this
new action for !aches."
315. See Mazzella v. Pan Oceanica A/S Panama, 232 F. Supp. 29, 32 (referring
to defendant's argument as "shades of a formalism which we had long thought dead
and interred").
316. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
317. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
318. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917); Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918).
319. See generally, D. Robertson, supra note 40, at 136-47, 185-201. Very recently, in Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973), the
Supreme Court made an important contribution on the question of when state law
features can be applied in a case within the admiralty jurisdiction. In holding that
Florida's statute dealing with oil pollution of territorial waters was constitutional,
Justice Douglas said that the Jensen doctrine-federal supremacy in the maritime
sphere-had given way under the weight of a number of considerations supporting
state law competence. Further, he cast that portion of his opinion in terms of
whether "admiralty jurisdiction" was "exclusive" in these matters. See 411 U.S. at
337-44. But he did not say or imply that the answer to this question, when can state
law apply in a maritime matter, varies according to the court where the question is
asked.
320. See D. ROBERTSON, supra note 40, at 136-283.
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time but local"321 rubric attaches, and these cases, while within the
admiralty, can be determined according to state law principles. 322
However, in no case is choice of forum allowed to influence the
matter. 323 If the case is totally maritime, it is to be governed by the
substantive federal maritime law, whether it has been brought in
admiralty, in state court, or in federal court on diversity grounds. If
the case is maritime but local in its nature, it may be governed by
settled features of the maritime law and borrowed features of state
law, but the federal-state blend is to remain the same regardless of
whether the matter is litigated in admiralty, in state court, or in
federal court on grounds of diversity.a 24
This reverse-Erie posture of maritime choice of law principles is
as well settled as any legal doctrine can be. Yet the competing notion
that in some instances the applicable substantive principles vary according to the forum selected continues to have a powerful and pernicious appeal. It is easy enough to understand why the error persists,
for in a number of contexts courts have occasion to assert tl1at, if a
matter is maritime, one set of principles governs, whereas, if it is not,
another set governs. Any such statement can conveniently and
simplistically be cast in the form: "In admiralty, result A; at law,
result B." A statement in this form is susceptible to the erroneous,
mechanical interpretation that one result is called for in an admiralty court and another in a nonadmiralty court.
321. The genesis of this phrase was apparently Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257
U.S. 233, 242 (1921) (state's wrongful death statute applicable in an admiralty case).
322. See, e.g., Wilburn Boat Co. v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955)
(state law principles govern breach of printed warranties in policy of insurance on
houseboat operating on Lake Texoma, landlocked but touching two states).
323. With a single exception, the Supreme Court has been consistent in insisting
on the correctness of the generalization in the text. In Caldarola v. Eckert, 332 U.S.
155 (1947), Justice Frankfurter rather plainly said that defendant's responsibility for
personal injuries caused by a vessel it was operating under a wartime general agency
agreement depended upon New York law's characterization of the contract because
New York's own "determination is decisive that there is no remedy in its courts for
such a business invitee. . . ." 332 U.S. at 158. There have been a number of attempts to rationalize Caldarola with the doctrine that choice of forum cannot affect
choice of substantive law in maritime cases. See, e.g., D. ROBERTSON, supra note
40, at 242-46. But the case just does not fit. It stands alone.
324. The problem of maritime choice-of-law is clearly and correctly analyzed by
Judge Wright in Oppen v. Aetna Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1973 ), where a
group of pleasure boat owners sought recovery for physical damage and loss of use
of their vessels resulting from the Santa Barbara oil spill. Plaintiffs argued tha:t California law gave them the right to recover for loss of use of their vessels; thus the
jurisdictional and choice-of-law inquiry was crucial. The court saw the inquiry as
bifurcated: (1) Was the case one of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction?- The conclusion was yes. See Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249
(1972). (2) Was California law a partial source of substantive principle in this admiralty case? This question was viewed as close and the answer was "perhaps."
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The possibilities for confusion are illustrated in a recent decision,
Principe Compania Naviera, S.A. v. Board of Commissioners of the
Port of New Orleans. 325 Arguably, the New Orleans dock board had
committed a tort; when sued, it claimed sovereign immunity. The
court disagreed, noting that while there was a wealth of state and
federal cases establishing the board's immunity from tort liability, this
case was in admiralty:
It is well settled that an admiralty court in proper exercise of its jurisdiction does not defer to state law in determining whether a cause
of action cognizable in admiralty can be asserted. . . . To hold otherwise would destroy the uniformity admiralty seeks since admiralty
law would vary according to the often-conflicting laws of the several
states. . . .
It is likewise settled that where an admiralty court has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter, sovereign immunity will not
defeat an otherwise meritorious lawsuit brought against a state agency
for its alleged torts. . , .
In almost all the cases on this subject the Court has found, an admiralty court has never applied state immunity law to defeat an otherwise meritorious cause of action against an agency or political subdivision of the state.
Judge Wright thought that, until recently, there would have been no room for California law in a maritime tort case of this kind. However, he pointed out that the Supreme-Court's decision in Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S.
325 (1973), discussed in note 319 supra, had "broadened the power of the states to
apply their own laws to certain maritime torts occurring within their territorial
waters." 485 F.2d at 253. Ultimately it was not necessary to decide the close question of the appropriate scope for application of California law because of the decision
that neither maritime nor California law would redress the plaintiffs' injuries. 485
F.2d at 259.
_ The important dimension of Oppen is the clarity with which the court's analysis
supports the central point here. Whether a case is admiralty and maritime in nature
is important for two distinct reasons: ( 1) If it is, it is litigable in the federal court
without reference to federal question or diversity grounds. (2) And, if it is, it is
presumptively governed by the substantive federal maritime law (to whatever extent
modified by the admission of limited state-law competence), whatever the court in
which the matter is heard.
See also McCross v. Ratnakar Shipping Co., 265 F. Supp. 827, 830-31 (D. Md.
1967):
Three of the seven cases [before the court in this consolidated proceeding] were
instituted as libels in admiralty. The other four cases are actions on the "law
side" of this Court. This difference is without legal distinction, insofar as the
"substantive" issues common to all seven cases are concerned. "For it is now
clear that the maritime law controls all 'substantive' issues in the disposition of
maritime claims _regardless of the form or forum of suit. . . . This is so
whether . . . [the] suit . . . be treated as a libel in admiralty . . . [or] as an
action on the 'law side' of the federal court . . . or if the suit . . . had been
brought in a state court under the saving clause. Larios v. Victory Carriers,
Inc., 316 F.2d 63, 65 (2d Cir. 1963)."
325. 333 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. La. 1971).
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[T]his Court can find no valid reasons supporting the doctrine
of immunity sufficient to offset the strong reasons . . . for not recognizing the state immunity doctrines in a court of admiralty . . . .326
There are two possible interpretations of the court's remarks: (1)
In a proceeding based on the commission of a maritime tort, brought
against the dock board in a United States district court on the ground
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, there is no sovereign immuniity; (2) In any proceeding in any court against the dock board based
on the commission of a maritime tort, there is no sovereign immunity.
The second statement is correct, but there is no way to discern
whether the judge intended it. As the passage stands "admiralty
court" might refer either to a United States. district court exercising its admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, or to any court exercising jurisdiction over a maritime matter.
The importance of this recurrent and troublesome imprecision is
considerable, for some courts apparently remain unaware of the
reverse-Erie principle. A fairly typical misinterpretation is contained
in a recent Eighth Circuit decision327 involving deaths on navigable
waters within Arkansas. At the time of the decision the law pertaining to deaths in state waters was a blend of admiralty and state
principles. 328 On the issue of whether the trial court applied the
correct principles as to beneficiary status, the court stated:
Had the federal district court been sitting as a diversity court faced
with the problem of choosing which of several competing state laws
should apply, the relevant contacts with . . . Arkansas may have
been sufficient to support a choice of the law of that state. But, a
federal court which sits in admiralty does not sit as a diversity court
and thus in fashioning the full details of this . . . federal cause of
action, it would seem that more consideration must be given to the
problem of which law is to serve as the proper analogue than to a
mere finding of a quota of contacts with a particular state.329
The assertion that a federal court, sitting in diversity, would be bound
by some fairly demanding choice-of-law (state/state) principles,
whereas the same court, sitting in admiralty, was free to concoct a
sensible blend of the available bodies of substantive law, is inconsistent
with both the reverse-Erie thesis and the spirit of the 1966 unification.330
326. 333 F. Supp. at 356-57 & n.10 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
327. Spiller v. Lowe & Associates, Inc., 466 F.2d 903 (8th Cir. 1972).
328. Very recent cases may have made the matter fully maritime. See Sea-Land
Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974); Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.,
398 U.S. 375 (1970).
329. 466 F.2d at 908 n.6 (citations omitted).
330. Other recent decisions have also displayed significant deviations. In Capoz-
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None of the recent articulations of the idea that choice of forum
determines choice of law were particularly costly. In two instances, 881 the mistakes were made by district courts and corrected on
appeal. In other cases, courts arrived at the right answer for the
wrong reasons. 332 However, it is purely fortuitous that no ultimate
injustice was done to the parties by the adoption of this mistaken
view. At worst it can cause injustice; at best it forces costly appeals,
sows confusion, and frustrates legitimate expectations. 833 The survival of a separatist notion concerning the nature of an admiralty
court is at least partially at fault here. If "the admiralty" were
ziello v. Brasileiro, 443 F.2d 1155 (2d Cir. 1971), the trial court concluded that because the matter was in federal court on the basis of diversity, state law controlled
the interpretation of an indemnity contract between shipowner and stevedore. The
Second Circuit corrected the misconception, pointing out that it was of no importance
in the instant case, where the applicable principles of state and maritime law were
equivalent. 443 F.2d at 1157. In King v. Alaska S.S. Co., 431 F.2d 994 (9th Cir.
1970), the trial court held that because plaintiff predicated federal jurisdiction upon
diversity of citizenship in a personal injury action by longshoreman against vessel
owner, the state statute of limitations controlled. However, plaintiff could have leave
to amend and invoke jurisdiction in admiralty, whereupon the doctrine of Inches
would apply. The Ninth Circuit, like the Second Circuit in Capozz.iello, made appropriate corrections. 431 F.2d at 996.
331. See note 330 supra.
332. See, e.g., Spiller v. Lowe & Associates, Inc., 466 F.2d 903 (8th Cir. 1972),
discussed in text at notes 327-30 supra, where the substantive conclusion reached was
correct. The case involved the elements of the federal right for death on territorial
waters created by the Supreme Court in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S.
375 (1970). The court was free to choose among the features of competing state
law as to elements of the new remedy not specified by the Supreme Court, not because it was sitting in "admiralty," but because it was hearing a suit on a maritime
cause of action. A court whose jurisdiction was invoked on grounds of diversity
would have been equally free.
333. All the above decisions, supra notes 330, 332, err in the direction of assuming that plaintiff must be in an admiralty court before he has access to maritime principles. The reverse was argued in an interesting way in McNeil v. A/S Havbor, 339
F. Supp. 1264 (B.D. Pa. 1972). Plaintiff in McNeil contended that a recent Supreme
Court decision, Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202 (1971), making clear
that his case was not within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, meant only that
he was foreclosed from invoking that ground of federal jurisdiction, not that he was
debarred from access to the beneficent principles of the federal maritime law. His
argument was ingenious:
[P]laintiff • • . argues that Law dealt with maritime jurisdiction and did not
limit the application of maritime law. Since this is a diversity case, plaintiff
contends, this court has jurisdiction • • . and must, under Erie • • • apply Pennsylvania law. Plaintiff further argues that the Pennsylvania courts have applied
maritime law in cases involving longshoremen and seamen. In this factual situ·ation, the Pennsylvania courts, it is argued, would apply the general principles
of maritime law • . • •
339 F. Supp. at 1266 (citations omitted). The court disagreed and found it obvious
that the decision in Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202 (1971), completely
removed cases like plaintiff's from the ambit of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.
339 F. Supp. at 1266. The court might have added that Victory Carriers binds the
Pennsylvania courts equally with the federal courts, so that, even giving plaintiff his
Erie route to Pennsylvania law, the federal court would be bound to find against him
when he got there. The Pennsylvania courts, like admiralty courts and diversity
courts, are now foreclosed from treating these cases as maritime cases.
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abolished as a separate heading of federal jurisdiction and merged
into the federal question category, 884 there would be much less occasion for the confusing language typified by Principe. 885
3.

Pre-Judgment Interest in Jones Act Cases

It is well settled that the award of pre-judgment interest under
general maritime law lies within the discretion of the trial judge.886
Under the prevailing view that the availability of pre-judgment interest is a matter of substantive law, 837 the saving clause plaintiff who
would have obtained pre-judgment interest had he brought his case
in admiralty is entitled to the same interest in the nonadmiralty
tribunal. 838
A special problem is presented in cases brought under the Jones
Act, 389 which incorporates for seamen the bundle of rights given
railway workers under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 840 because of a line of cases holding that in PELA litigation there can be
no award of pre-judgment interest. 341 Since the Jones Act incorporates
PELA, one sensible resolution is to hold that the PELA cases disallowing pre-judgment interest override the normal maritime rule and
make such interest unavailable in Jones Act cases as well. This viewpoint prevails in the Sixth Circuit. 342 Another equally tenable ap334. See notes 379-405 infra and accompanying text.
335. 333 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. La. 1971), discussed in text at notes 325-26 supra.
For related confusion in the choice-of-law area, see Hobart v. Sohio Petroleum Co.,
445 F.2d 435 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1971); Leach v. Mon River
Towing, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 637 (W.D. Pa. 1973); Bensen v. Jackson, 238 F. Supp.
309 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
336. See, e.g., Iberia Tankers Co. v. Gates Constr. Corp., 1974 A.M.C. 2186 (2d
Cir. 1974); Dennis v. Central Gulf S.S. Corp., 453 F.2d 137, 141 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972); Complaint of Farrell Lines, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 194,
205 (S.D. Ga. 1975).
337. See, e.g., Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Amirault, 202 F.2d 893, 898 (1st
Cir. 1953); Barton v. Zapata Offshore Co., 397 F. Supp. 778, 780 (E.D. La. 1975).
338. See, e.g., Doucet v. Wheless Drilling Co., 467 F.2d 336. 341 (5th Cir.
1972); Canova v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 301 F. Supp. 738 (E.D. La. 1967),
affd. sub nom. Canova v. Travelers Ins. Co., 406 F.2d 410 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 832 (1969).
339. 46 u.s.c. § 688 (1970).
340. 45 u.s.c. §§ 51-60 (1970).
341. See, e.g., Louisiana & Arkansas Ry. v. Pratt, 142 F.2d 847, 848-49 (5th Cir.
1944); Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R. v. Busby, 41 F.2d 617, 619 (9th Cir. 1930).
The reason for this limitation was not deeply rooted in policy but rather stemmed
from a recognition that since at the time the Federal Employers Liability Act was
enacted interest was not allowable on personal injury claims until damages had been
judicially ascertained, the silence of the Act on the subject of interest was indicative
of a purpose that no interest should be allowed. See Louisiana & Arkansas Ry. v.
Pratt, 142 F.2d 847, 848-49 (5th Cir. 1944 ).
342. See Petition of United States Steel Corp., 436 F.2d 1256, 1279 (6th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 987 (1971); Cleveland Tankers, Inc. v. Tierney, 169
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proach to pre-judgment interest in Jones Act cases is to conclude
that the FELA rule is not deeply rooted in policy,343 and that the
normal maritime rule making pre-judgment interest available should
prevail. This viewpoint obtains in the First Circuit. 344
The Fifth Circuit, however, which hears by far the greatest number of such cases, has developed a hybrid resolution that is highly
offensive to the general policy that choice of forum should not have
substantive law consequences.345 In the Fifth Circuit, as elsewhere, the normal maritime rule providing for pre-judgment interest at the discretion of the trier of fact usually prevails in whatever court the case is heard. 346 The rule applies to suits under direct
action statutes against the liability insurer of a Jones Act employer. 347
The same pre-judgment interest rule obtains in Jones Act cases brought
in admiralty. 348 But in Jones Act cases brought on the "law side,"
pre-judgment interest cannot be awarded. 349 This peculiar and littlenoted posture, which is one of the more indefensible, albeit accidental, effects of separatist thinking, excites controversy, 3 uo makes courts
F.2d 622, u26 (6th Cir. 1948); Bednar v. United States Lines, Inc., 360 F. Supp.
1313, 1318 (N.D. Ohio 1973). Annot., 96 A.L.R.2d 1104, 1112-15 (1964), states
as the general view that there is no pre-judgment interest in any Jones Act case. In
fact, this appears to be the settled view of the Sixth Circuit only. But see Mpiliris
v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 323 F. Supp. 865, 895 (S.D. Tex. 1969): "While the court
recognizes that there is some authority indicating that the court may, in the proper
exercise of its discretion, award pre-judgment interest on wrongful death actions
brought under the Jones Act . . . this authority represents only a minority position.
The court has concluded that, at least in the present case, such pre-judgment interest
should not be allowed."
343. See note 341 supra.
344. See Robinson v. Pocahontas, Inc., 477 F.2d 1048 (1st Cir. 1973).
345. See notes 316-35 supra and accompanying text.
346. See, e.g., Dennis v. Central Gulf S.S. Corp., 453 F.2d 137 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972).
341. See note 336 supra and accompanying text.
348. See, e.g., Brown v. Aggie & Millie, Inc., 485 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1973).
349. See, _e.g., Doucet v. Wheless Drilling Co., 467 F.2d 336, 341 (5th Cir.
1972); Sanford Bros. Boats, Inc. v. Vidrine, 412 F.2d 958, 973 (5th Cir. 1969).
350. In Barrios v. Louisiana Constr. Materials Co., 465 F.2d 1157, 1167 (5th Cir.
1972), the court referred to the plaintiffs' extensive brief on the issue of pre-judgment interest. That brief made a cogent argument for the availability of pre-judgment interest to any Jones Act plaintiff, and especially for the sort of workers who
may have been doubtful as to the likelihood of their achieving seaman status via litigation. A frequent plaintiff, particularly in the Fifth Circuit, is an amphibious employee who may ultimately be deemed to be covered by the Jones Act and other seamen's remedies, or by the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,
or by the state workmen's compensation statute. According to the brief:
When the man is hurt, the employer makes an initial determination as to what
benefits it will voluntarily pay. Here defendant decided to pay state compensation benefits (the lowest of the three possible rates) rather than either of the
other two rates. When a Jones Act suit is filed sometime later, the employer
generally stops paying all disability benefits under any of them. The employer's
reasoning is to the effect that "until the man's status is determined we won't
pay anything", or "since the man claims he is a seaman and we deny it, we can't
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uncomfortable,351 and yet is allowed to exist without plausible explanation. 352
4. Appellate Jurisdiction of Interlocutory Decisions
Section 1292(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code lists four
categories of interlocutory decisions that are appealable as of right. 353
Two of those categories are of special relevance in maritime cases.
Section 1292(a) (3) provides for the appealability of "[i]nterlocutory
decrees . . . determining the rights and liabilities of the parties to
admiralty cases in which appeals from final decrees are allowed." 354
The purpose of that section is well understood: 355 Admiralty
courts traditionally determined liability first and afterwards referred
the parties to a commissioner for the determination of damages. The
major purpose of section 1292(a)(3) is to permit an appeal from the
finding of liability. 356 As was intended, this admiralty peculiarity
survived the 1966 unification.857 It presents no special problems,
pay maintenance or it would be an admission, and we won't pay state or federal
compensation in the meantime because the man isn't asking for it."
Brief for Plaintiff at 17, Barrios v. Louisiana Constr. Materials Co., 465 F.2d 1157
(5th Cir. 1972). In such cases, it would seem that pre-judgment delay amounts to
a real and compensable injury.
351. See, e.g., Thibodeaux v. Rowan Drilling Co., 314 F. Supp. 543; 546 (W.D.
La. 1969), affd. per curiam, 429 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1970).
352. In Barton v. Zapata Offshore Co., 397 F. Supp. 778, 780 (E.D. La. 1975),
Judge Rubin wrote that the reason for denying pre-judgment interest in jury-tried
Jones Act cases might be "that the jury considers the delay in making the award."
That reason, of course, would be equally applicable to maritime cases tried to juries
under the saving clause, in which pre-judgment interest is available. See text at note
338 supra. In Sanford Bros. Boats, Inc. v. Vidrine, 412 F.2d 958 (5th Cir. 1969), the
court wrote that "[t]he reasons for this limitation have ranged from the view that
'unliquidated' claims cannot bear interest to the position that 28 U.S.C.A. § 1961 prohibits prejudgment interest in personal injury claims based upon federal law." 412
F.2d at 972-73 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted). Of course, many other unliquidated maritime claims tried before juries merit pre-judgment interest. See text
at note 338 supra. Further, a Jones Act personal injury clainl tried to a judge alone
is just as unliquidated as the same claim tried to a jury. When pre-judgment interest
in Jones Act cases in admiralty is awarded, it is under the theory that the delay is
a real loss and that the judgment should take it into account in order to afford full
compensation for the entire loss. For a convincing argument that the statute cited
in Sanford Bros. does not in fact speak to the question of pre-judgment interest, see
Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Amirault, 202 F.2d 893, 895 (1st Cir. 1953).
353. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1970).
354. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a){3) (1970).
355. See 9 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ,r 110.19(3), at 209 (2d ed. 1973).
356. Section 1292(a) (3) validates appeals in admiralty cases other than those
where the district court determined liability separately from quantum, whenever the
order goes to the merits. See generally 9 J. MOORE, supra note 355, ,r 110.19(3), at
209.
357. The last sentence of rule 9(h) states: "The reference in Title 28, U.S.C.
1292(a)(3), to admiralty cases shall be construed to mean admiralty and maritime
claims within the meaning of this subdivision (h)." FED. R. CIV. P. 9(h). As originally promulgated, rule 9(h) referred specifically to rule 73(h) in order to preserve
the right of interlocutory appeal in admiralty. When the Federal Rules of Appellate
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except for occasionally requiring an appellate court to conduct an
otherwise unnecessary inquiry into whether an action in federal court
had an admiralty, as opposed to a "law side," basis for jurisdiction. 3M
Considerably more difficulty has been generated by section
1292(a)(l), which provides for the appealability of "interlocutory
orders . . . granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving
injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions . . . ."8119
This provision presents one of those situations where, despite the
1938 merger of law and equity, the federal courts must sometimes
make a law/ equity distinction.360 The necessity arises when a party
seeks appellate review of a district court's ruling on a motion to stay
proceedings in that court. The statute has been interpreted to allow
an appeal of such a ruling only if the action in which the stay was
sought would, prior to 1938, have been an action at law, and if the
stay was sought to permit the prior determination of some matter that
would, prior to 1938, have been heard in equity. 861 The theory is
that prior to 1938 an order staying a proceeding at law in favor of an
equity proceeding would necessarily have been issued by a chancellor;
therefore, the order is thought to be an "injunction," appealable
under the terms of section 1292(a)(l). In contrast, an order staying other matters in favor of a prior determination at law would never
have amounted to an "injunction."862
Courts that heard admiralty cases escaped much of the confusion
generated by 1292(a)(l) by establishing that if the action stayed (or
for which a stay is denied) is in admiralty, the order is not appealable, regardless of whether the action and the matter for which a stay is
Procedure were adopted in 1968, rule 73(h) was abrogated, and the reference to it
was deleted from rule 9(h). To replace that reference, the above-quoted sentence
was added "to make it clear that the right of interlocutory appeal in admiralty continues to exist. Thus, the 1968 changes were entirely formal in nature." 5 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 292, § 1315, at 456 (1969).
358. See Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir.
1968), where the trial court determined that ~e Federal Tort Claims Act, rather than
the Public Vessels Act, was the proper basis of an action by a drydock owner against
the United States based on the negligence of a Coast Guard seaman while the vessel
was in drydock. That determination, while erroneous, would not ordinarily have required scrutiny by the appellate court, since, by whatever route, the trial judge had
ultimately arrived at the correct substantive principles. See 398 F.2d at 168. However, because of the restriction of section 1292(a) (3) to admiralty cases, whether
the trial judge's determination of liability was appealable necessitated inquiry into the
correct basis for jurisdiction below. 398 F.2d at 169.
359. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(l) (1970).
360. See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 292, at § 1045.
361. See Jackson Brewing Co. v. Clarke, 303 F.2d 844, 845 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 891 (1962); C. WRIGHT, supra note 110, at§ 102.
362. The rule is confusing and troublesome and most of the literature has thus
been critical. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, supra note 110, § 102, at 461.
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sought are "legal" or "equitable" in nature. 863 Nevertheless, partly
due to the above-described ru1e, with its underlying concept of a
law/ equity dichotomy, admiralty courts have encountered difficu1ties
even after the 1966 unification. The most obvious anomaly is
created by the very notion of separatism that characterizes admiralty: The appealability of interloctuory stays or refusals to
stay in maritime cases depends upon whether the plaintiff designated
this action as an admiralty and maritime claim under federal ru1e
9(h). If a rule 9(h) designation is made, the stay (usually sought so
that arbitration may proceed) will not be appealable; if the designation is not made, appeal may be taken.
Penoro v. Rederi A/B Disa3 64 is the leading case pertaining to
section 1292(a)(l) appeals in maritime matters. An injured longshoreman had filed suit against a shipowner, and the shipowner had
impleaded the stevedoring contractor. The stevedore, contending
that it had the dual status of stevedore and charterer and that a
charter party provided for arbitration of the dispute, moved for a stay
of the third-party action pending arbitration. The trial court granted
the stay, and the appellate court held the order nonappealable because
"[o]rders by courts in admiralty granting or denying stays of proceedings before them have been spared the confusion . . . . Such
orders have consistently been held not to be injunctions within the
meaning of § 1292(a)(l) even if based on equitable defenses or
counterclaims."365 The third-party plaintiff contended that the 1966
merger of the admiralty and civil rules forced admiralty courts to
confront the "fictitious injunction" confusion of the civil jurisprudence, further theorizing that post-unification admiralty actions are
to be treated as actions at law and that an order staying an action
at law, pending arbitration, is appealable. The appellate court rejected this argument. Noting that the matter of interlocutory appeals under section 1292(a) (1) is not explicitly considered in rule
9(h), the court concluded that the 1966 draftsmen had demonstrated
no intention to alter 1292(a)(l) in any way. Indeed, said the court,
the continued existence of the "fictitious injunction" question in the
post-1938 jurisprudence shows that "separate 'sides'" of the district
court may survive unification for purposes of 1292(a)(l). "Since a
court in admiralty had the power to stay its own proceedings without
363. See Penoro v. Rederi A/B Disa, 376 F.2d 125 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 852 (1967). See also C. WRIGHT, supra note 110, § 102, at 461 n.29.
364. 376 F.2d 125 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 852 (1967) (Black and Douglas, JJ., dissenting from the denial of certiorari).
365. 376 F.2d at 129.
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the aid of equity prior to unification, there is no reason to believe that
it somehow lost that power as a result of unification."366
·
Although the Second Circuit in Penoro evidently approved the
difference between interlocutory appeal rules for admiralty and civil
actions, the Fourth Circuit has deplored the distinction, while still
feeling compelled to maintain it. In J.M. Huber & Co. v. M/V
Plym, 867 a shipper sued a carrier in admiralty for cargo damage, and
the carrier moved to stay proceedings pending arbitration. The trial
court's denial of the motion was held not appealable, in line with the
court's interpretation that "if the underlying action is in equity or
admiralty the fictional 'injunction' is lacking . . . ." 868 However,
the court of appeals expressed its impatience with the restriction,
stating: "Were the decisional slate clean we would have no hesitancy
in discarding this fictional distinction and upholding appealability .
"369

The consistent application of the rule that stay orders of admiralty
proceedings are not appealable should not be taken to indicate that
1292(a)(l) problems cannot continue to arise in maritime litigation.
In La Capria v. Compagnie Maritime Belge,370 the defendant argued
that a district judge's order, permitting a longshoreman-plaintiff to add
a rule 9(h) designation to his personal injury suit commenced on the
basis of diversity, had, in effect, allowed a "transfer" to admiralty and
therefore was appealable under 1292(a)(l) as an order enjoining
further proceedings on the law side of court. Writing for the Second
Circuit, Judge Friendly deemed this argument nonsense: "[l]t is
the plaintiff who no longer wishes to proceed at law; to envision the
chancellor contemplating an injunction to require a plaintiff to keep
on proceeding at law despite the plaintiff's desire to shift to admiralty
in order to avoid jurisdictional doubts would carry the 'element of
366. 376 F.2d at 130-31. As well it might, the Penoro decision has served as
ammunition in arguments that the merger could hardly be expected to work a full
unification of the federal district courts. Writing in 1967, one commentator predicted: "I believe traditional admiralty procedure will continue to wait, in the wings,
like an old actor awaiting his cue. Some indication of admiralty's persistence may
be gathered from . . . Penoro . . • . Perhaps it is appropriate to postulate the potential survivability of the 'separate sides.'" Cohn, supra note 13, at 231.
When the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Penoro, Justices Black and Douglas
expressed dismay: "An order should be appealable within the meaning of this statute
[§ 1292(a)(l)] if in substantial effect it is equivalent to an injunction • . . . I
think the time has come to abandon this outmoded fiction about 'sides' of the court •
. . . Since the stay entered in this case was an injunction in every practical sense
I would hold that it was an injunction in the statutory sense and allow the present
appeal." 389 U.S. at 853-54.
367. 468 F.2d 166 (4th Cir. 1972).
368. 468 F.2d at 167.
369. 468 F.2d at 167.
370. 373 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1967).
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fiction' . . beyond permissible bounds." 371 Judge Friendly added
a muted plea for reason in treatment of the admiralty/ civil
dichotomy: "Prior criticism of the conceptualism of insistence on
the two-sidedness of a single court . . . gains added force from the
recent amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to include
admiralty cases. " 372
IV.

A

COUNTER-SEPARATIST PROPOSAL

We no longer need separate admiralty courts. The sole responsible protest to the 1966. unification arose from the fear that the end of
procedural separation would inevitably lead to the destruction of the
conception of maritime law as a distinct body of substantive principles. 373 But that argument rests on the dubious premise that a
federal district judge becomes sensitive to the niceties of maritime law
and the exigencies of marine commerce only through the magic of
symbolism. Many members of the federal judiciary are expert in
maritime matters, partly as a result of the concentration of maritime
cases in nineteen United States district courts. 374 However, as many
of the cases discussed above show, the expertise is spotty. In most
instances, procedural separateness seems to obfuscate rather than to
promote understanding of uniquely admiralty considerations.375 The
371. 373 F.2d at 581.
372. 373 F.2d at 581.
373. Our mythical separate court of admiralty, which did not [prior to the
1966 merger] admit the joinder of non-maritime causes of action and did not purport to offer equitable remedies, was well situated to apply the law of the sea.
It looked to its own clearly· marked precedents to identify and to develop that
law. It looked also to foreign law for information and authority on occasion.
The successor to the court of admiralty, the United States District Court having
jurisdiction impartially of actions in admiralty, in equity, and at law, and bound
to accept complaints joining maritime and non-maritime claims, may find it increasingly difficult to administer one rule of contract law applying to a charterparty and another rule applying to a car rental agreement, or one rule of tort
law applying to a ship collision and another rule applying to a collision between
two automobiles, or one rule applying to a hull insurance policy and another
rule applying to a standard fire policy.
Crutcher, supra note 13, at 376-77. See also Wiswall, supra note 12, at 46-47.
374. "Out of the 6020 admiralty cases commenced or pending as of June 30,
1960, 5655 were in these 19 districts." 1960 Dm. ADMIN. OFFICE, U.S. COURTS
ANN. REP., Table C-3a, at 240-47. 1960 was the last year separate admiralty statistics were kept. See Comment, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 594, supra note 108, at 605 n.57.
See also Fiddler, supra note 13, at 16-17.
375. In the words of the Advisory Committee, proposing the 1966 merger:
To the extent that admiralty procedure differs from civil procedure, it is a mystery to most trial and appellate judges, and to the nonspecialist lawyer who finds
himself-sometimes to his surprise-involved in a case cognizable only on the
admiralty "side" of the court. "Admiralty practice," said Mr. Justice Jackson,
"is a unique system of substantive law and procedure with which members of
this Court are singularly deficient in experience." Black Diamond S.S. Corp.
v. Stewart & Sons, 336 U.S. 386, 403, 69 S. Ct. {;22, 93 L. Ed. 754 (1949) (dissenting opinion). The comment applies generally to all levels of the judiciary,
The distinctiveness of substantive maritime law is a matter beyond the com-
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mystery engendered by separatism makes the nonspecialist judge and
attorney even more likely to err. 376 Since the unification, the silver
oar has come to be not so much an awesome symbol of a genuinely
specialist tribunal as an unfortunate and anachronistic signal of the
"usual tendency of a particularistic, restrictive approach to procedure
to drive out the more liberal view-the Gresham's law of procedure
whereby the technical gloss supersedes the . . . liberalizing principle."377
The 1966 merger of the admiralty and civil rules was accomplished with the belief that "simplification through unification has
been the path of procedural progress since the codes of the midnineteenth century." 378 The task begun with that merger should be
completed. A useful starting point would be legislation modelled
after the proposed Federal Court Jurisdiction Act. 379 The admiralty
provisions in the proposal should be deleted as separate sections and
rewritten into the federal question jurisdiction proposals as follows: 380
§ 1311

Federal, question jurisdiction; original jurisdiction;
exclusive jurisdiction

(a) Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the district courts shall have original jurisdiction, without regard to amount
in controversy,381 of all civil actions, including those for declaratory
or equitable382 relief, in which the initial pleading sets forth a substantial claim:
petence of this Committee, even if we were disposed to concern ourselves with
it; indeed, it is probably too much to hope that we can ever be spared the necessity of more or less recondite bodies of substantive law, whether they relate
to maritime affairs, or patents, or copyrights, or combinations in restraint of
trade. It is multiplying the burden of the bench and bar, however, to require
mastery of unnecessarily distinctive systems of practice and procedure.
ADVISORY COMMI1TEE ON ADMIRALTY RULES, AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF CIVJL
PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS PROPOSED BY THE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON ADMIRALTY RULES, 34 F.R.D. 331, 333-34 (1964) (emphasis added),
376. See Romero v. Bethlehem Steel Corp,, 515 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1975), discussed in text at notes 8-11 supra.
377. Cohn, supra note 13, at 232, quoting Clark, State Law in Federal Courts,
55 YALE L.J. 267 (1946).
378. Currie, supra note 13, at 14.
379. See notes 33-43 supra and accompanying text. In the following discussion,
the proposed Federal Court Jurisdiction Act of 1973 is taken as the beginning model.
See S. 1876, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973 ).
380. The following is evidently quite similar to a suggestion made by Leaven•
worth Colby, Admiralty Advisor to the American Law Institute, during the Institute's
deliberations on the 1969 jurisdictional recommendations. See note 45 supra.
381. The Federal Court Jurisdiction Act followed the recommendation of the
American Law Institute in removing the amount in controversy requirement for all
federal questions cases. While the proposal should be adopted, it is obviously not
essential to integrating admiralty cases into the general federal question jurisdiction,
since no monetary jurisdictional requirement has ever existed in admiralty.
382. Adding the words "or equitable" to the proposal is probably unnecessary, but
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arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States;
(2) arising out of any admiralty or maritime matter, transaction,
or occurrence.383
(b) The jurisdiction of the district courts shall be exclusive of the
courts of the States in actions and proceedings under Title 11 except
(1 )

it seems desirable to provide explicitly against any continuation of the doubt about
the equitable arsenal of a court exercising maritime jurisdiction. See notes 104-07
supra and accompanying text.
383. New subsection (2) simply lifts the proposal's section 1311 into the basic
federal question grant. See S. 1876, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 1311, 1316 (1973 ).
The proposal suggested here does not include the fairly extensive language that appeared in the Federal Court Jurisdiction Act attempting to clarify some of the contours of the body of cases that involve "admiralty or maritime matter[s], transaction[s], or occurrence[s]." S. 1876, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 1316 (1973). If that kind
of clarification is still deemed desirable, all of the language of the proposed section
1316 in the Senate bill could be written into section 1311. While the decision whether
to include all of that language is not central to the thesis here, it seems useful to point
out reasons for believing it unnecessary. The SUpreme Court has been quite active in
the maritime sphere since the ALi's recommendations were formulated. Each of the
decisions rendered during the intervening period has clarified an aspect of the maritime
law, and most of them operate toward clarification of the boundaries of the admiralty
jurisdiction. Significantly, with the exception of Moragne v. States Marine Lines,
Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970), each important step taken since 1969 has been restrictive.
We have been taught since 1969 that (1) Fixed offshore drilling platforms are islands, not watercraft, and are to be treated almost as though they were real land,
Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & SUr. Co., 395 U.S. 352 (1969). See also Chevron Oil Co.
v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971); (2) The pre-1972 Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act meant what it said when it limited its coverage to "navigable
waters," and injuries on a pier are outside that coverage, Nacirema Operating Co.
v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212 (1969). This outcome has been changed by the 1972
amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, Act of
October 27, 1972, P.L. 92-576, § 19, 86 Stat. 1263, amending 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950
(1970), approved October 27, 1972, effective November 27, 1972; (3) Longshoremen
(and probably seamen) do not recover on the basis of breach of the warranty of
seaworthiness when their injury stems from an instantaneous act of negligence; unseaworthiness depends on the existence of a condition over some period of time, Usner
v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494 (1971); (4) A longshoreman hurt on
a pier by pier-based equipment is a terrestrial tort victim, unable to enter the portals
of the admiralty jurisdiction and the maritime law, Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404
U.S. 202 (1971). This outcome has perhaps been changed by the 1972 amendments
to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, supra; (5) The fact
that an injury or accident occurred on navigable water by itself is not enough to
invoke the admiralty jurisdiction, when aircraft are involved, and probably more generally. See Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
It seems fairly obvious that a jurisprudential trend toward clarification and restriction of the admiralty jurisdiction is under way; that is the sense in which the lower
courts have been applying the SUpreme Court decisions. In the Executive I et case,
the Court said admiralty cognizance of aircraft crashes depended upon some "significant relationship to traditional maritime activity." 409 U.S. at 271. The tenor
of the opinion suggested that the "significant maritime relationship" requirement
probably should obtain respecting all questions of admiralty tort jurisdiction, and that
is the way the lower courts have been reading Executive let. See St. Hilaire Moye
v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 973 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 884 (1974); In re
Motor Ship Pac. Carrier, 489- F.2d 152 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 931
(1974); Onley v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 488 F.2d 758 (4th Cir. 1973);
Oppen v. Aetna Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1973); Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d
520 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974); Crosson v. Vance, 484 F.2d
840 (4th Cir. 1973),
.
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as otherwise there provided; in actions under the patent or copyright
law of the United States; in actions under the antitrust laws authorized by section 15 or 26 of title 15; in ·actions on bonds of contractors
for public buildings or works authorized by section 270b of title 40;
and in actions brought under section 185 of title 46 for limitation of
liability, admiralty and maritime actions brought against the United
States and its agencies, and in all admiralty and maritime actions
that proceed in rem or by maritime attacbment.384 In all other
actions within subsection (a) of this section, jurisdicition of the
district courts shall be concurrent with the courts of the States.
This suggestion accomplishes my basic aim, integration of the
admiralty into the federal question jurisdiction. Other admiralty
proposals in the federal court jurisdiction acts dealt with removal, 385 process and venue, 386 and jury trial. 387 The removal recommendation mirrored the prevailing view of existing law in one respect,
by disallowing removal of in personam actions unless there is a
federal jurisdictional basis other than admiralty,388 and deviated from
it in another, by providing for removal of exclusively admiralty actions
mistakenly brought in state court. Under my proposed integration of
the admiralty jurisdictional grant into the federal question section, no
separate provision for admiralty removal would be necessary. The
proposed change, removal of exclusively admiralty cases, would follow from the general federal question removal section;389 moreover,
once admiralty is made a subcategory of federal question jurisdiction,
· there will no longer be a plausible argument for prohibiting removal
of concurrent jurisdiction admiralty cases. With respect to venue and
process, the peculiarly admiralty proposals presented in section 1318
of the federal court jurisdiction acts could, in a purely mechanical
fashion, be added as separate subsections to the provisions of the
general federal question venue and process section.300
The effect of the proposed blending of the admiralty into the
federal question jurisdiction upon the availability of jyry trial in
maritime cases should not be left to judicial inference. An appropriate resolution of the jury trial matter was contained in the proposed
Federal Court Jurisdiction Act, which provided that in any case of
384. What is proposed here is that the Senate bill's provisions on admiralty
jurisdiction, S. 1876, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 1316(b) (1973), be added, verbatim,
to the exclusive jurisdiction portion of the federal question proposal, id.§ 1311.
385. S. 1876, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1317 (1973 ).
386. Id. § 1318.
387. Id. § 1319.
388. See ALI STuov, supra note 23, at 239-45. But see Monarch Indus. Corp.
v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 276 F. Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
389. See S. 1876, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 1312 (1973).
390. See id. §§ 1314, 1318.
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admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, "except for actions for limitation
of liability under section 185 of title 46, United States Code, and
actions against the United States and its agencies, any claim in
personam limited to money damages for personal injuries or death
shall be tried by a jury if any party demands it." 391 The question
may arise of how best to integrate this proposal into the Judicial
Code. A convenient place for such an insertion may be found in 28
U.S.C. § 1873,392 which presently provides a limited right to jury trial
for maritime claims relating to matters occurring on the Great Lakes.
Although usually viewed as an anachronism reminiscent of a peculiar
period in the nineteenth-century development of American admiralty
jurisdiction,393 the statute could easily accommodate a new subsection
that would incorporate the present jury trial recommendation.394
This proposal to integrate the admiralty with the federal question
jurisdiction would necessitate modest amendment of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Admiralty cases under the proposed section 1311 (a) ( 2) 395 would continue to be "admiralty and maritime
claims" 396 within the meaning of rule 9(h). A plaintiff with admiralty as his only federal jurisdictional basis would continue to be a
maritime plaintiff under that rule; a plaintiff with an additional basis
for federal jurisdiction would still be permitted the choice of proceeding on the basis of maritime jurisdiction. In either case, the proce391. Id. § 1319.
392. The statute presently reads:
In any case of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction relating to any matter of
contract or tort arising upon or concerning any vessel of twenty tons or upward,
enrolled and licensed for the coasting trade, and employed in the business of
commerce and navigation between places in different states upon the lakes and
navigable waters connecting said lakes, the trial of all issues of fact shall be by
jury if either party demands it.
28 U.S.C. § 1873 (1970). I am indebted to Leavenworth Colby, Admiralty Adviser
to the American Law Institute, for the idea of using this statute as a vehicle for the
new jury trial provision. See note 45 supra.
393. See N. HEALY & B. CURRIE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADMIRALTY 27-30
(1965).
394. The statute would then read:
(a) In any case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, except for actions for
limitation of liability under section 185 of title 46, United States Code, and actions against the United States and its agencies, any claim in personam limited
to money damages for personal injuries or death shall be tried by a jury if any
party demands it. (b) In any case of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction relating to any matter of contract or tort arising upon or concerning any vessel of
twenty tons or upward, enrolled and licensed for the coasting trade, and employed in the business of commerce and navigation between places in different
states upon the lakes and navigable waters connecting said lakes, the trial of all
issues of fact shall be by jury if either party demands it.
It may be that the Great Lakes jury provision ought to be changed or abolished, but
this is not the place to argue that matter.
395. See text at note 383 supra.
396. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(h).
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dural consequences specified in rule 9(h) would survive. However, if
all the present recommendations were adopted, the second sentence of
rule 82 and the reference thereto in rule 9(h) would be deleted. 807
Further, while not essential, the following revision of rule 38(e) 808
would clarify matters:
Admiralty and Maritime Claims
An admiralty or maritime claim within the meaning of Rule 9 (h)
shall be governed by the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 1873. In
respects not covered by that statute, these rules shall not be construed to create a right to trial by jury of the issues in an admiralty
or maritime claim within the meaning of Rule 9 (h).
( e)

After these changes in the rules, several special procedures for admiralty and maritime claims under rule 9 (h) will still exist: thirdparty practice under rule 14(c) ;399 interlocutory appeals under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3);400 trial by judge alone, except as provided in
the amended28 U.S.C. § 1873.401
The proposed integration of the admiralty and the federal question jurisdictions would not affect the source of substantive law in
maritime cases. As stressed above, 402 that law is presumptively
federal. The task of determining when and to what extent state
principles should apply is a preeminently judicial one, and is "among
the most difficult and subtle that . . . courts are called upon to
make." 403 These necessary choice-of-law determinations under my
proposal would be neither easier nor more difficult than at present,
although I believe some of the mistakes discussed earlier in this
article404 would be somewhat more difficult to commit. The inclusion of the words "or maritime" in the suggested incorporation of
397. That sentence reads: "An admiralty or maritime claim within the meaning
of Rule 9(h) shall not be treated as a civil action for the purposes of Title 28, U.S.C.
§§ 1391-93." FED. R. CIV. P. 82. Under the recommendation to write the proposals
of the federal court jurisdiction acts on admiralty venue and process into the general federal question venue and process sections, the caveat would no longer be neces•
sary. See text at note 390 supra.
398. Rule 38(e) now states: "These rules shall not be construed to create a right
to trial by jury of the issues in an admiralty or maritime claim within the meaning
of Rule 9(h)." FED. R. Crv. P. 38(e). Since the present recommendation would
entail amending 28 U.S.C. § 1873 to make specific provision for jury trial on some
admiralty and maritime cases, see notes 391-94 supra and accompanying text, rule
38(e)'s disclaimer of any effect of the rules themselves on jury trial could stand.
See note 261 supra.
399. See notes 141-46 supra and accompanying text.
400. See notes 353-58 supra and accompanying text.
401. See notes 390-94, 398 supra and accompanying text.
402. See notes 316-35 supra and accompanying text.
403. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 375 (1959),
404. See notes 316-35 supra and accompanying text.
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admiralty into the federal question jurisdiction405 is intended to make
clear that this delicate choice-of-law balance would be unaffected.
The proposal to make admiralty and maritime cases a subcategory
of federal question cases closely approaches the result rejected by the
Supreme Court in Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co.406
In that case, the Supreme Court was asked to conclude that the terms
of the present federal question statute407 were broad enough to accommodate cases arising under the general maritime law. 408 A fivemember majority refused to do so, reasoning that the words of the
present federal question grant trace to the Judiciary Act of 1875,
which directly tracks the language of Article ID, section 2, clause 1,
of the Constitution; similarly, the co-equal admiralty grant traces
back to the language of Article ID. There was thus every indication
that Congress, like the Framers, meant to distinguish cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction from those arising under federal laws.
Nothing in the Romero opinion even remotely suggests that it is
beyond the power of Congress to integrate the federal question and
admiralty jurisdictions. Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion does
stress that Article ID of the Constitution plainly erects federal ques-tion cases as one category of judicial power, and admiralty and
maritime cases as another. He was impressed with the fact that "in
dealing with a subject as technical as the jurisdiction of the courts, the
Framers, predominately lawyers, used precise, differentiating, and not
redundant language."409 But this distinction in the Constitution
militates only against interpreting a statutory scheme based on the·
words of the Constitution as somehow blurring the distinction; it does
not erect a constitutional bar to an alternative statutory rendering.
Justice Frankfurter explicitly addressed this issue: "It is a statute,
405. See note 383 supra and accompanying text.
406. 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
407. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970): "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value
of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws,
or treaties of the United States."
408. The Supreme Court was being urged to hold that cases arising under the general maritime law also arise under federal law in the sense necessary to sustain federal question jurisdiction. This proposition was put forth as an answer to the problem
of trying the typical three-pronged seaman's personal injury action. The Jones Act
gives such a plaintiff access to the "law side" of the federal court and to a jury; naturally, there was pressure also to take the maintenance and cure and unseaworthiness
claims that typically accompany a Jones Act claim to the jury. Plaintiffs in Romero
urged that the maintenance and cure and unseaworthiness claims arose under federal
law, so that all three claims could be tried to the jury. The Court rejected that argument, but did hold that the two general maritime law claims could be heard in the
federal district court, law side, as pendent to the Jones Act claim. See notes 115,
231-39 supra and accompanying text.
409. 358 U.S. at 364.
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not a Constitution, we are expounding. Of course the many limitations which have been placed on jurisdiction under section 1331 are
not limitations on the constitutional power of Congress to confer
jurisdiction in the federal courts."410
Nor does Romero offer any argument against the wisdom of integrating the jurisdictional grants in the wake of the 1966 merger.
Indeed, Justice Frankfurter indicated that the Court could have read
the present federal question grant to include maritime cases if sound
reasons for policy had dictated such a reading: "Of course if compelling reasons can be found for redefining the statute, if an ancient
error cries out for rectification, we should not be deterred from
applying new illuminations to the interpretation of past enactments."411 The failure of the Romero majority in 1959 to find
reasons sufficient to support what it considered a strained interpretation of section 1331 hardly constitutes an argument against present
legislative action to complete the unification project begun ten years
, ago.412
The motivation for this article is a self-described generalist bias
against unnecessary separatism, esoterism, and specialization. It
seems obvious that few of the effects of civil/ admiralty conceptualism detailed in section ill of this paper should have survived the
1966 merger of the admiralty with the civil rules. Yet as Professor
Brainerd Currie pointed out in his analysis of the Romero case, there
is something "seductive [about the] influence of thinking in dichotomous terms of the admiralty and civil jurisdictions. " 418 Six years
later, writing about the imminent merger of the civil and admiralty
rules, Currie was forgivably exultant: "One may understand and
respect the preference of the admiralty bar for a separate set of rules;
yet I must say that, given the demonstration of the extent to which
uniformity is feasible, unification seems compelled by the logic of
history." 414 The exultation was premature. As I sought to demon410. 358 U.S. at 379 & n.51.
411. 358 U.S. at 380.
412. The commentary inspired by Romero was generally favorable to the resolution reached by the majority. See CUrrie, supra note 235; Kurland, supra note 235.
But nothing therein is pertinent as an argument against the proposal to combine the
admiralty and the federal question jurisdictions by amendment to the Judicial Code.
Indeed, the best-known commentary, CUrrie, supra note 235, is at bottom a diatribe
against precisely the kind of separatism being decried here. In Professor CUrrie's
view, the problem that gave rise to the issue in Romero was itself a product of artificial separatist thinking about the nature of the admiralty jurisdiction.
413. CUrrie, supra note 235, at 14.
414. CUrrie, supra note 13, at 13. Professor CUrrie's firm convictions against
separatism have been well known and sometimes deplored. One commentator stated:
[I1he protective feature of the General Rules-the forced awareness that Admiralty was "different"-was ignored by many who propounded unification, and
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strate in this article,· civil/ admiralty separatism is still very much with
us. It is time to take aim once again at the goal of unification, so that
it may yet be possible accurately to state: "We now have one form
of civil action. Libels, .libelants, respondents, exceptions, petitions
and monitions have met the fate of the Dodo bird, and maybe even
proctors are going the way of the duck billed platypus."415
the cloaking of the substance of Admiralty law in quaint antique terminologies
was scoffed at by many others as a pseudo-mystery by which the proctors, as
the only initiates, snobbishly contrived to set themselv~s above and apart from
the Bench and their brothers at the Bar. It cannot tarnish the valuable contributions to the literature of Admiralty by the late Professor Brainerd Currie • . •
to cite his single-minded zeal for reform and his widely-held view that while Admiralty had become a relatively unimportant area of the law, and the unification
about to take place ·was not an event comparable with the 1938 merger of Law
and Equity, it was still a necessary duty to ring out the old, ring in the new,
and welcome Admiralty to the dynamic twentieth century Law and Equity Club
on an equal footing ..
Wiswall, supra note 12, at 47.
·
415. Bradley, supra note 13, at 260. Genuine specialists in maritime law will
not fear the unfrocking. As pointed out shortly after unification: "We do not think
that specialization in admiralty practice will be affected by the unification of the
rules. . . . [S]pecialization is not primarily a matter of procedure, but a matter of
substantive law and know-how in the field of specialization." Tweedt, supra note
13, at 237.

ANNOUNCEMENT OF AWARDS AND PRIZES
JASON L. HONIGMAN AWARD FOR 1975-1976
This award has been given to Charlotte Crane, Elizabeth Goddard Gentry and
Andrew H. Marks in recognition of their outstanding contribution as editors of the
Michigan Law Review.
HOWARD B. COBLEN1Z PRIZE FOR 1975-1976
This priz.e has been awarded to Yvonne S. Quinn and Lyman Franklin Spitzer
in recognition of their contribution as Associate Editors of the Michigan Law Review.
ABRAM N. SEMPLINER MEMORIAL AWARD FOR 1976-1977
This award has been given to Robert H. Gorlin, Editor-in-Chief of Volume 75
of the Michigan Law Review, in recognition of his superior scholastic record, effective leadership, and outstanding contribution to the Review.
BODMAN-LONGLEY AWARD FOR 1976-1977
This award has been given to William L Cathey, Robert H. Jerry II, and Steven
P. McDonald in recognition of their superior scholastic records and their contribution
to the Michigan Law Review in their junior year.
RAYMOND K. DYKEMA AWARD FOR 1976-1977
This award has been given to Bruce A. Featherstone and Daniel K. Tarullo for
significant contribution to the Michigan Law Review during their junior year and in
recognition of qualifications that indicate the likelihood of future contributions to the
legal profession.

